

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ANNIVERSARY
1941 - 1991

Daily Report

Soviet Union

FBIS-SOV-91-023
Monday
4 February 1991

Daily Report
Soviet Union

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Military Analyst Views Revised SDI Program

LD0102195591 Moscow TASS in English 1922 GMT 1 Feb 91

[By TASS military analyst Vladimir Chernyshev]

[Text] Moscow February 1 TASS—President George Bush in his State of the Union address said he had issued instructions to have the SDI programme re-orientated so that it could ensure protection against limited nuclear strikes no matter what direction they may come from.

The new anti-missile defence concept, according to THE NEW YORK TIMES, envisages the deployment of about 1,000 land-based and 1,000 space-based interceptor missiles. The previous, brilliant Pebbles programme envisaged the deployment of about 2,000 land-based and 4,612 space-based interceptor missiles.

The U.S. Administration is clearly reluctant to give up its Strategic Defence Initiative and is only willing to reduce its scale and cost step-by-step. This despite the fact that even the full-scale Star-Wars system, according to most experts, could hardly deter a massive nuclear strike. Many American specialists were openly doubtful about the space shield technical feasibility.

The Pentagon, of course, cannot ignore these arguments, but its utmost desire is to preserve the SDI programme. By changing the structure of a future anti-ballistic missile [ABM] system, the U.S. Defence Ministry seeks to make it more attractive for legislators and the general public. The same aim is served by plans to cut SDI spending. The updated variant of the global protection system is expected to cost an estimated $30 billion instead of $60 billion originally earmarked for the first phase of the original variant.

The improvement of Soviet-American relations is often named as one of the reasons behind the rejection of the full-scale SDI plan. This being so, the question immediately arises: Is the ABM system a necessity, even in its curtailed form? According to Henry Cooper, head of the SDI implementation organisation, this system can ensure protection against about 100 warheads. This is clearly insufficient to ward off or even to considerably decrease the effect of a massive strike. On the other hand, this cumbersome land- and space-based system is not needed to deflect missiles launched by misadventure or without sanction or to protect the country against a Saddam Husayn.

Is spending $30 billion worthwhile in such a case? What political or military logic prompts such plans?

Now the final point. The creation of an anti-ballistic missile system, even in its curtailed form, is bound to undermine the Soviet-U.S. ABM Treaty, which bans the development, testing and deployment of space-based ABM systems or their components.

In addition, according to this treaty and the protocol to it, the sides pledged to deploy land-based anti-missile systems within the boundaries of only one region. Is it wise, now that cooperative relations are taking shape between the Soviet Union and the United States, to discard the ABM Treaty which provides the basis for the process of strategic arms limitation and reduction?

Foreign Ministry's Churkin Holds Briefing 1 Feb

Denies Baltics-Gulf Link

LD0102175691 Moscow TASS in English 1717 GMT 1 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondents Yuriy Rublevskiy and Sergey Ryabikin]

[Text] Moscow February 1 TASS—A Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman today denied a statement by an "anonymous U.S. official" that during recent Washington talks between the Soviet foreign minister and the U.S. secretary of state they struck some deal.

The official claimed that the United States agreed to soften its position on the Baltics in exchange for the Soviet Union's support for the United States on the Gulf.

"There is not and cannot be any relation between the situation in the Gulf and the Baltics. I am empowered to say that there was no such deal, and the issue has not been raised or discussed in such a way," Churkin said.

Additional supplies of U.S. weapons to the Salvadoran Army is a "new negative element impeding agreements" at talks between the Salvadoran Government and rebels, Churkin said.

The U.S. Administration's statements that Salvadoran rebels recently received movable anti-aircraft missile complexes from Nicaragua, cannot be considered a justification, Churkin said.

Churkin pointed out that the Nicaraguan Government and the Salvadoran Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front have agreed that Salvadoran rebels will return missiles and launchers to Nicaragua.

Churkin said "differences between the Soviet Union and the United States on the Gulf are out of the question". Such a position is expressed in the joint statement signed by the Soviet foreign minister and the U.S. Secretary of State in Washington.

"We would like a ceasefire in the Gulf," Churkin said, but U.N. Security Council resolutions should be implemented first and Iraq should withdraw from Kuwait.

The Soviet Union is taking into account the position of the Palestine Liberation Organisation with respect to the Gulf crisis and maintains contacts with it. The war has not changed the Soviet Union's approach to the need to resolve the Palestinian problem and settle the Arab-Israeli conflict, Churkin said.

Rumors on Linkage Eyed

LD0102161991 Moscow TASS in English 1548 GMT 1 Feb 91

[By TASS World Service commentator Aleksandr Kanishchev]

[Text] Moscow February 1 TASS—In spite of the Soviet-U.S. joint statement explaining the reasons for the postponement of the summit, some circles in this country and abroad continue discussing rumours that events in the Baltics were the main reason for the decision.

The situation in the region causes serious concern in the West. Sometimes its reaction is extremely emotional. Of course, if the situation in the Baltics further deteriorates and dramatic events happen there, the Baltic issue could impede the normal development of Soviet-U.S. relations.

Circumstances oblige us to exert every effort to evade dramatic results. But to say that the Baltic issue suspended the Soviet-U.S. dialogue and forced to postpone the Moscow summit between Presidents Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush would be at least an exaggeration. The Gulf war caused suspension of the scheduled summit.

If it were not for the war, the United States would attend the summit, White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater said on Tuesday.

The issue was already raised during the Malta summit. There were questions why the United States came to Malta, in spite of the Lithuanian problem. The U.S. President believes that meeting President Gorbachev face to face could help resolve all such problems, Fitzwater said.

Certainly, the crisis launched by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait has already drawn into its nets one of the superpowers and many countries in the Middle East, Europe and other regions. Because of Baghdad's aggressive intractability and dangerous military provocations going beyond the borders of the conflict, the war can grow into a regional confrontation.

For many years, we have spoken about the danger of local conflicts becoming global. I believe such a danger is nearer now than any time in the past 40 to 50 years.

This is a war with unpredictable consequences for everybody. A recent consultative meeting of the foreign ministers of the Rio de Janeiro group indirectly proved this. The ministers discussed possible consequences of the Gulf crisis for Latin America, although it is thousands [of] kilometers away from the Middle East. Is this not a warning for the whole world?

There is no doubt that the Gulf war is a vitally important problem for mankind and the main international political issue today. No matter how bitter it is for Moscow and Washington to realise it, even the Soviet-U.S. dialogue, about which we have been speaking over recent years as a decisive factor or world politics, disarmament and international problems have moved to the background, screened by the Gulf war.

In such conditions, holding a Soviet-U.S. summit would mean artificially shifting international focus, like trying to turn back rivers.

Cites U.S. Arms to El Salvador

LD0102163391 Moscow TASS in English 1550 GMT 1 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondents Yuriy Rublevskiy and Sergey Ryabikin]

[Text] Moscow February 1 TASS—Additional supplies of U.S. weapons to the Salvadoran Army is a "new negative element impeding agreements" at talks between the Salvadoran Government and rebels, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Vitaliy Churkin told a briefing here today.

Such a move by the U.S. Administration contradicts the decisions taken during recent meetings by the presidents of Central American countries, who favoured demilitarising the region, Churkin said.

The U.S. Administration's statements that Salvadoran rebels recently received movable anti-aircraft missile complexes from Nicaragua, cannot be considered a justification, Churkin said.

Churkin pointed out that the Nicaraguan Government and the Salvadoran Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front have agreed that Salvadoran rebels will return missiles and launchers to Nicaragua.

Churkin said he hoped that Washington will refrain from actions fraught with real or potential dangers of worsening the armed conflict in El Salvador and impeding a political settlement.

International Observers Roundtable Meets 3 Feb

LD0302211191

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1230 GMT on 3 February broadcasts the 30-minute "International Observers at the Roundtable" program moderated by Vladimir Georgiyevich Pasko, All-Union Radio foreign political commentator, with participants Vitaliy Yakovlevich Chukseyev, TASS chief foreign editor and collegium member, and Vsevolod Ivanovich Sovva, USSR Foreign Ministry Information Directorate deputy head.

Pasko begins by saying that six months ago, no one could have predicted the upshot of Iraq's accusation that Kuwait was stealing its oil. He says that the war threatens to spread, is affecting many states, and its consequences are unknown. Chukseyev remarks that the war has brought many surprises, and gives factual details. Sovva notes that CNN and other television coverage underplays the horror.

Pasko then asks if this can be regarded as a regional conflict, when the U.S. Air Force is using the United Kingdom, Diego Garcia, and the Philippines. It is a major international conflict, he says.

Chukseyev says that truth is the first casualty, that it is not just a matter of military secrets: a pyschological war is being waged. He says: "Judge for yourselves: to say now that the sides have lost only a few dozen men, after the aircraft of the multinational forces have carried out dozens of combat missions, is to present a picture that does not accord at all with reality. Some experts, American ones included, are now giving figures of thousands and tens of thousands of people, and moreover, among the civilian population."

Pasko notes that the Red Cross is preparing tents for nearly a million Iraqi refugees.

Chukseyev then asserts that the notion of "surgical strikes" is a myth—Saddam is not Iraq. "This man has committed a crime for which he will, no doubt, answer to history," he says—the media are mainly showing the electronic weapons, not the people.

Pasko then says that the war may spread: Turkey, Algeria, and Tunisia could be drawn in. The economic and ecological consequences must be considered, he says.

Chukseyev notes that U.S. Vice President Quayle has said that nuclear weapons could be used against Iraq. Saddam's threat to use unconventional weapons is barbaric, he adds. Pasko remarks that President Bush has said that the United States will not use unconventional weapons—Quayle is not the President. But extremism among politicians is dangerous, he says.

Sovva then recalls the Soviet-U.S. declaration that everything must be done to avert escalation. The war could get out of hand and "prompt the taking of measures that would demand political solutions," he says: "The consequences of the war—any consequences, the most horrible—can only be overcome by collective reason." Collective efforts are needed to combat the pollution of the environment, he says, and quotes White House figures on the huge economic cost of the war. Alan Greenspan in THE NEW YORK TIMES warns of a possible slump in the United States if the war lasts more than three months, he says.

Pasko then remarks on unprecendented anti-war demontrations in the United States, FRG, and Japan. The Soviet-U.S. declaration is widely supported, he says: "Many politicians" are asking how far the war has been justified, and Soviet listeners have been posing the same question. Bessmertnykh has said the conflict is a blow to civilized behavior, he notes.

Sovva remarks that "a full-blooded peacemaking process in the Middle East and around the Middle East is possible," and that diplomatic efforts continue.

Chukseyev then says the declaration says the allies do not want to destroy Iraq, but some Western statements arouse fears that the aims could be extended. John Major said in THE TIMES last week that when it is over, Britain will probably patrol the region, and that military operations could continue even after the Iraqis leave Kuwait, he says.

Pasko then says: "Vitaliy Yakovlevich, I would like to separate two things here: Where the USSR and the United States have a similarity of positions, and where they disagree in relation to what is taking place in the Persian Gulf. First, I would like to speak on the similarity of positions.

"I would like to now continue one of the statements the USSR foreign minister made in Washington. I think it is of principle importance in understanding our position. The USSR and the United States are acting together, in accordance with the resolution of un security council, said the minister—The United States is undertaking the difficult and important part of implementing the resolution of the UN Security Council. The United States is receiving moral and other support in its actions because they are directed at banishing the aggressor from the country it has occupied; this task is our mutual aim, and we will apply all our efforts to its fulfillment.

"But the coincidence of positions does not exclude worries with regard to the possible development of the conflict. I had the chance of seeing our foreign minister off to Washington. He also made a statement there for the press. He said, in particular, that keeping in line with the resolution of the Security Council, we should see to it that the actions that are taking place in this zone do not go beyond the limits set by the resolution.

"It looks as if this idea was expressed in a rather clearcut way in Washington, and Washington responded to this anxiety, actually, by the joint statement that you, Vitaliy Yakovlevich, have just mentioned, and by President Bush's statement on the state of the country. He considered it necessary to repeat, in the statement, that the United States does not want to destroy Iraq, its culture, or its people, and that U.S. forces will not remain in the zone a day more than is necessary to carry out their mission."

Sovva says: "Vladimir Georgiyevich, there are—and we have already touched upon this today—many aspects to this conflict. All these actions are of course taking place under the flag of the United Nations. This is happening for the first time—for real—as it should be done within the framework of the multinational forces, in order to repel aggression. "But let us admit that many things are having yet to be done for the first time. They have not been worked out within the framework of the United Nations, though this organization has existed for many years. I have been asked: where is the Military Staff Committee? It was spoken of, and consultations were held. It is this working body within the Security Council that should analyze the military actions: whether they are within the limits of the mandate, or have gone beyond."

Chukseyev remarks: "By the way, the press had almost even stopped writing about it."

Sovva says: "It looks as if, without pretending to be original, we are the first to speak about this committee for the last two weeks. Second, the interests of the military pacts clash. The Warsaw Pact still exists—though it looks likely that these are the last weeks of its existence. But NATO stills exists, with its own structures, and Brusseis is frantically discussing the influence of this conflict on NATO. Moreover, Turkey has been already been drawn into these actions, having allowed U.S. planes to use a base for air strikes on Iraq. This may lead to retaliatory measures.

"What should NATO do, if it is asked in Brussels? That is, there are many military and political aspects that are not regulated from one center. Yes, there is the Soviet-U.S. statement. It acts as a, so to speak, guideline. But many aspects do not meet this guideline, and do not lead to the full peace process that should come into being."

Pasko then says there is no hope at present of stopping the war, but we can try to establish lasting peace in the region once it is over. The United States and the Soviet Union agree on the need for "effective structures of security," he says, but an arms race in the region would be dangerous. Pasko says that "the declaration reflects, in my view, more differences in the approaches of the USSR and the United States on this problem than agreement. The United States, for example—even judging by the statement of President Bush, already quoted—intends to remain in the Middle East indefinitely after the end of the war. After all, the formula about not staying any longer than necessary is pretty vague with reference to time."

Sovva then quotes the BOSTON GLOBE on the need for an extended U.S. military presence.

Pasko replies: "The very posing of the question of a possible prolongation of the U.S. military presence cannot be a stabilizing factor. It is quite clear that the Arabs will protest strongly against the U.S. presence. They are already doing so. Divergences between the Soviet Union and the United States remain in their approaches to an Arab-Israeli settlement. While we advocate calling on international peace conference on the Middle East, under United Nations aegis, the United States prefers bilateral accords between Israel and the Arab countries." Yet the joint declaration is very important, he concludes.

Sovva says that an arms race in the Middle East could only increase the threat of violence and terrorism. A traditional "pax Americana" using gunboat diplomacy is not the answer, he says—the diplomatic efforts are promising.

Pasko remarks that if any politicians are against a negotiated settlement, they are keeping a low profile. He quotes Yugoslav Foreign Minister Loncar on the UN collective security system and on the need to eliminate first the cause of the conflict—the occupation of Kuwait. On this, most members of the world community are in agreement, he says.

IZVESTIYA Reports Ignatenko 29 Jan Briefing

PM0102163991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 Jan 91 Union Edition p 1

[Report by G. Alimov: "V. Ignatenko: A Serious and Confidential Discussion in Washington"]

[Text] Vitaliy Ignatenko, director of the USSR President's press service, held a routine briefing for Soviet and foreign correspondents 29 January which touched on the broadest range of questions—from the Persian Gulf to the USSR's domestic problems. Of course, the correspondents were primarily interested in the results of the meetings between the USSR foreign minister and the U.S. Secretary of State.

Results of the Washington Talks

As is well known, the U.S. President's visit to Moscow planned for 11 February has been postponed and will be held later in the first half of this year. Recalling the reasons for the postponement of the summit, the director of the USSR president's press service announced that the two presidents will decide the precise dates of this visit.

It was also announced that the talks between the USSR foreign minister and the U.S. leader covered a very broad range of questions. Sufficient time was allotted to the Baltic question. Answering the question of why the two countries' foreign ministers spent five hours discussing the Soviet Union's internal affairs, Vitaliy Ignatenko replied that the very posing of the question stems from the old logic and vocabulary. In his opinion, we are now entitled to discuss a whole range of questions and there is nothing surprising in that. This is all right and proper, he noted, we value the relations established with the leaders of the United States and therefore a sincere, earnest, and confidential discussion should take place covering all questions. The briefing director voiced satisfaction at the fact that just such a discussion took place and this "can only please us."

"Understanding one another correctly is a fine art," Vitaliy Ignatenko stated. "That art was demonstrated in this situation and, it seems to us, we were equal to the task. The times have reaffirmed that the accumulated potential in relations between the two countries and the unprecedented trust and mutual understanding characteristic of our contacts are very difficult to undermine.

Has the USSR's Stance on the Persian Gulf Crisis Changed?

Judging by the replies of the president's official representative, there have been no changes. Journalists were told, during his visit A.A. Bessmertnykh conveyed to U.S. leaders a whole series of our concerns over the development of situations [as published] in the Persian Gulf.

"Every war has its own logic," Vitaliy Ignatenko said, "and it is very important it should not prevail over political logic or extend military actions beyond the framework of the aims set by the UN Security Council resolutions."

The leader of the briefing added: There is a keen wish that the multinational forces should not inflict unwarranted casualties on the civilian population and that there be no intention to destroy Iraq and take it out of political circulation. It is very important, the presidential press service leader stressed, that the war itself should not cause irreparable harm to the moral and ethical values in whose name the world community agreed to the use of armed force. But we want to see the clear implementation of the Security Council resolution.

Is the Baltic 'To Blame' for the Postponement of the Summit?

In one form or another this question cropped up during the briefing. People wanted to know what effect the Baltic crisis has had on the postponement of G. Bush's visit.

"As you know, the official announcement on the reasons for the postponement make no mention of the Baltic," Vitaliy Ignatenko noted. "The reasons are indicated there and we cannot wonder about what other possible catalysts there may be."

"Does this mean that President Bush is not very concerned about the situation in the Baltic," was the next question.

"President Gorbachev is well aware of President Bush's concern. It was also expressed in a personal letter which the U.S. President sent to Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. That concern is evident there," the leader of the briefing replied.

Continuing this discussion, he said that the situation in the Baltic today is a subject of great concern for our president and for all who cherish the ideals of perestroyka, glasnost, and democracy. Journalists were informed that the USSR president is in almost daily contact with the main players in the republics, for example, Latvia and Estonia.

"Our president has agreed on very important matters with some of them," the president's representative stated. In any event there are agreements that the most objectionable and anticonstitutional laws which have been adopted in Estonia and Latvia will quite possibly be revoked. The most major changes have been noted in those republics. As for Lithuania, the process there is slow but we believe that it, too, will develop in a positive direction.

It is important to understand, he went on, that in our turbulent and contradictory processes everything has become interlinked—the economy, politics, ethnic relations, personal ambitions, even chance circumstance. But our aims are clear. For the first time our country is trying to move toward democracy and democratic ideals without the division into "white" and "red," "blue" and "green," "red cavalrymen and white cossacks."

Have We Sold the Kuril Islands to Japan?

Vitaliy Ignatenko repudiated the POSTFAKTUM agency's report that a secret document on the transfer to Japan of the four islands in question had been signed or agreed during the Japanese premier's recent visit to Moscow. Or that Japan has responded by promising to invest at least $200 billion in the Soviet economy.

"That comment has nothing to do with the real state of affairs," the leader of the president's press service stated. "No secret documents were agreed or signed with the Japanese side during Japanese Foreign Minister T. Nakayama's recent official visit to Moscow. Consequently all the other so-called facts and figures cited in the agency's report are pure fabrication."

Since the discussion has turned to the recent talks in Moscow with the Japanese foreign minister, he said. I want to remind you that during them the sides discussed the most difficult question of the elaboration of a peace treaty—the territorial question. Our side noted here that this is a most complex and delicate problem which also affects the Soviet people's national and patriotic feelings. We urged our Japanese colleagues to consider all aspects of this problem, its historical and contemporary context, and the Japanese and Soviet aspects. How all these factors are to be combined should be the subject of talks and searching and we do not lack the good will. But the search will be successful if it guided by a balance of interests.

Our side also said that we do not consider it possible to resolve this question in just a few months and one or two visits. At the same time, we do not intend to put the peace treaty talks process on ice or put a brake on it.

Is the Kremlin Following the Series on the Boeing 747 Mystery?

That question, from a Mexican TV correspondent, was answered like this: IZVESTIYA's investigative series has had a perceptible response both at home and abroad. In Vitaliy Ignatenko's opinion, this is quite justified and, if you will, legitimate for the following reasons.

First, like it or not, this item is evidence of the continuation of the president's main line in domestic and foreign policy and of the course toward openness and cooperation on all problems regardless of the complexity or the sensitivty of their public perception in the recent past. That is why, as is well known, during South Korean president No Tae-u's recent official visit to the USSR, apologies over the tragedy seven years ago were made on the USSR Foreign Minister's behalf to his colleague.

Second, I want to remind you that last December four prominent U.S. Senators sent M.S. Gorbachev a letter asking him to help clarify the circumstances of the destruction of the South Korean airliner. I think that the newspaper's investigation will be a major contribution to this process.

We expect that with the participation of all the interested parties, all the circumstances of this tragic incident will be completely cleared up, he stressed.

CPSU International Policy Commission Meets

LD0202025391 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1927 GMT 1 Feb 91

[Text] Moscow, 1 Feb (TASS)—Concern with the war in the Persian Gulf region, which endangers lives of Iraqi and Kuwaiti civilians, and with grave ecological consequences was expressed at a sitting of the permanent CPSU Central Committee Commission on International Policy which took place here today. It was stressed that persistent efforts within the UN framework aimed at cease-fire and a transfer of the settlement of the confict—brought about by the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait—into a political channel are necessary.

While examining relations between the Soviet Union and East European countries, participants of the sitting noted the importance of elaborating a long-term concept of cooperation orientated at the universally recognized norms of international law, interests of good-neighbourliness, equality, and mutual benefit which takes into account positive traditions in relations between our peoples. The significance of reaching mutual understanding with Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland on property aspects of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from these countries was pointed out.

Members of the commission exchanged opinions on the state of and prospects for interparty contacts. Satisfaction was expressed with regard to the progress in cooperation between the CPSU and the Communist Party of China.

Responses to USSR Problems Noted, Weighed

PM0302192391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Feb 91 First Edition p 5

[Unattributed commentary under the rubric: "Editorial Comment": "What Language Should Be Used?"]

[Text] For three weeks now, or more precisely since the tragic events in Lithuania, the debate on the subject of what language should be used in the future to communicate with the Soviets, and whether there is any need to continue to actively support President Gorbachev—who has supposedly veered to the right, giving way to pressure from the army, the conservatives, and the KGB—is not abating in the West.

Despite the difficulties which our country has run into at the beginning of the new year, we are adhering to the chosen course both in domestic and foreign policy. This has been clearly expressed in the president's recent statement. Therefore the language used to communicate with us must be the same as that which has established itself in practice since 1985—the language of trust and mutual respect, the language of understanding of our situation and our problems in the shape in which they exist, rather than from the viewpoint of academic knowledge of the problems of democracy.

The language of ultimatums, threats, and arrogant patronization is not the most suitable. Especially following the end of the "cold war" and of the Paris conference of heads of state and government where accords were reached to safeguard human rights, rather then just assure them of profound respect. Of course, the Paris Charter for the future Europe and its entire humanist purport in no way condone position-of-strength attitudes and the discussion of problems in the style of ultimatums, and that applies to "Baltic" problems, too.

The Soviet Union remains a great state, despite the desire of certain politicians (including politicians in our country) to reduce it to a second-rate power. The Soviet Union must not be cut off from the world community—this thought resounds in the Western press. In actual fact, how could a country be isolated which was by no means in the backwaters of history during its most difficult hour, when the world drew back from the abyss of a nuclear catastrophe, when a universal human approach to the solution of complex problems was proclaimed, and when the new thinking emerged.

It has been claimed in the West that the USSR is reverting to dictatorship and repressions, as if we could not wait to return to what we are trying to get away from, recalling with anger and condemnation the cataclysms we have been through. There is no way back. But there must be order in the country. Deliberations about allegedly "Stalinist tactics," about what measures should be adopted against Moscow, and individual expressions of regret "regarding the indecision of the United States and certain Western countries" are nothing but a call to return to the "cold war" and to sow discord between the two powers. This must not be encouraged.

Perestroyka is an internal phenomenon. But as fate would have it, perestroyka has met with the broadest international response, it has found application in practical deeds, and—most importantly—it has been accepted by the people of the planet as a symbol and hope for a new world order under which there will be no wars or atrocities.

The processes evoked by perestroyka both in our own house and in the world arena have gathered momentum and have acquired a new quality today—they have become irreversible. There are two roads into the 21st century—either to advance along the highway along which the community is traveling today, or to slide back in the opposite direction. There is no other option.

It has to be noted that, despite certain predictions, the West has displayed sufficient prudence and restraint. The politicians of a whole series of countries have weathered the first and most powerful onslaught of opponents who are advocating that Moscow be punished without delay. The motive for their behavior has not been the war in the Persian Gulf. The reason has been that the whole world needs perestroyka. To punish the USSR would mean to write off perestroyka and the support for it; it would mean leaving without support Soviet people who are accomplishing an experiment on an unprecedented scale. Let us be frank, we need this support.

Giving up what has been achieved is both easy and hard. It is hard if we recall how difficult it was for both the West and the East to meet each other halfway.

United States & Canada

Reports on Bessmertnykh's U.S. Visit Continue

Summit's Delay Questioned

PM0102115191 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Feb 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA observer Manki Ponomarev under the rubric "The World Today: Problems and Opinions": "Concern"]

[Text] Despite the upbeat tone of the statement by our Foreign Minister A. Bessmertnykh to the effect that he was in no way disappointed about the decision to postpone the Soviet-U.S. summit, I and, clearly, very many others were disappointed and distressed. Such a meeting might well have played a big role in the very difficult conditions that have taken shape in the world. It would have allowed a comparison of views of the present-day situation, which is determined to a significant extent by the war in the Persian Gulf, and it would have made it possible to clarify relations between the Soviet and U.S. leaderships, which are beset by a number of circumstances, particularly the events in the Baltic region, and to solve major problems on the path to disarmament. What we have now is a postponement. A postponement not for days or weeks, but for months.

One feels distressed at the thought that throughout the history of Soviet-U.S. relations a summit has been postponed only once. That was in 1960, when on the eve of the meeting, which was due to take place in Paris, President Eisenhower sanctioned the U-2 spy flight over Soviet territory. The aircraft was shot down in the vicinity of Sverdlovsk, its pilot, Powers, fell into our hands, and the meeting was off. There followed a lengthy stage of not just cooler relations, but a sharp deterioration in relations between the USSR and the United States.

On this occasion, though, it all looks different. Relations between our countries have developed mightily over recent years. They have become more stable and a certain level of mutual understanding has been reached—a quite high level, in fact. Suddenly we have this decision: a long-planned meeting postponed. Serious reasons are given, it is true. "Because of the war in the Persian Gulf," the joint announcement says, "President G. Bush has to be in Washington. Moreover, work on the treaty on stategic offensive armaments (the treaty was supposed to be signed in Moscow—M. Ponomarev) will need some more time."

In all conscience I must say that these explanations do not appear entirely convincing. Yes indeed, President Bush, as head of executive power in Washington and commander in chief of the Armed Forces, is extremely busy because of the war in the Persian Gulf—after all, U.S. forces form the basis of the multinational forces operating against Iraq. But President Roosevelt was just as busy during World War II, when the United States was waging combat actions simultaneously on many fronts in Europe, Africa, and the Pacific. But he was able to meet with the USSR Council of Ministers chairman on two occasions—in Tehran in 1943 and in Yalta in 1945. In fact, he was a very sick man when he flew to Yalta and died soon after. At that time, however, the United States needed the Soviet Union to be able to unite efforts to rout the axis powers and determine the foundations of the postwar structure of the world.

At a time when the United States is waging battles only in a limited theater of hostilities and when means of communication and transport are vastly superior to those of 50 years ago, it is not possible to leave Washington for two to three days? This makes no sense, somehow.

To say that the treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive armaments is not ready makes no sense either. In fact, it has been worked on for eight years already, and as has been reported more than once, it was completed a long time ago. It is an enormously complex document, of course, but all the fundamental problems have now been solved—and the USSR and the United States are agreed on this. Only a few technical details remain.

Remember that such details were left until the last minute both in the case of the elaboration of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Armements and in the case if the elaboration of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. The state and government heads assembled in Paris last November, while in Vienna delegations from 22 countries were still feverishly polishing up the wording of the treaty and the addenda to it. But they met the deadline. I have no doubt that the Soviet and U.S. delegations in Geneva would have met the deadline, too, if they had been set that political task and a rigid timeframe.

So how does one view the reasons that have been given for the postponement of the summit? Is there something else behind them?

Journalists in Washington were insistent, I would even say importunate in pressing J. Baker and A. Bessmertnykh to admit that the events in the Baltic area were the main reason for the postponement of the summit. Both foreign policy department leaders totally rejected these attempts and stressed that the reasons for the postponement were clearly defined in the joint announcement, which must be read as it is written, and not between the lines. But, judging by the world press' reaction, they did not convince everyone.

In my view, the sides have nothing to hide. Their relations have become intimate and allow for a frank discussion of the most acute issues. They exist. Moreover, some of them have generated mutual concern. I believe I am not mistaken when I say that this word was a key one during the talks in Washington. The Soviet Union is concerned, for example, about the danger that could be posed by the logic of war in the Persian Gulf, if it overpowers the logic of politics and gets out of control.

The UN Security Council made a clear decision—the annexation of Kuwait is unacceptable, it must be freed. That is the mandate of the multinational force—no more than that. Yet on the other side of the Atlantic there have been calls, even issuing from the mouths of official representatives, for the destruction of Iraq's military industrial potential and its elimination as a real political force in the region. The President is under pressure from a considerable section of the public, which is demanding that the war be fought until S. Husayn's regime is finally destroyed.

Once it seemed that Bush was about to yield to this pressure. Now one hears from Washington his very clear words to the effect that the United States and the multinational force it heads "are not seeking to destroy Iraq." "We have a feeling of respect for the Iraqi people," G. Bush said. "We do not want to destabilize the country to the extent that Iraq itself becomes a victim of aggression."

If that policy is actually implemented, the Soviet Union's concern might in large measure disappear. The USSR has ideas geared to ending the bloodshed and the destruction of Iraq's material base and the environment in the zone of hostilities. These ideas were expounded in Washington. They were reflected in the Soviet-U.S. joint statement on the Persian Gulf. It not only expressed a mutual resolve to regulate the crisis in the region, but also contained a call for a peaceful solution of the entire Near East conflict and the Palestinian problem.

In turn, the United States expressed during the talks serious concern at the development of events in the Soviet Union, above all in the Baltic area. A great deal of time was spent discussing these problems. A. Bessmertnykh gave a detailed rundown of the complex processes in our country and talked about the efforts the USSR president is making to solve the questions that arise by means of dialogue in the interests of renewing Soviet society and by means of perestroyka.

By and large, in connection with this and a number of other issues, it should be noted that the United States and other Western countries are reacting in a purely emotional way and tend to make snap judgments. This is scarcely the basis on which to build reliable mutual relations, and this was firmly stated in Washington.

Indeed, the shaping of new relations between the two great powers is no simple matter. There are opponents of their further improvement in our country, too, but they are very active and energetic in the United States. Suffice it to recall a number of U.S. Congress resolutions urging the President to consider the question of economic sanctions against the USSR in view of the events in the Baltic area. Bush has to deal with these sentiments, of course and in this sense his concern is understandable. It must not be forgotten, however, that all this is the USSR's domestic business and outside interference in it is impermissible.

But there is the clear conclusion that despite the acute problems that are occurring, the positive development of Soviet-U.S. relations remains a matter of prime importance.

Statement 'Repercussions' Eyed

PM0102124591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Feb 91 Second Edition p 6

[Report by correspondent V. Gan: "Backpedaling?"]

[Text] Washington, 31 Jan—The Soviet-American joint statement on the Persian Gulf conflict, made by USSR Foreign Minister A.A. Bessmertnykh and U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker, has had unexpected repercussions here. White House and State Department spokesmen essentially spent the whole of today... playing down the document's significance.

In terms that resembled a repudiation of his own secretary of state, President Bush was at pains to stress that the declared policy in the Gulf region remains unchanged. Even State Department spokeswoman M. Tutwiler spoke in the following terms at a news conference: "To be honest, everyone was surprised" by this statement. Other administration aides were dismayed, saying that the statement contained "infelicitous words," which had not been given top-level approval in advance and could inadvertently "promise more than one would like."

What is going on, then? Why has the administration decided to backtrack, although only yesterday the Soviet-American joint document had rightly been given the highest possible rating?

One of the main reasons given here for this unusual turnabout is the extremely strong reaction to the statement on the part of Israel, which immediately accused Washington of adopting a "new policy" on the Israeli-Palestinian issue, without consulting Tel Aviv. Let me remind you that in the joint documents the USSR and the United States announced that the cessation of armed action in the Persian Gulf would be possible if Iraq were to give a clear commitment to get out Kuwait, backed up by immediate concrete moves.

It was noted that special importance would attach to the elimination of the causes of instability and the sources of conflicts, including the Arab-Israeli conflict. It was stressed that the elimination of the sources of conflicts and instability in the region is impossible without a full-blown peace process contributing to a just peace, security, and genuine reconciliation between Israel, the Arab states, and the Palestinians. The belief was expressed that the surmounting of the crisis in the Persian Gulf would considerably facilitate, and make it possible to step up, joint efforts by the USSR and the United States in contact with the other sides in the region, with the aim of contributing to peace between the Arabs and Israel and to regional stability.

To all appearances, Tel Aviv sees "linkage" between the settlement of the Near East conflict and the cessation of the Gulf war as an allusion to the need to convene an international conference, which is opposed by the Israeli Government. In turn, Washington is very conscious of the mood in Israel and is seeking to restrain the Israelis from visiting "retribution" on Baghdad for the Iraqi missile raids. It could result in the collapse of the anti-Iraq coalition.

Communist Officials Question U.S. Aims in Gulf

LD0102144191 Moscow World Service in English 1400 GMT 1 Feb 91

[Text] Soviet Communist Party officials have warned the United States not to surpass the UN mandate to liberate Kuwait. Aleksandr Dzasokhov, the party's ideology chief [title as received] and member of the national legislature's Foreign Affairs Committee called on the leadership of the United States to take more necessary measures to end the bloodshed and promote a cease-fire.

His statement echoed a joint U.S.-Soviet communique issued this week, saying that a cease-fire would be possible if Iraqi President Husayn undertook a commitment to withdraw from Kuwait.

The 500-member Central Committee approved a statement on Thursday urging the U.S. Government to limit its objectives in the Gulf war. Soviet officials have expressed concern that U.S.-led forces plan to destroy Iraq's economic and military potential rather than just drive its troops from Kuwait.

Valentin Falin, chief of the party's International Department, said that the Iraqi people should not be punished for a policy they did not choose.

Military Official Views START Treaty Issues

LD0302142791 Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 3 Feb 91

[Statement by Radio Moscow military affairs observer Colonel Vadim Solovyev—recorded; Solovyev's comments are in Russian with superimposed translation into English]

[Text] According to our estimates, the treaty on strategic offensive arms is ready by 98 percent. The issues of principle have been settled. Seven years after the treaty is signed the two sides will have much smaller potentials of strategic nuclear missiles, to be reduced by about one-third. The Soviet Union will have to cut back a larger amount of such armaments. Accordingly, the likelihood of a nuclear conflict will be reduced.

Now what will the delegations in Geneva be working on during the remaining time? What do the two percent of the issues' required accord yet stand for? [sentence as heard] Mainly, these are some aspects of verification of action on the future treaty. Besides using national technical means for the purpose, which was agreed upon earlier in the treaty to reduce medium and shorter-range missiles, the new treaty should provide for a great number of notifications, one-time inspections and inspections on a permanent basis. At the moment the related procedures are being coordinated in detail. For example, under the agreement the number of mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles is not limited. Restrictions concern only the number of nuclear warheads for these missiles, 1,100 for each side. For this reason there should be special verification of their manufacture and storage.

There is an accord of principle that in the two arsenals each side will deploy permanent inspection posts. But how will these posts function? That is the question still being discussed. There is another verification method: getting telemetric data from aboard rockets. Roughly speaking the data are necessary to differentiate between combat launches of missiles and test and training launches. An accord has been reached to ban any actions that block getting such data, including coding the data and jamming. At the moment the two delegations are pondering on how to realize this provision in practice.

Also ahead is the final editing of the treaty text to rule out any possible inaccuracies. But the text is 500 pages long. At a meeting in Washington between the Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh and the United States Secretary of State James Baker, confidence was voiced that the agreement may be ready for signing as early as this month. In the opinion of the Soviet military, this time is quite realistic.

Commentator Views Soviet-U.S. Relations

LD3001150791 Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 30 Jan 91

[Commentary by Mikhail Mayorov]

[Text] [Announcer] In the last few hours there have been fewer news agencies' reports about a cool-off in Soviet-American relations. Although the summit has been postponed for a later date, commentaries by the sides, above all the American, show no crisis of trust in relations between Moscow and Washington. Some reflections on this score by Mikhail Mayorov:

Do we not see too primitively such a complex process, filled with natural contradictions, as Soviet-American rapprochement? Do we not simplify the situation by believing that the stereotypes built up for decades can be done away with for ever just within years? Then this process is under way in the rather alarming international situation. Who knows how extremely dangerous developments in the Persian Gulf can be in early February, when the Moscow summit was initially planned to be held?

If not for the war we would go to the meeting, the U.S. President's press secretary Marlin Fitzwater has said at a briefing in the White House. It is been alleged that one of the reasons for the postponement of the summit are events in the Baltics. Our goal is to provide assistance to the Baltic nations in carrying out their aspirations rather than in punishing the Soviet Union, President Bush said in his State of the Union address to the Congress on Tuesday. Before that, the Secretary of State James Baker denied the linkage between the Baltic factor and the decision to put off the summit.

Even if we risk to assume that there is some connection, this least of all means punishing Moscow, as is borne out by what Mr. Bush said, but the desire to give his Soviet opposite number more room for action, refrain from burdening him with other commitments at a time when the hard search for a settlement in the Baltics by political means is underway.

There is every indication that both Mr. Bush and Mr. Gorbachev need time for various matters, including time needed for experts of the two countries to be able to agree on the little that is left to complete the draft on a strategic arms accord.

But let us allow ourselves to theoretize [as heard] further on along these lines. If Mr. Bush and Mr. Gorbachev decide to give each other a pause for urgent matters, this least of all means shutting the door with a bang. In a broader sense, this reaffirms the mutual understanding the two men have established in the last few years. All the more so since Mr. Bush declared in his State of the Union address, that he wants to continue building a basis for a long-term cooperation between the USA and the USSR, for the sake of a peaceful future for all humanity.

Since the United States and the USSR have such an intention there is no doubt that the top level meetings in Malta, Washington, and Helsinki will be extended to a new Soviet-American summit in Moscow in the first half of this year.

Northeast Asia

Reports Continue on Alleged Kurils Agreement

Reports Labeled 'Provocation'

LD0102201191 Moscow TASS in English 1927 GMT 1 Feb 91

[By TASS political observer Yuriy Vorobyevskiy]

[Text] Moscow February 1 TASS—TASS subscribers know already about an official denial by the Soviet president's press service of a statement of Artem Tarasov, a businessman. He asserted that Gorbachev had concluded a "secret deal" with the Japanese Government envisaging the giving over to Japan of four of the Kuril Islands for $200 billion. The press service described this invention as a "political provocation".

It is noteworthy that Tarasov, deputy to the Russian legislature, came up with his invention at the time when the Soviet public is worried about a suspicious deal—the selling abroad of 140 billion roubles. In this case the deal can be proved by documents signed, among others, by the deputy prime minister of the Russian Federation.

In the second case, Tarasov's statement is nothing but words. This is an obvious attempt to distract public attention from the scandal with the selling of roubles to some mysterious foreign firm.

The report of the president's press service says that Gorbachev intends to remit the case on false charges against him to corresponding judicial authorities, if Tarasov does not apologise publicly for deliberately circulating slanderous inventions. Unfortunately, no apologies came in the morning of February 1.

Tarasov only said that he is subject to all kinds of oppression, and this is true to some extent. Tarasov working in the cooperative sector has been nervous of late. One of the reasons for it is the presidential decree on measures to promote the struggle against economic sabotage and other economic crimes. It even seems to him that he is being kept under continuous observation.

This is presented as a "threat to democracy". According to the POSTFAKTUM news agency, Tarasov sent a special message to Russian Prime Minister Ivan Silayev. He believes that a secret protocol has been signed already, which envisages the transfer of the Kuril Islands during Gorbachev's visit to Japan scheduled for next April. According to Tarasov, the Japanese side will put forward the following terms in this or that form: "the suppression of the democratic movement", "strict punishment for the violation of labour discipline", the elimination of Soviet market structures, joint ventures and their investments to suppress potential rivals.

In view of the forthcoming visit, these "sensational" statements are actually aimed at undermining the normalisation of Soviet-Japanese relations.

Seen as 'Political Agitation'

OW0202100491 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1200 GMT 1 Feb 91

[Commentary by Radio Moscow commentator Pogodin]

[Text] As reported in the news program, there are rumors alleging that the Soviet Union has concluded an agreement to hand over four islands of the Kuril Islands for $200 billion. There were questions on such rumors even from some of the participants in a meeting of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum yesterday. These recent rumors have their root in one (Saratov), a businessman of a Soviet cooperative. A spokesman for the Soviet president has denied these rumors. Please listen to the comments of Radio Moscow commentator Pogodin in this regard:

It is only natural that speculations of this type, regardless of whether they are put out in Japan, the Soviet Union, or any other country, should be criticized as aimed at political agitation. There is no doubt that the issue of the Kuril Islands does exist and that there is no escape from it. That question remains a major impediment to a way toward the conclusion of a peace treaty between the Soviet Union and Japan.

There is no peace treaty between the Sovet Union and Japan, although more than 45 years have passed since the end of war. The Soviet Union has for so long taken the position that there is no problem in the four islands belonging to the Soviet Union and hence that there is no reason to talk about them. Frankly speaking, that has not been constructive.

At the same time, however, I want to point out that Japan's position also has been far from realistic. The Japanese side has been insisting unilaterally that the four islands, which Japan calls northern territories, are inherently territories of Japan, historically and legally, and that the islands must be returned to Japan.

This state of confrontation, with both sides unwilling to yield, lacks in perspective and will only draw the bilateral relations into darkness, as you would agree when looking back on the history of the past several decades.

I think this difficult and delicate issue will naturally come up during President Gorbachev's upcoming visit to Japan. The Soviet Union is now taking the stand that, although it may be difficult for this issue to be resolved in the matter of a few months and over several exchanges of visits, a probe for a solution can be fruitful if both sides can agree to stand on the equilibrium of interests.

Spreading various rumors or demagoguery relating to the territories issue can only add an impediment to the solution of the issue now when, even without such a problem, there are enough problems as it is.

Commentaries Assess Japanese-DPRK Talks on Ties

To Lower Tension

SK0202122491 Moscow International Service in Korean 0900 GMT 30 Jan 91

[Text] The DPRK and Japan had the first round of official talks for the normalization of diplomatic relations between the two countries today, 30 January. This gave rise to another opportunity in the policy of this region to lower the level of tension and convert confrontation into friendship and cooperation.

The station commentator (Viktor Valentinov) writes on this:

The Korean peninsula is now experiencing a difficult but very important time, that is, a time of responsible decision and great change.

On the heels of the positive progress in the international situation, the trend of detente reached the western region of the Pacific Ocean directly touching the two countries on the Korean peninsula.

Among the recent events, I would like to note the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the ROK, which rectified the regrettable facts in the international politics in the Far East.

Beijing also seems to be preparing to develop its relations with Seoul into an official footing. In the capital of China today on 30 January, the office of the Korean Trade Promotion Corporation was established, and this office will perform part of the function of a consulate as well. This gave the ROK an opportunity to play a role commensurate with its political and economic potential in the international arena.

The DPRK also has good external political prospects. The DPRK will open its embassy in Thailand soon.

Meanwhile, the DPRK and the United States had their first contact in Beijing.

Also, as we noted before, the official talks began between the DPRK and Japan today for the normalization of the mutual relations. The DPRK is enjoying its considerably stable position in the international political arena, maintaining solid relations with the Soviet Union and China, its traditional allies. This is necessary, for one thing, for its dialogue with the ROK.

Some say that the inter-Korean dialogue has not brought forth anything at all. But I disagree with this view, for despite all its complicated nature, the inter-Korean dialogue has not stopped but is developing continuously. Second, the North and South Korea boosted the dialogue onto a high level of premiers' talks. The dialogue between the premiers of the DPRK and the ROK has already been held three times. The fourth round of talks are forthcoming.

The position of the DPRK, which puts forward extensive and constructive proposals to ease tension on the Korean peninsula in the process of the dialogue, promises many things. The ROK prefers to follow the road of developing economic relations. Nevertheless, the position of Seoul clearly shows progress heading on military and political lines. For instance, the ROK and the United States have recently adopted a decision to reduce the scale and duration of the annual Team Spirit joint military exercise, and increased the number of countries they invited to observe the military exercise. Among these countries are the PRC, Czechoslovakia, and Poland as well. The DPRK has also informed of the date of this military exercise in a timely manner. We can conclude that if the United States stresses its plan to reduce 7,000 men of its troops in the ROK, the condition of talks between North and South Korea will become all the more advantageous.

The two countries ought to use all of their diplomatic tactics to use this new condition to the interest of the majority and for peace and cooperation in West Asia.

Difficult Change Predicted

SK0302121591 Moscow International Service in Korean 1300 GMT 30 Jan 91

[Commentary by Aleksey Kondrashev; from the "World Today" program]

[Text] The DPRK and Japan held the first round of official talks on normalizing their relations in Pyongyang today.

It must be remembered that prior to the current talks, the two countries held three rounds of negotiations in Beijing in November and December last year.

Station commentator Aleksey Kondrashev noted that the DPRK leadership took the initiative in proposing the negotiations. He also said that the negotiations in Beijing were held in camera and that very little is known about them.

Even brief official reports on these talks clearly revealed that the participants had to overcome not a few difficulties in the process of preparing for the Pyongyang talks.

Why? The reasons are apparent. There exists almost no (?good) chapter in the history of relations between the DPRK and Japan. During the 36 years before the end of World War II, the Korean people regarded the Japanese as brutal colonialists. The history of relations between Japan and North Korea following the establishment of the DPRK is characterized by tension and confrontational feelings.

We remind you of these facts because we want to make it easy for you to understand how difficult a road the two countries have travelled in search of normalized relations. The situation becomes more complicated because in the course of holding talks with Pyongyang, Tokyo has to pay attention to the countries that are concerned about the developing situation on the Korean peninsula, Seoul and Washington in particular.

All these facts put particular stress on the significance of the Pyongyang talks as well as on their delicate nature. The start of the talks in itself is an indication that there has been positive progress in ensuring the security in the expansive region of Northeast Asia in recent years. Apparently, it is impossible to make this region stable without coordinating the situation on the Korean peninsula. (?Crossing this line is the balance of interest.)

The point of cross interests of the ROK, the United States, and Japan, on the one hand, and that of the DPRK, China, and the Soviet Union, on the other, has begun to change in recent years.

The Soviet Union and the ROK are the first to embark on breaking the cold war alignments on the Korean peninsula by establishing diplomatic relations last September. The ROK also has set out to establish ties with China.

The DPRK seems to have begun changing its foreign policy lines. Premier-level talks between the DPRK and the ROK over South-North [word indistinct], a series of talks between North Korea and the United States in Beijing, and talks that have already begun between Japan and North Korea (?prove this point). Common trends showing the declining level of military confrontation in this region have become visible.

Simply put, the winds of change have reached the northeast shore of Asia. The Pyongyang talks are one of such evidence, concluded station commentator Aleksey Kondrashev.

DPRK Foreign Minister Hopes for Ties With Japan

SK0302122191 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 2 Feb 91

[From "Asian News" segment of the "Focus on Asia" program]

[Text] DPRK Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam expressed the hope that agreement on the normalization of relations between the DPRK and Japan will be reached.

Speaking at a news conference at the conclusion of the first round of talks between the two countries, he stated that the DPRK approach to Japan, which has diplomatic relations with South Korea, should not be regarded as a change in Pyongyang's policy. The foreign minister stressed: Korea is one from the beginning, and the North and the South should be reunified. This is the consistent yearning of the entire nation of the North and the South. We intend to establish diplomatic relations with Japan under this precondition.

Near East & South Asia

Belonogov Meets With Iranian Envoy on Gulf

LD0102141991 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1334 GMT 1 Feb 91

[Text] Moscow, 1 Feb (TASS)—Aleksandr Belonogov, deputy USSR minister of foreign affairs, today received Nematollah Izadi, ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the USSR.

A thorough exchange of opinions was held on the situation in the Persian Gulf zone and efforts being made by the Soviet Union and Iran to achieve the speediest end to combat operations on the basis of fulfillment of the UN Security Council resolutions regarding the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait.

Military Officials View War in Gulf Issues

Filatov Predicts U.S. Defeat

PM0102152991 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 1 Feb 91 p 3

[Interview with Major General V. Filatov, chief editor of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL, by A. Khokhlov; place and date not given: "'The War in the Gulf Has Not Yet Begun...'"—first paragraph is KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA introduction]

[Text] Will the war in the Persian Gulf be over soon? Plenty of prognoses are being made about this now but, in the main, they all boil down to one thing: The international force will defeat Iraq in one week (two, three weeks, one month, two months). The No. 1 military journalist—Maj. Gen. V. Filatov, editor of VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKIY ZHURNAL—has his own opinion on this. Viktor Ivanovich has witnessed a majority of the military conflicts in the world over the past two decades and relies on no authorities to draw his conclusions.

[Filatov] In my opinion, the war in the Gulf will end in a major U.S. defeat. There have essentially been no armed operations there yet. Iraq had no intention of fighting the Americans either in the air or on the water. Iraq's advantage lies in the ground troops which are now, I believe, in reliable underground shelters. They will surface as soon as occupiers appear, as soon as the first U.S. soldier steps onto Iraqi soil. It is then that the war will begin. The ballyhoo about successes is most probably just a propaganda ploy.

Two wars are essentially being waged now, you know: one with bombs, the other in the mass media. It is no coincidence that a group of journalists has been set up to filter information about the conflict through such a censorship "strainer"! If we had such a thing, our press would simply "tear" the government to pieces. But here no one even "mumbled" against it, as though this were necessary! How is it necessary, if the United States is a democratic state? What kind of war are they now "writing" for us and the whole world...?

But in any case the United States is moving steadily toward its "second Vietnam," which will be somewhat worse for it than the first. The Vietnamese do not live all over the world, which cannot be said of the Arabs and Muslims. As soon as the war begins on land we may see the governments of Syria, Egypt begin to shake....

[Khokhlov] Do you suppose that the entire Arab East could flare up?

[Filatov] Certainly. Even if Iraq is defeated, which I doubt, other Arab countries will enter the war against the so-called international force. This could happen—and very soon—if Israel is drawn into the conflict.

[Khokhlov] But are you sure that it will begin fighting? The Iraqi missile strikes against its territory have so far gone unanswered.

[Filatov] If Israel enters the war the consequences for it will be simply awful. The Israeli Government realizes this and so refuses to have anything to do with combat operations, while at the same time not ceasing to intimidate Husayn with the atom bomb.

[Khokhlov] Does Israel have one?

[Filatov] If not, the Americans will give them one. But dropping an atom bomb would be tantamount to signing your own death warrant today. Israel is still looked on as a victim. After a nuclear strike world public opinion would turn away from that country. In general, I do not think that nuclear or chemical ammunition will be used in this war. Both are "last-gasp" weapons, which can only be used in the event of the definitive defeat of one of the sides. But this war, when it begins, will be protracted.

[Khokhlov] You say that the war has not yet begun. Maybe there is still a chance of stopping it? Will Soviet diplomacy not be able to help here by offering a compromise to suit everyone?

[Filatov] No. Husayn will no longer be able to give up Kuwait without losing face. Moreover, he knows that the Americans will not stop at that, will demand the demilitarization of Iraq, will remove him from power—maybe even physically—and will place a government of their own puppets in a sinecure of power. Bush will be unable to explain to his own people and to the whole world why he transported half a million soldiers and heaps of combat hardware thousands of miles from America if there was even a hypothetical possibility of resolving the conflict by political means. Therefore—only war.

[Khokhlov] Viktor Ivanovich, the entire left-wing press unambiguously places you in the camp of Soviet "hawks." Our government has already listened to a lot of advice "from the left" about the USSR's position in this conflict. What can you advise, "from the right"?

[Filatov] In politics all "turns" are harmful.... Let people consider me personally what they like, but a sensible political orientation is probably the very best one.

There are concepts such as political offensive and political defense. I believe that we have done the right thing now—given our internal disruption—and not launched a political offensive in foreign policy. If people did not have enough sense to resolve the conflict in the Gulf peacefully at once, it is now necessary to take up a defensive position in depth and not get involved in any intrigues or any maneuvers with or against anyone. War in the Near East will very sharply polarize all the countries of the world community and put a lot of distance between them. The United States will lose very many of its allies. While we, remaining on the sidelines, must acquire them. The Arabs realize that their rear is secure, that the Soviet Union will not hit them in the back. Therefore our chances of acquiring new friends in the Arab world are now preferable to those of any other world superpower.

Therefore the only correct position for the USSR in the U.S. war against Iraq is to take up a defensive position and be on its guard, without getting involved in any military adventures. The chief aim of our foreign policy here must be to prevent a conventional war from escalating into a nuclear one.

Lobov Foresees Settlement

LD0102173691 Moscow World Service in English 1210 GMT 1 Feb 91

[Interview with Gen. Vladimir Lobov, chief of staff of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact—Lobov's comments are in Russian with superimposed translation into English]

[Excerpt] [Announcer] [passage omitted] Military actions have been under way in the Persian Gulf for two weeks now. Would you comment on them?

[Lobov] So far it has been impossible to unequivocally assess the military situation. The armed services have been used up til now [as heard] are not crucial to the fate of either side. In a broader perspective it had not developed to the use of ground troops yet. Only when ground forces are in action can a conclusion be made. But forecasts may prove wrong. For instance it has been argued that air forces and missiles can be decisive to developments in the Gulf. Two weeks of bombardment with aircraft and missiles have not led either side to any results, however. I regard today's strategic situation as equal, with some military and technical advantage for the United States.

[Announcer] How do you evaluate the fighting abilities of the sides?

[Lobov] Both sides claim that they have enough strength to suppress each other. In fact this is NATO operating under the coalition forces' flag. Ninety percent of the aircraft that have been used are those of the United States. Britain and other countries, too, have also used aircraft. Although there's interaction and coordination, there's no reason to speak highly of their actions at this stage.

Now for the Iraqi forces. As the chief of staff of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, I condemn Iraq's aggression against Kuwait. So far Iraq has used only aircraft and missiles in full. Both sides have put these weapons into effect, mainly against civilians, with damage to the nation's economy and the ecology of the region. All this goes beyond purely military assessments.

[Announcer] The area of fighting is quite close to the Soviet border. Does the Soviet command see any menace there?

[Lobov] NATO keeps about 500,000 men in that area. The troops are equipped with the most advanced weapons, and given that the Armed Forces of other states are being stationed in that region, the conflict may involve groups millions of men strong. Naturally there are many dangers. Accidents may arise. There is the threat of such mass destruction weapons as chemical agents and also germ warfare. We are aware of their effects should they be used. For instance, bacteriological weapons transcends frontiers. This may (?be) dangerous for the USSR. In particular its southern parts.

On the other hand, scientists predict an ecological disaster with environmental damage to this country, too. It is no wonder we have been taking care of national security, and this calls above all for searching for a political solution to the Gulf conflict. I believe a settlement will be found.

Israeli Official on Retaliation Against Iraq

LD0202170991 Moscow Central Television Vostok Program and Orbita Networks in Russian 1530 GMT 2 Feb 91

[Report by correspondent A. Popov; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpts] The firing of Iraqi missiles at Israeli territory continues. [passage omitted]

The mass media constantly returns to the question of Israel's possible reaction in reply. To get firsthand information, I met with Benjamin Netanyahu, Israeli first deputy foreign minister, in Jerusalem.

You have just returned from a Knesset session, and in connection with the question discussed, I would like to ask for your opinion on the development of the crisis in the Persian Gulf and Israel's reaction in reply to the continuing attacks.

Israel is not a participant in this war. As is known, Iraq has occupied Kuwait and threatened Saudi Arabia, Netanyahu said. But, since Iraq has chosen Israel as a target for its missiles, then we undoubtedly have to act to defend our country and our population. This does not mean that we will reply to every act of terrorism, however. We will refrain from strikes and amass strength. We will choose the time, place, and target to strike a decisive blow in reply. [passage omitted]

PLO Special Envoy Seeks Full Kuwaiti Sovereignty

LD0302123991 Moscow TASS in English 1214 GMT 3 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondent Igor Kondratskiy]

[Text] New Delhi February 3 TASS—Jamal al-Surani, special envoy of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), stated here on Saturday that the PLO favoured complete restoration of Kuwait's sovereignty.

At the same time, he said the United States now worries not about the problem of Kuwait but as to how to bring Middle Eastern oil fields under U.S. control.

Al-Surani believes that the main reason that prompted the Americans to launch a war against Iraq is that Washington, due to Baghdad's resistance, could no longer dictate its terms as to the amount of oil that should be produced in the area and no longer could set world oil prices "convenient" to it.

The influential Indian newspaper HINDUSTAN TIMES reports today that al-Surani delivered a message from Chairman of the PLO Executive Yasir 'Arafat to Indian Prime Minister Chandra Shekhar and to Rajiv Gandhi, leader of the country's largest party—the INC (I).

The message calls on India to play a more active role within the framework of the non-aligned movement in efforts towards a peaceful settlement of the Gulf conflict.

The document also conveys a wish that India take new steps towards suspension of combat operations in the region.

Environmentalist Cited on Gulf Oil Pollution

PM0102125591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Feb 91 Union Edition p 6

[Report by G. Charodeyev: "Ecological Bomb Aimed at the Future"]

[Excerpt] According to the statement issued by Lieutenant General T. Kelly, deputy chief of intelligence of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, as a result of the recent U.S. missile and bomb strike against the Kuwaiti pipeline from which Iraq was discharging oil into the Persian Gulf, the flow of oil has virtually ceased. But the gigantic slick, already about 60 miles long and 20 miles wide, which has formed as a result of the discharge of oil is continuing to move South and is close to the Saudi Arabian coast, a REUTER telegram says.

Commenting on this report at IZVESTIYA's request, Doctor of Juridical Sciences Kamil Bekyashev, chairman of the Soviet "Peace to the Oceans" committee's ecology commission, said:

"This 'self-defense' measure undertaken by Iran is the most flagrant violation of the basic principles of international law and should be resolutely denounced by the world community. Saddam Husayn, having given the order, in this case has violated commitments envisaged by many international conventions. In particular the 1972 convention on the prevention of the pollution of the sea by effluent and other materials bans the discharge or pouring into the sea of crude oil and its by-products, refined petroleum products, oil refining waste, and also of compounds containing any of these substances. By virtue of its universality this convention is binding for all states. By its illegal behavior Iraq has also grossly violated the Kuwaiti 1978 regional convention on cooperation in the field of protecting the marine environment from pollution (it has been acceded to by seven countries including, as of 1 July 1979, Iraq). This convention, in addition to banning the discharge of harmful substances into the sea, demands that its signatories take appropriate measures to prevent and reduce pollution of the marine environment. Thus for its ecological crime (ecocide) Iraq must bear responsibility in international law. No references to the principle of necessity can justify its actions not only against the natural environment but also against the inalienable right of the region's inhabitants to a healthy life. The littoral and other states have the right to demand that Iraq restore to them the former cleanliness of the water and coast. In brief, it is a case of compensation payments of hundreds of billions of dollars."

Delegate to UN Urges Mideast Peace Talks

LD0102200291 Moscow TASS in English 1804 GMT 1 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondent Vitaliy Makarchev]

[Text] Geneva February 1 TASS—The Soviet Union has repeatedly stated that it opposes the accommodation of immigrants coming to Israel on occupied Arab lands, because this runs counter to the standards of the international law, Yuriy Reshetov, head of a Soviet delegation, said at a session of the U.N. Commission for Human Rights.

The agenda of the session includes the item on human rights violations on occupied Arab lands, including Palestine. In the course of the discussion some Arab delegations brought up the problem of Jewish immigration to Israel from East European countries, specifically the Soviet Union.

According to the Soviet representative, Soviet citizens emigrate from the Soviet Union to take permanent residence abroad in conformity with provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the international pact on civil and political rights. This emigration can be restricted only for the reasons envisaged by those documents.

Touching upon the situation on Israeli-occupied Arab lands, the Soviet representative said it was "explosive" and "fraught with new human tragedies". The reason for the incessant violation of rights of the Arab population is the refusal of the Israeli authorities to abide by generally recognised standards in the sphere of human rights, as well as the fact that the Palestinian people have been denied the inalienable right to self-determination.

A peaceful settlement in the region should be based on a political dialogue, the taking into account of security interests of all countries, the strict observance of human rights and the exercise by Palestinians of the right to self-determination. An international conference on the

Middle East with the participation of five permanent members of the U.N. Security council and all parties concerned, including Palestine, could be a concluding stage of this process. The Soviet Union is ready to promote the resumption of settlement processes in every way, the head of the Soviet delegation said.

Commentaries Review, Assess War in Gulf

Allied Euphoria Ends

91UF0401A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 4, 30 Jan 91 p 1

[Report by LITERATURNAYA GAZETA correspondent Sergey Medvedko: "He Will Not Spare His Own People"]

[Text] Damascus—Days of anxiety and doubt have come to replace the first days of the war, which were accompanied in the ranks of the anti-Iraq coalition by optimism and a presentiment of quick victory.

The participants in the air raids on Iraq have admitted that its air defenses, air force, and army have not sustained such high losses as reported in the first war news releases of the allied forces.

Iraq's surprisingly feeble resistance, as certain military experts, Western included, here believe, is not an indication of the collapse of Iraq's defenses or its helplessness but a tactical or even strategic plan, in accordance with which Iraq's main forces will be engaged at the time of the assault by the Americans and their allies on Kuwait. Saddam Husayn intends avoiding open battles for as long as possible in order to hold out until spring, when the heat will prevent active offensive operations.

Meanwhile, according to recent estimates of specialists in Israel, Iraq still has missile launchers and part of its Air Force, chemical weapon delivery systems included. The danger for Israel will be over, Israel's Defense Minister M. Arens believes, only with the start of a new stage of the war, which will not be confined merely to air forces. "After many days of war and 25,000 combat sorties, the decisive blow at the Iraqi Army has not yet been struck," Israeli radio points out.

Israeli military experts maintain that the United States is employing in the war with Iraq obsolete tactics of staged commitment to combat operations first of aviation, then armored forces and, finally, infantry, whereas in modern battle all three components should be used simultaneously, which guarantees the most complete success. According to Israeli intelligence information, Saddam Husayn had in the six months of preparation for the war concealed deep under ground not only equipment and forces but his military industry also.

Iraq is making active use of political and psychological means of influencing the enemy. The need for combating a "new crusade of the West" is being instilled in the Arabs. The war cry "Allah akbar!" (God Is Great), with which the Army of the legendary Saladin routed the Crusaders in the 12th century, has now appeared on Iraq's national flag.

Maintaining that Saddam has rallied his people, although the cement of the cohesion has been universal fear, certain Arab diplomats and politicians are intimidating the world with nightmares of the post-Saddam period in Iraq. They are predicting, for example, a civil war even more bitter and bloody than in Lebanon and the division of Iraq.

So the euphoria of the first days of the war, successful for the anti-Iraq coalition allies, is over. Military observers, Western included, are acknowledging that if he has not won the first round, S. Husayn has not lost it either. Everyone is anxiously awaiting the allied forces' ground offensive. It is then that the Iraqi leader will reveal all his military trump cards. He will not spare his own people. If in the war with Islamic Iran the Baghdad leader sacrificed half a million soldiers, it is not hard to assume that in an engagement with the "infidel forces of imperialism" he is prepared to accept even greater casualties. Nonetheless, the countries of the anti-Iraq coalition have no doubt that they will win and that Kuwait will be free. But when? At what price?

Diverse Opinions Compared

91UF0402A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 29 Jan 91 p 3

[Article by Stanislav Korolev, professor at the USSR Defense Ministry Military Institute, under the rubric "Point of View" and followed by the objections of journalist Aleksandr Oskin: "In Too Much of a Hurry With the Bombing"]

[Text] *When I try to sort out who I am—a conservative, democrat or whatever—I still incline to the view that I am a conservative. I console myself here with the fact that the Conservatives govern in Britain, and that is all right—they are living okay. It is from these conservative standpoints that I will set forth my opinion of the conflict in the Persian Gulf. I was there recently and saw a thing or two and had a chance to think about this and that....*

The war has been under way just over a week. The information which is being fed us, including astrologers' predictions, is dreadfully feeble because of a desire to oblige everyone. Officially, the war is between the "world community" and Iraq. We, that is, the USSR, together with Israel, Arabia, and South Africa, are a part of this "community." There can therefore be no question even of a pluralism of opinions. Since the events have begun, only operational information is of any value. It is too late for reflection and philosophizing, they say.

Nonetheless, I shall be so bold as to reflect. First, the disastrous nature of a global conflict is now recognized by everyone. Consequently, strategic national aspirations are being resolved and will continue to be resolved at the local conflict level only up to some limit. The events themselves have been declared the consequence of the ill-considered actions of the president of Iraq and... the considered measures of the American President. World processes and national interests are taken out of the picture. We may speak about them, but it is better to remain silent. Established authorities are needed to explain the position here. Here is K. von Clausewitz: "The force which we will have to employ in respect of the enemy is in accordance with the dimensions of our political demands and also the demands of the enemy.... Political demands are not always clear, however, and this is the first cause of the difference in resources employed on both sides." The resources employed by the Americans do not correspond to the stated purpose, and for this reason require interpretation. In addition, Iraq had the impertinence to put forward a positive political goal: a comprehensive solution of the protracted Near East conflict and defense of the national independence of the Arab countries in the economic sphere.

Does this mean it is not a question of Kuwait and not the recklessness of the Iraqis, nor the subjective feelings of certain politicians?

At an Arab world summit in Baghdad last May Saddam Husayn expressed a wish for the transfer of half the Kuwaiti petrodollars, which are stored in Western banks, for the needs of perestroyka in the USSR. This was approximately $170 billion. The Americans immediately began to talk about the fact that they were prepared to grant us most-favored-nation status. At this same time, many people were trying to forget Article 10 of the 1972 treaty between Iraq and the USSR: "Each high contracting party declares that it will not enter into alliances or participate in any groupings of states and also in actions or activities aimed against the other high contracting party." The Chinese have no such treaty, but during the vote in the United Nations they "abstained," nonetheless.

We are still hoping to win the Americans' economic sympathies by any concessions and cooperation. I hope that Clausewitz will prove relevant here also: "We will never encounter an instance of a state acting in the interests of another treating them as seriously as its own. An auxiliary army of medium size is usually dispatched; if it fails, the whole venture is given up as lost, and attempts are made to disentangle oneself as cheaply as possible."

This tradition is being observed by the United States' European allies, and they have been joined, for forgiven debts, by Syria and Egypt. Iran, naturally, had to remain neutral: It had been weakened by war and an undeclared blockade and has an interest in a weakening of Iraq, but not its defeat. Other Arab countries have not expressed loyal feelings toward the United States but have taken up a wait-and-see position. Except for Jordan and Yemen.

Military specialists incline to the view that time is on the side of the weaker party: It may acquire new friends. In this case Israel has to show hesitation, but not for long. After all, things are moving in the direction of a real, not verbal, solution of the Near East crisis, of compliance with UN decisions and the liberation of Palestinian land.

Even now the combat operations of the United States are rather an advertisement for might, and military art is turning into simple caution built on the probabilities of a half-war.

Iraq, on the other hand, is not afraid of closing directly with the forces of the enemy. In the contact zone equipment loses much in the sides' advantages. [sentence as published] The Americans are afraid of such duels—the difference in the troops' training and their morale is manifested here. They will agree to move to contact only given enormous superiority.

It was with good reason that January was chosen for the attack on Iraq in the hope of a Blitzkrieg. There will not be a swift end to the war, but it will hardly be possible to extend the timeframe of combat operations in Arabia for forces shackled in iron beyond March with its high temperatures. In any event, active operations a month hence are not to be expected. Consequently, the Americans plan to accomplish all combat assignments within February.

Such is my viewpoint. Unfortunately, such views are currently not wanted by the majority of Soviet publications.

Instead of talking with people seriously, our press is engaged in a search for some mystification. Radio Liberty, the Voice of Israel, and the Voice of America and various other "airwaves" cannot be distinguished from Moscow radio and television. What is this? Where does such a united vision of events come from? Can there be here now, in addition to the shadow economy, a shadow policy also?

[Signed] Stanislav Korolev, professor at the USSR Defense Ministry Military Institute

A Journalist's Objections

The view of the Iraq problem offered in Prof S. Korolev's article which we publish will surely seem to many readers controversial and will evoke emphatic objections among considerable numbers of them. But we considered it necessary to offer this, as the author himself ironically states, "conservative" standpoint because S. Korolev is not alone in his favorable disposition toward S. Husayn. The editorial mailbag contains dozens of similar letters and appeals. Their authors are, in our view, living in the past and are unwilling to come to terms with reality. They are forgetting that it was Iraq which perpetrated aggression against sovereign Kuwait. The dictator's forces are continuing to engage in appalling lawlessness on the occupied land. S. Husayn's thugs are committing brutal crimes, raping women and men and slaughtering infants. They have employed 38 types of refined torture against the peaceful population. Are at the present time continuing to

carry out missile attacks on cities of Saudi Arabia and Israel, threatening the use of weapons of mass destruction against peaceful inhabitants.... All this is evoking anger and protest. Our official condemnation of the aggressor together with the whole international community can in no way, in our view, be classed as some "shadow policy."

But it is difficult not to agree with S. Korolev on one point—the problem of the friendship and cooperation treaty which has bound our countries since 1972. Yes, it exists. But the present-day positions of the USSR and Iraq contradict it to a large extent. It is for this reason, in our view, that it is necessary to adopt measures immediately to denounce the treaty. It is odd that our government has not done so yet.

[Signed] Aleksandr Oskin

Television Coverage Examined

PM0102173091 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 Feb 91 Union Edition p 5

[Article by Vitaliy Kobysh under the "Political Observer's Opinion" rubric: "A Slick in the Ocean of Madness"]

[Text] The world has already stopped paying as much attention to the allied air raids and Iraq's missile strikes against Saudi Arabia and Israel as at first. Two weeks of war. Two weeks of trying to extract a grain of truth about what is happening, the true facts. Nonetheless, attention has to be paid to the news. Television, even when it deceives you, shows everything. Something curious and rather frightening has come through.

The United States (speaking rather hypothetically, because the American people have little to do with what is happening) has, among other things, made Iraq a testing ground for testing the latest weapons. Britain likewise. But here is something new: The U.S. "Patriot" missiles have won such a good reputation that Washington is apparently reviewing the much-publicized SDI military space program. This is matter of not tens, but hundreds of billions of dollars (taking into account that SDI is projected into the 21st century). Whatever the Soviet Union's attitude to SDI, for us this information (unless, of course, it is just another piece of disinformation) is of strategic importance.

About Iraq and its missile strikes. IZVESTIYA's correspondents in Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia, who are highly skilled journalists and courageous men, have discovered the following pattern. Iraq's missile strikes against Riyadh are mainly carried out in such a way that, taking into account the time difference, reports of the strikes are without fail in time for the evening news on U.S. television. Many people have to live according to instructions from the television—we have heard about that before. Now we learn about missile banditry and mass killings also designed especially for television.

All the same, the attention shifted to the progress of the oil slick through the Persian Gulf. For understandable reasons, people throughout the world are interested in the details: the size of the slick, the wind speed and direction, its possible course. Much has been said, so I will dwell only on the last point. Pessimistic experts (and it has long been a bitter joke in some countries that that means well-informed optimists) believe that the slick could leave the Persian Gulf. Then: the Gulf of Oman—the Arabian Sea—and then everywhere, that is, the ocean. In other words, this ecological catastrophe, which has already become a fact, could result in a universal disaster with irremediable consequences.

Saddam Husayn has done what no one could ever forgive or will ever forgive him for, that goes without saying. The other questions are more difficult. These questions are now being asked even in the United States, where, along with the value of certain corporations' shares on the stock market, President G. Bush's popularity has shot up to unprecedented heights.

On the other hand, danger hangs over all mankind. How can this have come about, when if the Pentagon and other U.S. departments, using the best minds and the latest equipment, had calculated all the possible options and played out all the scenarios for war? Do the actions of the coalition Armed Forces fit in with the powers defined by UN Security Council Resolution 678? Indeed, what are the real U.S. aims in this war, are they confined to the liberation of occupied Kuwait and the neutralization of an Iraqi dictator who has "gone off the rails"?

There are many serious questions, as you can see. A few unofficial answers, if I can put it like that, are coming to light, albeit in a fragmentary form. The UN Security Council is maintaining an enigmatic silence; not a single resolution. This is at a time when mankind is holding its breath with justified anxiety: People are hoping that the slick will not reach the ocean. What if it does? It is already dispersing rapidly in an ocean of military-strategic and political madness.

The war is entering a new phase. The Washington leadership has announced that it is preparing for a surprise strike (in war in our time, the surprise factor is more important than ever) against Iraq using ground forces. These forces exceed in might the forces used in Vietnam. The war is dragging on indefinitely.

Even now, in many parameters the war has surpassed Vietnam. The difference between the two wars does not favor the United States and the coalition forces. On that occasion, only one side had nuclear weapons. Let us not mislead ourselves or others. Now both sides have nuclear weapons—not de jure, but de facto. The way the world is now means that nearly everything can be bought and sold for money (except, of course, friendship, decency, and so forth). Saddam Husayn and those who, willingly or unwillingly, openly or secretly, support him, have money.

The French defense minister has announced his resignation. So the reports said. He said it was because the objectives set by Resolution 678 have been lost sight of. It seems he became ashamed, and perhaps frightened. Furthermore Saddam Husayn is beginning to threaten to use highly accurate French "Exocet" missiles. The very same. If you remember, one of them, during the recent war over the Falkland Islands (also known as the Malvinas), instantly destroyed a British warship. Argentina, it seems, had few such missiles, but Saddam Husayn has a lot of them. The Iraqi ruler, however, is threatening to launch not only "Exocet" missiles, but also, if he deems it necessary, chemical, bacteriological, and nuclear weapons.

In the existing situation the Soviet-U.S. summit meeting in Moscow, planned for February, was apparently becoming entirely unnecessary. It has now been announced that the meeting will not be held on 11 February. It is postponed.

It is a very good thing that during USSR Foreign Minister A.A. Bessmertnykh's visit to Washington a considered, balanced, and, in short, serious Soviet-U.S. statement was formulated. Let me draw your attention to these words in the statement: "The ministers continue to believe that an end to military operations is possible if Iraq gives an unequivocal undertaking to leave Kuwait. They also believe that such an undertaking should immediately be backed up by concrete steps leading to the complete fulfillment of the resolutions (I take that to mean **all the resolutions**! V.K.) of the UN Security Council." As was only to be expected, this promise provoked the anger of Tel Aviv and protests from a number of departments in Washington itself.

The joint Soviet-American statement cites two reasons for the postponement of the meeting. The main reason is that because of the war, G. Bush, who is President and commander in chief of the U.S. Armed Forces, will not be able to come to Moscow at this time. Another reason is also cited. Work on the strategic offensive weapons treaty is not complete. In a television interview A.A. Bessmertnykh explained: The treaty is 98 percent ready, but that two percent still remains. Moreover, for purely technical reasons, the drafting of the treaty—and it is 500 pages of text—cannot be completed by 11 February, when it was planned to start the Moscow meeting.

I have no information on which side it was that found the technical problems insuperable. I can deduce from past experience that there was time to agree the two percent that was not agreed, and certainly to finalize the 500 pages. This has been done before, with the SALT-I and SALT-II treaties among others. True, they worked all night (A.A. Bessmertnykh, too), and had virtually no sleep. But they finalized the texts of the treaties. Apparently Washington is saving up that two percent "for a rainy day" as a bargaining chip.

U.S. President G. Bush's "State of the Union" message says, in particular: "Our aim in the Persian Gulf remains unchanged: to drive Iraq out of Kuwait, restore the legitimate Kuwaiti Government, and ensure stability and security in this critically important region." Presumably after that the U.S. Armed Forces will leave. Presumably. The U.S. President did not say so in his message.

Will the U.S. (and coalition) Armed Forces leave the region? They will leave, while staying behind—that is, they will leave British-style—that is what people think in the countries of the Arab world, and elsewhere. The aforementioned joint Soviet-U.S. statement also failed to clarify this extremely important question.

A breeding ground has been created for all kinds of mass media speculation in the United States and other Western countries and, particularly unfortunately, in the so-called "Third World." The gist of the pernicious speculations is as follows. The two military superpowers have done another deal. The USSR will not harp on about strict observance of Resolution 678. The United States will ignore the appeal by certain representatives of the Baltic republics for recognition of their independence. Pernicious, but also farfetched speculation: As far as we know, Washington had no intention of reacting to the appeals from the Baltic. As for the USSR, its position on strict observance of Resolution 678 is immutable, as was clearly stated by both the USSR president and the foreign minister. There was no deal. It was politics.

About the first, most important reason for the postponement of the summit meeting. I find it rather unconvincing, too. True, G. Bush is commander in chief. But the war, let us repeat, is dragging on. A timely visit by the U.S. President to Moscow would, I am sure, have helped to bring closer an end to the madness that now threatens life on earth.

Being commander in chief is not only power, but also responsibility. You cannot suspect someone like G. Bush of irresponsibility. The conclusion that suggests itself is: Even a protracted war apparently suits some people in the United States. I would like to think the U.S. President is not one of them. Although it has become known that on the eve of his adoption of the decision to commence operation "Desert Storm" his National Security Adviser B. Scowcroft, a very knowledgeable and profoundly decent man, said: Peaceful means of settling the conflict have not been exhausted. G. Bush did not take that opinion into account, or the similar opinions of others of his advisers. America's TIME magazine reported all this, and much else that in our country is for some reason not much discussed, in one of its January issues.

People remember, especially over there in the Arab world and the whole of the "Third World," some very clear statements by well-known political figures like Henry Kissinger and Margaret Thatcher. Even before the start of hostilities by the coalition Armed Forces in the Persian Gulf region, they were calling for the destruction of Iraq's military potential, regardless of Saddam Husayn's future behavior. Iraq, they said, will always be a threat to Israel and to Western countries' interests in that region. Now, in the view of many analysts, the military potential is being destroyed, and with it the whole of Iraq as a powerful state. That is not to the liking, not at all to the liking, of not only Iraq, but the majority of its neighbors.

The oil slick meanwhile continues its journey south, through the Persian Gulf. From the ocean of military-political madness, in the direction of the real Ocean.

Impact on Emigrations to Israel

LD0302144891 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1223 GMT 3 Feb 91

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] Many people are now wondering whether Soviet Jews are continuing to leave for Israel or whether the war has had an impact.

[Correspondent I. Shestakov] Over the past week the stream of Soviet Jews wishing to emigrate to Israel has dropped by 25 percent. It is not just a matter of the frost. After all, the immigrants receive the same rights as other Israeli citizens, including the right to security.

Not just people but missiles, too, are striving to get to the promised land. According to REUTER 29 missiles have been launched against Israel, and four people have been killed.

The wife of the Israeli consul, who is now in Tel Aviv, invited a group of Soviet Jews to a dinner, and through her the following information was transmitted to the consulate. There are no Soviet immigrants among the casualties. One of the main problems remains housing. Frequently two or three families are living in one apartment. Work is another problem. In this respect, it is indicative that Soviet specialists are not baulking at manual work and in this area are gradually supplanting Palestinians. There is also the problem of language. It was a revelation to many immigrants that people in Israel speak not Yiddish but Hebrew. Men here have run up against the problem of circumcision. In Israel it is not desirable to refuse this sign of belonging to the Jewish people, which was covenanted between God and Abraham. According to ZEITMAGAZIN, special ritual surgeries have been set aside in hospitals where on certain days circumcision is performed while prayers are said. The main thing now is the expectancy of war. The shops are open only to 1800. The highest likelihood of bombardment occurs at night and on the weekend. In the event of attack, each apartment contains a hermetically sealed room. People have to sit in their gasmasks for hours awaiting the all-clear signal. This is particularly burdensome for the very young. Nevertheless, enterprises are functioning. The schools have opened and examinations have begun at the university. If Saddam Husayn refrains from using chemical weapons, the situation will scarcely deteriorate.

Low Morale Seen Among U.S. Troops

PM0302150591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Feb 91 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "'Our Morale Is Reaching Rock Bottom.' U.S. Airman's Unexpected Revelations"]

[Text] Bonn, 30 Jan—"Everything is far more terrible than you think"—this is how a U.S. airman involved in the bombing of Iraq describes his impressions of combat operations in the Persian Gulf. The German magazine QUICK published excerpts of an interview with him. "Everywhere there are destroyed apartment blocks, factories, and public buildings. The number of fatalities is bigger than it is possible to imagine. I was in the Vietnam War, but what I see here is particularly dreadful and brutal," the airman said. In the interview with the magazine correspondent he asked not to be named because he fears punishment for speaking out. "They will chuck me out if they find out that I have bypassed the censor and told the truth about this war," he stated.

Each time I get into my aircraft cockpit, the airman goes on, I experience the fear of being shot down by the Iraqis. You see, they are telling us that the Russians have not handed over the information they have either about the locations of antiaircraft missile launchers or about Iraqi military depots.

Our morale, the pilot stated, is reaching rock bottom. "I would like nothing better than to chuck all this," he confesses. "The most terrible thing is that nobody must know just how many people are actually killed in this war—10,000, 100,000, or even a million."

Reports Continue on Crisis in Gulf, Region

Details Given on Soviets in Iraq

PM0102134191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Feb 91 Union Edition p 6

[Report by G. Deyev: "They Have Crossed Border"]

[Text] It has become known to your IZVESTIYA correspondent from USSR Foreign Ministry sources that on the evening of 30 January, 32 employees of the Soviet Embassy in Baghdad crossed the Iraq-Iran border in a truck and arrived in Tehran. Our Foreign Ministry has done everything possible to ensure appropriate safety for them on their journey. It turned out that no one was hurt.

The chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry information administration confirmed that 13 Soviet Embassy employees remain in Baghdad. They feel all right.

Six Soviet journalists still remain in the Iraqi capital: two from Lithuania (the "Sajudis" press organ), two from Ukrainian "independent television," one from Vologda, and one photographic correspondent from the "Novosti" news agency. They all came here at their own initiative. Incidentally, this was stated back on 20 January at a briefing at the USSR Foreign Ministry press center. The press attache of our embassy in Iraq has met with these journalists repeatedly and tried to persuade them to leave the country and has also warned of the possibility of the dangerous development of events. Which, as is well known, has happened. Recently our six journalists expressed the desire to return home. At present the Iraqi authorities are deciding the question of the possibility of their travel to the USSR.

Radio Expresses Allied Support

LD0101121591 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1100 GMT 1 Feb 91

[Text] With what interest and alarm do we listen to reports about the military operations. We greet the young Americans, British, French, Italians, Egyptians, and citizens of Saudi Arabia, who are out in the Arabian sands defending the principles of democracy, freedom, and the principles of international law. Stick with it, lads. We greet you with Duke Ellington's Hymn of Freedom. [recording of this song follows]

Baghdad Bombing Described

PM0302195591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 2 Feb 91 Union Edition p 4

[Report by IAN correspondent S. Tatarinov for IZVESTIYA: "Out of Danger"]

[Text] Tehran—For the first time in the past 12 days they had a quiet night in the neutral zone between Iran and Iraq. They had to sleep in their clothes, in cars, but hardly anyone noticed these inconveniences. The main thing was that they were not being awakened by air raid sirens, or bomb explosions, or the rumble of anti-aircraft fire.

They left the war behind at the Iraqi border posts. A foreign war, it is true, but no less dangerous nonetheless. Ahead lay Iran, ready to assist those who found themselves in the war zone.

"Leaving Iraq today is not a simple matter," Aleksandr Mikhaylovich Kalugin, counselor-envoy at the USSR Embassy in Baghdad, told me. "Even though we held exit visas, we still had to obtain special permits from the Iraqi Foreign Ministry to be able to leave the country. This procedure applies to all foreigners, including the few diplomats who remain in Baghdad."

We are talking in the residential compound of the Soviet Embassy in Iran. Less than 24 hours have passed since the arrival of the second group of our citizens evacuated from Iraq. Some 32 people in all, part of the embassy staff. Thirteen of their colleagues remain in Baghdad to continue the work of the embassy, even in these complex conditions.

"Baghdad is being subjected to very intensive bombing raids," Kalugin goes on. "For instance, during our last night in the Iraqi capital, 27-28 January, there were nine air raids. Baghdad is also regularly subjected to cruise missile attacks from U.S. ships in the Persian Gulf. The destruction is extensive, even reaching the area where the Soviet Embassy is located. The power station in the Daurah district of Baghdad has been virtually completely destroyed, as has Al-Muthannah Airport, and the capital's telegraph office. Life in Baghdad goes on, however. Stores and markets are trading."

Listening to the Soviet diplomat's account, I try to picture the improvised bomb shelter on the embassy's territory, referred to as the "pipe." It is indeed a large-diameter metal pipe buried in the ground in which benches have been installed. They had to stay in this shelter during the numerous bombing raids. Some of the staffers remained in the building even during the most intensive bombing. People responsible for the embassy's security, for example, always stayed at their posts. Add to this the absence of electricity and heat, acute shortages of water and food, and the constant tension as you wait for the next air raid to materialize.

"Naturally, the first bombing strikes were carried out with great precision," Kalugin recounts. "But war is war. There is also destruction in the residential quarters. It is increasing. Many Iraqis who had fled from Baghdad during the first days of the war are returning to the city, since virtually the whole territory of the country is being bombed. And no one knows where the greatest danger is."

A.M. Kalugin rejected Western media reports that Soviet military specialists remain in Iraq. They all left the country prior to the beginning of the military operations, 9-10 January, the diplomat emphasized.

Political & Social

Federation Council Reviews Union Treaty

LD0102220391 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 1 Feb 91

[Report by V. Stepanyuk; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] A regular session of the Council of the Federation was held today in the Kremlin, with Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev in the chair. As has been reported, it examined a group of questions connected to the preparation of the new union treaty, and discussed the situation in the Baltic republics. Here is a report from our correspondent, V. Stepanyuk.

[Stepanyuk] Today, the Council of the Federation began to examine the clauses of the document that is to become the legal basis of our multinational state, transformed on federative principles. During the discussion, most attention was paid to the demarcation of the authority of the union and the subjects of the federation. The session's participants spoke in favor of the treaty clearly defining joint union and republican authority, and the group of questions tranferred by the republics to the jurisdiction of union authority and government bodies. While on the whole supporting the approach to demarcating the competencies reflected in the draft, the speakers put forward many remarks and amendments. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev stressed that the source of a renewed union is the will of the people of our country for unification, and the voluntary agreement of the republics to construct a democratic, federative state. In this regard the referendum to be held by decision of the USSR Congress of People's Deputies and Supreme Soviet will have great significance. We are trying to create a lively, dynamic union, predictable in its policies and actions both for its own population and the whole of the world community.

A decision was adopted that the plenipotentiary representatives of the subjects of the federation begin to agree on the articles of the treaty in the very near future. Here are the opinions of the session's participants.

[Begin recording] [G.I. Yanayev] This is a quality basis that can be discussed calmly without emotions, and I am very pleased that such a practical conversation is taking place. Evidently we should now begin the practical reworking of this union treaty, section by section. Today, we began the most problematical, most difficult areas giving rise to the greatest, so to speak, variant readings. That we are coming to a common demoninator seems to me to be the main result of that part of the conversation that has already taken place.

[V.G. Ardzinba, chairman of the Abkhazia Supreme Soviet] A whole number of very interesting and important proposals were expressed concerning a broadening of the authority of the union republics, a broadening of the sphere of their participation in deciding and judging issues and functions of the union. At the same time it was said that it is necessary to more broadly, let's say, on the one hand take into account the declarations of state sovereignty adopted by the republics, and on the other, find mutually acceptable solutions.

[N.I. Dementei, chairman of the Belorussian Supreme Soviet] The alternative being discussed, the alternative for the treaty, I would say, has already come close to the minimum demand where it says that those independent states and sovereign union republics, if they secede, then they secede voluntarily. And they, proceeding from this voluntary basis, will determine what union bodies there should be, and what these union bodies will be like—and not by any center, but the union republics will determine the bodies of power and government. They will be decided that jointly it is cheaper, that jointly it is more advantageous, that jointly it is expedient. [end recording]

[Stepanyuk] The second question, as the USSR president noted, has been prompted by life itself: The situation in the Baltic republics. Among the speakers on this problem was USSR People's Deputy Anatoliy Alekseyevich Densisov. We spoke with him.

Anatoliy Alekseyevich, it is known that having visited Latvia you came to the conclusion that it is possible to stabilize the situation there only by presidential rule. Aren't you appraising the situation too pessimistically, and wouldn't this measure cause further worsening of the situation?

[Begin Denisov recording] No, I think that on the contrary, this appraisal is optimistic because I can see a way out of the situation. It would be worse if I could not. I do not think that this will cause any worsening, because the situation is already bad, and the only thing that could calm the situation is a return to legality, because all our troubles are occuring because we, while preaching a law-governed state, have completely forgotten that a law-governed state is the dictatorship of the law. As a result of anarchy in Latvia there are, in particular, two procuracies, two militias, and a diarchy of laws, apart from anything else. In such conditions it is simply impossible to introduce order. The only way out of the situation is to have one legality: This can realistically be done by presidential rule. Moreover, in the conditions facing Latvia, this can be through the local powers. There is no need to change, drive out, arrest, or dismiss anyone, and so forth. They can all act within the framework of presidential rule, and only follow union law. This law allows, in particular, secession of the republics from the make-up of the union, a legal secession. [end recording]

[Stepanyuk] We asked Rafik Nishanov [chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of Nationalities] to comment on the results of the examination of this issue at the Federation Council Session.

[Begin Nishanov recording] We cannot solve any issues by use of force. No matter what tension there is, we need to find political methods to solve any issue. A tragedy has occurred; we are all going through this and we sympathize with the families of those who died. But in the future, force and anticonstitutional methods must be ruled out. Everything needs to be solved, in the opinion of the Council of the Federation, through talks, agreement, and mutual patience.

The Council of the Federation today concentrated its efforts on searching for ways to solve the situation that has arisen, and to normalize the situation. The first and most important thing, the council considers, is that the republics themselves, opposing groups, various political forces, various groups or factions in the parliaments, must agree among themselves constitutionally by creating commissions of concord, through dialogue, and organizing roundtables, and analyze the situation and solve issues. In particular (?de-ideologize) those laws that were hastily adopted and to some degree, violate citizens' rights. They should examine the question of their abbrogation. And secondly, until they agree among themselves, and achieve the agreement of the general population, not adopt laws in haste.

Secondly, the Council of the Federation spoke in favor of the immediate renewal of political dialogue. Today, by presidential decree, a delegation was created for every individual republic to discuss questions with representatives of these republics on a range of political, social, and economic questions. These delegations will develop their programs in the very near future, and will begin talks. But the Federation Council considers it necessary, while these meetings, consultations, and discussions are taking place, to freeze the earlier adopted anticonstitutional decisions, and not adopt them again during these talks so as not to worsen the situation further.

Apart from this, an appeal has been made to all citizens to show patience, respect, and wisdom, and to revive the highest, most deferential attitude to the basic clauses of the USSR Constitution, and the constitutions of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR], the Latvian SSR, and the Estonian SSR, and the declarations adopted by the parliaments of these republics. [end recording]

CPSU Central Committee Plenum Continues Meeting

Issues Statement

LD0302181191 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1647 GMT 3 Feb 91

[Text] Moscow, 3 Feb (TASS)—Below follows the text of the [CPSU Central Committee plenum] statement: On the current situation and tasks of the Party.

I.

The plenum notes that within the framework of socioeconomic and political transformations, despite serious obstacles, the creation of political and legal conditions for further radical reforms continues. The question of a renewal of the USSR on a democratic basis has been placed on the agenda. Freedom of speech and freedom of conscience have been legislatively guaranteed.

But, the contradictoriness of social processes, the mistakes and miscalculations that have been committed, including those in the economic sphere, have become the cause of serious negative phenomena making themselves especially felt of late. Never before has the need for new practical actions to implement reforms been so urgent or the internal disorder in society been so menacing. This is a distinctive feature of the current situation.

The social crisis in the country has reached the danger mark beyond which destructive social shocks are possible. The number of regions is increasing where opposition between political positions is taking on forms of social and interethnic confrontation, and the situation not infrequently gets outside the control of the bodies of power and shows manifestations of anarchy and bloodshed.

In the political arena, forces that have made it their goal to change the social order in the USSR have already emerged and are trying to unite. Their design is to remove from power supporters of the socialist choice and to impart to the transformations under way a regressive and antipopular nature.

Disregard in some republics for the decisions of congresses of USSR people's deputies and the unlawful abrogation of provisions of the USSR Constitution have opened the way to lawlessness and made it possible to adopt antidemocratic discriminatory acts that infringe the rights of the individual, give rise to protests, and incite people to resistance. National-separatist forces have embarked on an open course of eliminating social achievements, have transgressed the borders of reason and the law, are destroying the centuries-old internationalist ties between the peoples, and are reviving the worst forms of ethnic discrimination. Nationalistic totalitarian regimes are being formed which proclaim the pretended superiority of the rights of nationality [natsiya] over the rights of man and citizen generally recognized in the world.

The exacerbation of the situation, the tragic events in the republics of the Baltics and Transcaucasus, and the maintenance of tension in other regions are a serious warning to all of society. The democratic process and positive transformations have been brought to the brink of breakdown, and there is a growing threat to people's lives and security.

The plenum participants voice their sorrow over the loss of life. We declare that the party is doing everything possible to halt the fratricide and return the country to the path of peace and construction.

The situation that has come about is the result of the violation of human rights and the constitutional order, of the toleration by central and republican bodies of numerous violations of the basic law of the country, and of the infringement of the vital interests of large groups of the population by destructive forces.

Under these circumstances the plenum regards the immediate restoration of constitutional order in the country as essential.

The plenum's participants are in favor of the urgent repeal of anticonstitutional acts and decisions violating human rights, no matter by which bodies they have been passed. We call on the supreme soviets of the USSR and the republics and on people's deputies to organize mutual contacts, up to and including the holding of joint sittings of presidiums and sessions, to examine disputed issues and to adopt effective measures to overcome the legislative crisis.

The plenum regards as inadmissible the setting up of illegal armed formations and the disruption of the unified statewide structure of the armed forces and law enforcement bodies. We oppose attacks on vital state institutions: the army and the security and internal affairs bodies. The plenum sides with the people's demand for the maintenance of order, security, and calm, as well as normal living and working conditions for Soviet people, regardless of their nationality or social status.

We must develop the best traditions of friendship of the peoples and internationalism, to take the path of bringing closer together the nations and ethnic groups of our country and of mutually respecting national uniqueness.

More than anything else, the country now needs civil peace and nationwide accord. To achieve them is the party's most important political task. The plenum calls on all party organizations to carry out persistent work to solve this urgent problem, bearing in mind specific local features and relying on the support of broad sections of the working people and in cooperation with trade union, youth, women's, veterans', and other associations.

II.

The plenum calls on Communists and on all citizens to speak out for the preservation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

It is precisely this position that Communists are defending as they prepare for the referendum on the future of our union as a federation of sovereign soviet socialist republics enjoying equal rights. The referendum must be the truly free and perceived expression of the will of Soviet citizens and not as an instrument for breaking down the state in the hands of irresponsible political operators.

Preparation for it must be placed at the center of the whole of the party's political work.

The plenum supports the process of asserting the sovereignty of Union and autonomous republics and sees in it an essential condition for transforming our state into a renewed union of genuinely independent republics and peoples.

Our policy aimed at building a law-based state remains unchanged. It can only be realized if it receives the support of all constructive public forces: the soviets of people's deputies, political parties, mass movements, and the citizens of the country. This demands of all genuine democrats that they should wage a consistent struggle against those who are hostile to a constitutional system and who undermine the foundations of executive power. The CPSU considers that power in the country must be profoundly democratic.

III.

The plenum considers that the crisis in the economy, that has aggravated the growth in social and national tension, is the consequence of a gap in the rates of economic and political transformations.

However, these difficulties and contradictions must not stop radical economic reforms. On the contrary, the policy of developing the market economy must be consistently pursued.

The transition to the market must be accompanied by the formation of a mixed economy where priority is given to collective forms of ownership and where the economic independence of enterprise, free economic initiative, and free enterprise are expanded.

In these conditions the social and economic policy of the party is aimed at creating for each worker broad conditions for efficient and highly paid labor; at forming a reliable statewide system of social protection; at security of employment; and at support for needy groups in the population, providing for compensation for the population in connection with price increases, and for indexation of income.

The plenum is in favor of the priority development of the agro-industrial sector, of strengthening its material and technical base, and of carrying out land reform. The CPSU is opposed to any violence toward the peasantry or to the destruction of agro-industrial structures which work effectively. The CPSU is in favor of providing land to those who want to and are capable of laboring on it productively, taking into account in so doing the specific features of different districts.

Those taking part in the plenum support the program for stabilizing the situation in the country elaborated by the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies and call on labor collectives, Communists, and representatives of other forces of the socialist option, people's deputies, and all Soviet people to show good organization at this critical time and show understanding for a complex situation.

As the main and pressing tasks of Party organizations, the Plenum puts forward the struggle to preserve the economic unity of the country, making the process of taking things out of state hands a process that is of the people and transferring the predominant part of the property into the hands of labor collectives. All this should be implemented widely relying upon the labor collectives jointly with the trade union organizations and the bodies of public self-government.

IV.

Society has grown tired of constant economic and interethnic tension that deforms the humanistic values and the moral foundations of people. It is particularly dangerous and immoral when individual representatives of culture and science who are called upon to preserve and multiply the spiritual potential of society call for violence and lawlessness. Ought they not to know that the psychological charge of social hatred is the most mass and most terrible factor of destruction!

Under conditions where ideological and political confrontation have become exacerbated the positions of the mass information media acquire ever greater importance. It is the task of Communists and of all democratically disposed journalists in this sphere to firmly defend the democratic gains, to explain the strategy of socialist renewal, to disclose and analyze mistakes, and to expose the fabrications and actions of the opponents of perestroyka.

The time has come for everyone—youths and veterans, mothers and wives, workers and cultural figures, teachers and doctors, servicemen and peasants—to make a conscious civic and moral choice: whether to come to the defense of the noble aims of renewing society and achieving the unity of the country and peace in our multinational home, or whether to silently pander to infringements of people's lives and safety, or whether, still more, to participate in fanning interethnic and social flames. The plenum urges society to rally together on a broad common civic and constitutional foundation. The moment has come for acknowledging the truth, the time for responsible action in the name of preserving civil peace, of renewing our union, and of creative progress along the road of the socialist choice.

Expressing deep concern with the dangerous development of events in the Persian Gulf zone, the Plenum urges the country's state leadership to take essential additional steps before the international community and the United nations to end the bloodshed, forestalling irremediable damage to the environment, and channeling the military conflict toward a political solution in the spirit of the UN Security Council resolutions.

Shenin Reports to Plenum

PM0302141591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
2 Feb 91 Second Edition pp 2-3

[Report by O.S. Shenin, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to the 31 January 1991 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, under general headline: "On the Current Moment and the Party's Tasks"]

[Text] Report by Comrade O.S. Shenin

A number of practical questions pertaining to the organizational-political strengthening of party organizations are submitted for your consideration. The first thing we need solve the issue of registration of the CPSU Statutes.

In line with the USSR Law "On Social Associations," our party, just like other parties and social organizations, is obliged to register its Statutes at the USSR Ministry of Justice.

The CPSU is currently the biggest mass political organization in the country, with a history that goes back for almost a century and encompasses the party's work in clandestine conditions, the accomplishment of the greatest of revolutions, the implementation of socialist transformations, and the organization of the people's efforts during the years of the Great Patriotic War and the building of the peace [mirovoye stroitelstvo]. The historical path of the party is known, its program tasks and statutory principles have been promulgated. Our party is open to all who are committed to the socialist choice. Even against the backdrop of known mistakes that have been committed, we have a right to evaluate the experience accumulated by the CPSU as a tremendous political, intellectual, and organizational asset.

The act itself of the registration of the Statutes and the legal recognition of the CPSU places an even greater responsibility on the party before society.

The work that was necessary to prepare the Statutes for registration has been carried out, and I would like to report this to the joint plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and Central Control Commission. As is known, the USSR Council of Ministers has approved rules for considering applications for the registration of the statutes of union, interrepublic, and international social associations. They stipulate that the applicants should be members of the party's leading organ, and that they should be indentified by name.

All members of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo at this plenum may act as applicants.

During the registration of the Statutes documentary proof has to be furnished of the foundation of the CPSU. This is a political act rather than a technicality, of course. We intend to submit to the USSR Ministry of Justice historical documentation that the party takes its beginning from the first congress of the RSDRP [Russian Social Democratic Workers Party], its ideological foundations, method of recording membership and the principle of organizational building have remained unchanged, and its activities have been uninterrupted. Furthermore, official information on the CPSU's membership as of 1 January 1991, the complete stenographic record of the 28th party congress, and certified texts of the CPSU Statutes will also be sumitted.

There is one issue which calls for a special decision on the part of the joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission. Article 10 of the USSR Law "On Social Associations" contains a list of obligatory provisions which must be contained in the statutes of the social associations to be registered. There are eight such provisions in all, and seven are reflected in the existing Statutes. However, the provision on the procedure to end the activity of the party is lacking in the Statutes. However, even in these circumstances the Statutes can be accepted for registration, provided that the plenum provides the USSR Ministry of Justice with a written pledge to add a provision to this effect at the next congress or conference. This is taken into account in the draft resolution in your posession.

One more point. The CPSU is applying for registration as a unionwide social association; its organizations exist throughout the territory of the USSR and they all operate on the basis of the general fundamental programmatic and statutory principles of the CPSU. In accordance with the law the CPSU is obliged to register its Statutes as a single party at one state organ—the USSR Ministry of Justice. This act will apply to all the party's structures, including republic structures.

Now allow me to dwell on questions of the new normative base of the CPSU's activities. The 28th CPSU Congress created a new normative basis for the party's activities by approving the Statutes and defining by what regulatory documents they have to be concretized.

The drafts of these documents were submitted to participants in the CPSU Central Committee October (1990) Plenum. In compliance with the instructions of the plenum, the Central Committee Secretariat organized their broad discussion and publication in the press. The proposals and critical remarks received from party committees, via publications in the party press, and from Communists' letters have been generalized. As we were not able to reply to people individually, we deem it fitting to express on behalf of the plenum our gratitude to all the comrades for taking part in the debate.

The documents were finalized in CPSU Central Committee commissions with the particpation of representatives of the Central Control Commission, advisers, and academics. The Secretariat, and subsequently the Central Committee Politburo, having examined the results of the preparatory work, deemed it possible to submit the normative-methodological documents to the joint Central Committee and Central Control Commission plenum. This opinion was also backed by the Central Control Commission Presidium. The comrades have the necessary materials at their disposal.

I would like to draw your attention to certain factors charaterizing the work on the documents submitted to you.

First, we proceed from the premise that during the work on the normative provisions there were the demands to democratize intraparty life. They served as the criterion for adopting or rejecting proposals and observations. Second, it was necessary to balance the Statutes and the directives in such a way as to ensure that, together, they would constitute an integrated normative-methodological foundation for the CPSU's activity. And so, Lenin's demand, enshrined in the Statutes, that democratic centralism must be consistently implemented to ensure self-management in party life, the combination of the interests of the party and of individual Communists, the authority of the party masses, and conscious discipline, also served as a cornerstone in our work on the instructions.

The CPSU's normative-methodological documents, drawn up in accordance with the Statutes, make it possible confidently to strengthen the organizational-political aspects of the party. It is important to acquaint party organizations and Communists with them as soon as possible, so that everyone is completely clear regarding fundamental organizational issues, and so that the party is able to conduct its work on a solid normative basis.

We must put an end to the interminable anarchic approach to party procedures, an approach witnessed fairly frequently of late. There have been quite a few cases where Communists, and sometimes even party organizations, do not deem it necessary to abide by the CPSU Statutes, and try, on the spur of the moment, to modify them according to their own interpretation.

Here and there questions already discussed at the 28th party congress, resulting in and party decisions are being raised again and again.

There are continual attempts to draw the party into the discussion of new topics or revived old topics, and to push it onto the path of self-analysis and permanently getting nowhere in questions of intraparty life.

We could not present a better gift to our political opponents and adversaries than actually embarking on this path. This would finally lead the CPSU into a dead-end situation and eliminate it from the political arena. Because a party preoccupied only with its internal problems is no good to anyone.

We must enhance the effectiveness of the party and of all its organizations and cells. Enhancing organization and discipline, Communists' activeness, and their responsibility for the destiny of the people—this is our main task.

Of special importance for the party is the revitalization of the primary party organizations' activity. With the adoption of the new Statutes they have been given every opportunity to become independent, you could even say sovereign, agents of party policy. Essentially, all the necessary conditions have been created to enable primary party organizations to become active bearers of party policy in society.

At the same time, it cannot go unremarked that primary party cells have become one of the main targets of the struggle against the CPSU. Ideas of freezing dues, dividing up party property, eliminating the party apparatus, carrying out depolitization, departyization, and so forth, are being infiltrated precisely into these cells.

It cannot be denied that in some places these ideas have fallen on fertile ground. A whole series of party organizations seem to be unable to emerge from the state of passiveness and paralysis. Party meetings are not being held, influence is not being exerted on the situation in collectives, and Communists are losing touch with each other. There are attempts at the self-liquidation of primary party organizations.

We must establish order in those party organizations tha have lost the characteristics of an organization, where the CPSU Statutes are not abided by. This has to be done by the Communists themselves with the assistance of party committees. They must make their influence felt through socially significant actions, revive the spirit of party comradeship and collectivism on a new basis, and learn to influence, by means of political methods, the situation within collectives, the deployment of cadres, and the solution of socioeconomic issues.

Members of the CPSU Central Committee and Central Control Commission must give all-around assitance to primary organizations. Special attention must be focused on those of them that, as a result of purposeful antiparty actions, find themselves on the brink of disintegration and self-liquidation. If necessary, the reregistration of individual party organizations will have to be carried out.

Party raykoms [rayon committees] and gorkoms [city committees] must begin to work more energetically. This component of the party has proved its resilience and militancy during the most crucial period. It is exerting decisive influence on the strengthening of party organizations and the creative renewal of party work in all spheres and, most importantly, among the population.

In view of the fact that the apparatus of all committees has been considerably reduced, we must focus efforts on boosting the voluntary principle in their work. It is necessary to give some thought to how the voluntary structures attached to committees could be revived in the new conditions, and how the work of councils of primary party organization secretaries, already gaining a good reputation, could be developed.

I would like to draw the plenum participants' attention to the need to counter more actively attempts to drive a wedge between the center and local party organizations. As is known, certain people quite often contrive to have appeals to the CPSU Central Committee adopted leveling accusations against the Central Committee without furnishing proof, and raising issues that have already been resolved. This is particularly noticeable at rayon level and also in primary party organizations.

In most cases the adoption of these appeals is based on a lack of knowledge of party documents, including congress materials. Some people have even stopped reading the party press and use information gleaned from "independent" publications.

This is no accident. Recently the Central Control Commission together with the Central Committee Organizational Department [Orgotdel] carried out a study of the implementation of Central Committee decisions at local party organizations. Amazing things came to light. Communists are not familiar even with the content of many Central Committee decisions that have a direct bearing on their work. And this applies not only to primary organizations but also to gorkoms and raykoms, and even to obkom [oblast committee] and kraykom [kray committee] bureau members.

I will cite just one example. At the Volgograd Obkom only eight of 15 bureau members were familiar with the CPSU Central Committee resolution "On Self-Disbandment of Moscow City Educational Establishment Party Organizations." At the Volgograd Gorkom, the city's Tsentralnyy CPSU Raykom, and higher educational establishment party organizations, where similar tendencies were in evidence, nobody had any idea at all about this Central Committee resolution.

I believe that the examination of the state of executive discipline in the party outlined at the Central Control Commission plenum will be useful. If we display this sort of attitude toward party decisions and if we ignore existing experience and recommendations of party organs, we can hardly expect a breakthrough in party work.

It is also necessary to establish a more efficient information system within the party because without this the party will not be able to function as an integrated organism. Maybe we should also reprint individual CPSU Central Committee decisions in the local party press. It is necessary to revive the practice of Central Committee letters to primary organizations and all Communists on the most crucial issues.

To be fair, it has to be noted that party work at local level is becoming increasingly businesslike. After difficult and protracted reports and elections and structural reorganization, party committees are coming round, tackling major issues, and reestablishing contact with the cadres. In short, they are beginning to work again. Many of them are becoming more independent in the assessment of the actions of all organs of power and management, they are finding optimum solutions in the economic sphere and elaborating methods and tactics of action in the prevailing situation. I would like to wish them greater self-confidence, mutual support, and understanding of what the center, the CPSU Central Committee, the Central Control Commission, and the CPSU Central Committee general secretary are doing.

The implementation of stabilizing economic and social measures, the transition to the market, work within the soviets, the active establishment of a national consensus, and the struggle for the preservation and stregthening of the Union—this is a vast field of action for every party organization and every Communist.

I believe that the discussion of the question, the proposals raised at the CPSU Central Committee January Plenum, and its decisions will provide good support for the country's party organizations in this work.

Polozkov Addresses Plenum

PM0102215491 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 2 Feb 91 First Edition p 2

[Speech by I.K. Polozkov, first secretary of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Communist Party, "from the stenographic record of the joint plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and Central Control Commission" on 31 January: "Our Choice Is at a Crossroads"]

[Text] Comrades! Continuing the discussion of the current moment, I would like to draw your attention to the following.

First, it is now clear to everyone that perestroyka—conceived in 1985 and begun by the party and people as a renewal of socialism, a more dynamic and complete utilization of its potential to boost the economy and culture, widen democracy, and increase people's prosperity—has not happened.

The so-called democrats have managed to supplant the aims of perestroyka and seize the initiative from our party. The people are being robbed of their past, their present is being destroyed, and no one can yet give a convincing account of what they can expect in future. Thus society is at a crossroads.

It must be admitted that the CPSU failed to see the beginning of the degeneration of perestroyka in time and allowed that process to gather speed. The party did not immediately realize that it was departing from its historical mission—to defend first and foremost the interests of the working people, that it was being taught to remain calm in the face of the artificial creation of a class of entrepreneurs at the expense of the working people, and that a social base was being created for political parties and movements with aims far removed from socialism. And the formation of such a class and the strengthening of its parties is accelerating in conditions in which no one has repealed our Constitution and our laws, including lawfully promulgated presidential decrees.

By differentiating between panhuman interests and class interests and by giving priority to planetwide values, we did a disservice to the socialist idea, loyalty was reaffirmed by the 28th CPSU Congress. The dialectical unity of class and panhuman interests was violated. Yet you and I know that no one ever expressed panhuman interests better than the working class. By forgetting this and drawing a veil over class contradictions, we basically robbed the party of a very important methodological tool and politically disarmed the broad masses of Communists. As a result the party proved unprepared for a keen political struggle. And now our prime task is to look around us, look into all this, and adopt appropriate measures to rectify this situation.

Second, now the liberals—or to put it more accurately, the right, or, more simply, the reactionaries—have cast off their democrats' masks. Proclaiming anticommunism as their ideology, they are rallying to its banner the heirs of the overthrown classes, nationalists, and dealers in the shadow economy—all who were or are inconvenienced by Soviet power.

Our pseudodemocrats flout the Constitution, kindle interethnic conflicts, and flout the elementary norms of democracy and morality. The anticommunist movement is eagerly supported by international capital, doing everything in its power to promote the widening of the movement's political positions, help strengthen its material base, and pay all kinds of compliments to its leaders.

All this, as has already been said, takes place under the flag of saving perestroyka and protecting it from the conservatives, and now even from the president and the new, recently formed cabinet. (applause.)

As we have seen, the democrats will use any method: slander, defamation, fabrications, blackmail—every method is employed against those who try to stand up to them or tell people the truth. Nevzorov only had to make one program that did not suit their plans for him to fall out of favor the very next day. That is an example of their morality. And we need hardly be surprised at the attempts that are being made to whitewash the recent dubious 140-billion-ruble deal perpetrated by Russia's leadership, astounding the whole world. These are all ways of reducing our people to such a state that they will say: "Do what you like with me, things can't get any worse." And then a dictatorship will really be installed—the dictatorship of private capital. That has happened in the countries of Eastern Europe, and this is the turn events are taking in Lithuania and some of our other republics. Let us call things by their names. If in Lithuania today a state organ declares the Communist Party of Lithuania to be outlawed and adopts repressive measures against it, how can there be any question of democracy, of perestroyka, of the development of renewal processes?

I would like to advise those who still believe in that kind of perestroyka to look closely at what has happened to, say, the Hungarian working people. According to data from the Gallup Institute published in NEPSZABADSAG on 2 January, after the reforms that have taken place only four to five percent of the population have seen an improvement in their material position. The standard of living for 42 percent has declined drastically. Next year a further deterioration in living conditions is expected for 84 percent of the population, and only 2 percent of Hungarians can hope for a better life. This would undoubtedly have been in store for us too if we had adopted those programs that people attempted so enthusiastically to impose on society—first the Program-90, then the 400 days, then the 500 days. They are all of the same kind.

Third, what we have now certainly cannot be called a multiparty system. There is the CPSU, the defender of socialist perestroyka, approved and voted for by our people, and then there are leaders with small political groups who in the final analysis share the same political face: anticommunism. These groups are consolidating and uniting in the struggle against the CPSU to seize power.

Neither do we have glasnost. Whereas formerly the CPSU had the monopoly of glasnost, now that monopoly belongs to the forces opposing it. It is they who determine the content of the main bulk of the information that people receive every day. And let us admit that they are succeeding to a considerable extent in exerting their corrupting influence on public awareness.

We are now learning not from pamphlets but from real life what bourgeois morality and bourgeois ethics are like, what unscrupulous methods and means can be used when power is at stake.

We must subordinate all forms of our party work to the struggle against them for people's minds and feelings. USSR People's Deputy A.A. Denisov was right when he said that you cannot make a policy with trembling hands—and, with his permission, I would add, a trembling voice. (Applause.) And in our view the prime need, as has already been said here, is to develop theoretical work. After all, we have proclaimed that we are moving into humane, democratic socialism. What is that? Where are we exhorting people to go? What will this society constitute? Without answering these questions we have nothing to rally the party behind and nowhere to urge and lead the working people.

We need to define our positions and tell the people about our steps toward the market, about economic structures and their relationships during the current period, about the protection of the interests of labor collectives that by virtue of the nature of their production process and specific characteristics cannot yet make it into the marketplace, and to place the public sector in equal conditions with the economic structures that are currently emerging. The lecture propaganda network needs to be rapidly reborn. Central Committee members, Politburo members, the entire party aktiv must go on television, write in the newspapers, go on the radio, visit labor collectives.

We must state bluntly that we will be loyal to the socialist choice, that we are for the renewal of socialism and the unfolding of its potential in the interests of working people, and tell people that the liquidation of socialist values will not enrich world civilization. The attempts that are being made to destroy socialist ideas are as immoral as they are illegitimate. We must stabilize people's awareness. Because it is no secret that many people today are fearful for their lives and their children's lives. And instilling faith, instilling dignity in our people is a task of paramount importance at this time.

Our ideological work will be successful only if the economy is successfully stabilized. And I agree with the keynote speaker and other speakers that in the heat of political passions economic leaders have been left to wrestle with their problems alone. Economic links have been disrupted and there is no discipline, and, to speak plainly, currently nobody is concerned with the economy, at least in Russia, its Supreme Soviet, and government. And those leaders who are outraged that central bodies' attention is currently devoted to distribution rather than production are right. Until we reorient ourselves in the direction of production there is no point in hoping for an increase in the working people's standard of living.

It is clear that these are priority questions for communist deputies. It is worth pondering how to establish more effective links with Communists working in soviets and their institutions. I believe that the Politburo was right to submit the question of work with Communists elected to soviets for discussion by this latest CPSU Central Committee plenum. I hope that this question does not suffer the same fate as the proposal made by Central Committee members at the last plenum: for an examination of the question of the party mass media. Today we are having another plenum. As we can see, this question is not on the agenda. I do not believe such delay in examining highly topical questions should be allowed.

The RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party Central Committee in particular is acutely aware of the information vacuum. We are the only party organization in the CPSU that does not have its own mass media. We are denied access to state television, and even the newspapers, with the exception of PRAVDA and SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, are not very kind to us.

There is something I would like to point out. In the keynote report, Vladimir Antonovich urged: Let us put an end to self-destruction in the party. But these processes are also being fed by the same forces. The main question is how we resist and rebuff these forces.

Comrades, all of us can see how the processes of the disarmament of the party and its transformation into an amorphous mass incapable of anything are developing. What conclusions stem from this? I saw a report by a correspondent for our Central Television from the Spanish Socialist Workers Party congress. Asked how for almost nine years this party has managed to retain leadership of the country single-handed and, moreover, with success, one of its leaders said: "Thanks to firm discipline and a well organized apparatus." As we know, their own perestroyka is proceeding successfully there. So let us learn from that party.

Comrades, perestroyka was supported by the people. It developed under the slogan "More socialism, more democracy." It was for precisely that policy that all of us obtained mandates as people's deputies, mandates as party congress delegates, mandates as CPSU Central Committee members. The people did not empower us to carry out any other kind of restructuring [perestroy], and they have given nobody the right to change the course of the sociopolitical system.

Oleynik Addresses Plenum

PM0102230991 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 2 Feb 91 First Edition p 2

[Speech by B.I. Oleynik, deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Soviet of Nationalities, "from the stenographic record of the joint plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and Central Control Commission" on 31 January: "If the Hard Rain Falls"]

[Text] Esteemed Comrade Communists! The present state of affairs in our country can in no way be examined in isolation from the context of events happening in the world. And these events are already stained with blood.

Hemingway said that you can kill a man but you cannot defeat him. Naturally, what he had in mind was not so much a person's physical end as attempts to destroy an individual's pride and national dignity. People, and even more so nations, never have, never do, and never will forgive anyone for that.

Over seven decades we in our motherland have also come to this unimpeachable truth by the method of trial and bitter and tragic error. Is this not the fundamental reason for the ubiquitous and sometimes hasty declaration by our country's peoples of sovereignty for themselves as a reliable defense against the threat of a new unitarianism, and fear has become part of the genetic code?

Maybe the chill of anxiety also flows from our inability to convincingly explain what kind of a formation we are headed toward. This is also why we lurch from a Union of soviet states to a Union of sovereign republics to accord among the peoples. This confusion plays right into the hands of every possible kind of political speculation, showing up particularly graphically at the Fourth Congress of People's Deputies. Using the machinery for open voting, that in their hands plays a universally despised snooping and whistle-blowing role while sneakily omitting to mention voting consistency or motives, some factions selectively published lists—primarily of Communists—indicating votes "for" but without indicating votes "against," thus disorienting the public. Yet we all unequivocally advocated a Union of **sovereign** states. And, consequently, for **the full sovereignty of all its components**.

At the requisite time I will of course expose this filthy "machine" and identify the specific "mechanics." But why is the party press again being so unpardonably slow to explain, especially with a referendum imminent? Meanwhile, even now people are already demanding clearer definitions and explanations of the questions on the referendum paper, of what kind of Union they should say "yes" or "no" for or against. And who said that there will be no place in the proposed community for either a centralized federation, or autonomy, or contractual-federal ties, or confederal ties, or even international-legal relations? This also ought to be explained.

Finally, the Communist Party must take an unequivocal stand on the recent tragic events in the Baltic region, condemning the use of force from whatever side it comes. As a first-hand witness of these explosions I believe that it would be appropriate to analyze the statement and actions of certain opponents in this supremely grave situation. I personally got the impression that some statements on events in the Baltic region were prepared in advance, while the outrageous hysteria of this invective prompts the thought that these statements were prepared in expectation of even bloodier outcomes. That, having failed in these arrogant calculations, these opponents have done and are doing everything to wreck the efforts of the president and the Supreme Soviet to stabilize the situation. Special attention should be paid to this.

But today there is a problem we are obliged to give an immediate answer, if it is not too late, of course, stands before us in all its sinister magnitude.

Elementary decency presupposes telling the truth at all times, even when it is to the speaker's detriment. This principle must prompt Communists to talk openly about the consequences of "Desert Storm," threatening to develop into the hurricane of World War III. In terms of ecological damage it can already be regarded as the beginning of an unprecedented world disaster that comparatively even the Chernobyl disaster pales. Without going in for the equivalent of a search for individual culprits, Communists must honestly admit that our actions in this situation have not always been optimal, to put it mildly. Indeed Saddam Husayn's aggression, like any other, is unpardonable. The person who unleashed it must receive the severest punishment, even after he has left occupied Kuwait.

And the world community in the shape of the United Nations immediately began to carry out these punitive actions, the most effective being the blockade. The unwavering hammering home of the blockade message, already exerting tangible pressure on Iraq, the worldwide moral condemnation of the aggressor, and other political actions seemed to be instilling hope that the conflict could be contained. Let us be frank that we too, right up until the fatal hour, did not believe that war would break out. We didn't believe it because we agree that far from all the levers for a peaceful settlement were utilized.

It is worth looking very closely at the frantic hyperactivity the American side has urged the allies, out of all the options, to accept military intervention as the only possible option and no alternative. All this was naturally extolled under the noble banner of the defense of panhuman values. And who would dare to call into question that lofty idea?

But we know that the United States, for all its commitment to panhuman interests, has never forgotten its own national interests. And does not hesitate to identify a threat to those interests anywhere on the planet, generally a thousand miles from its own territory.

What about us, may I ask—don't we have our own vital national interests? While the Americans are watching the theater of hostilities from a distance of several thousand versts, the USSR has basically become a front-line state, since war has broken out only 260 km from its borders. And it is hardly permissible to forget another factor, namely that a significant proportion of our country's population is of the Muslim faith. But even if that factor was absent, is it not blasphemous to talk of panhuman values, when for the sake of these values hundreds of thousands of innocent Iraqis, Israelis, and indeed allies are being sent to their deaths on Calvary?

I am struck, to put it mildly, by the boldness of certain statesmen who, standing comfortably with one boot in Grenada's face and the other in Panama's, lecture us like professors on these same panhuman values, human rights violations, and so forth. And is it not strange that our vigilant campaigners for human rights did not breathe a single word in condemnation of the aggressor, even when, having crushed an entire country, he abducted its president in passing? Good or bad, he was, after all, the legitimately elected president... And surely such an act is aggression, whoever perpetrates it. Or does a different principle apply here: "What Jupiter is allowed to do, the bull is not allowed to do"? Yet this kind of selectiveness indicates that we have given our a priori consent for a special role, Jupiter's role, to be played by one side, whose actions, whatever they may be, are not subject to analysis by the bulls ambling amenably to the slaughter—and some people are trying hard to drive our country into that herd!

I, who have lived through a war, do not want my distant descendants, digging around in the ruins of an ecological disaster, to find under the ashes the scorched remnants of declarations of national sovereignty, remaining no more than declarations. And I therefore call on the Communist Party, together with all social movements, to demand that the Supreme Soviet, the government, and the president appeal to the world community to stop the hostilities in the Persian Gulf at all costs. To this end an emergency UN session must be convened immediately, and the Security Council must vote for an end to the systematic slaughter of entire peoples. At the same time national and international commissions of experts must be set up to determine immediately the threat to mankind arising from the disastrous disruptions of the ecological equilibrium in the Persian Gulf. Because for us, who have lived through Chernobyl, delay in this respect is indeed like death!

It is at least surprising to find that the usually so magniloquent leaders both of the new movements and of certain sovereign republics are silent in the face of the specter of the apocalypse. Does anyone really expect the hard rain, the radiation from smashed reactors and chemical facilities in Iraq, to pass them by, on racial or national grounds? Blessed is he that believes. But the road to hell is paved with good intentions.

In this terrible time I would like to ask you all and ask myself: Are we going to go on pouring scorn on our Army? (Applause.) Let us at long last stop this cynicism, in the fateful hour when war is already thundering 200 km from our borders! After all, the Army is our last hope. Because if, God forbid, this poisonous and radioactive fallout should rain down on our own cities and villages, it will be the Army that is sent in to save us and our children. The Army, to whose soldiers we already owe a debt beyond payment for quenching the Chernobyl Vesuvius at the cost of their own health and lives. We must, at long last, ban anyone and everyone from putting the Army in the path of the leaden spittle of interethnic strife. It has a supreme, sacred duty—the defense of the Fatherland, today in danger not metaphorically, but in truth.

Ivashko Reports to Plenum

PM0102203091 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Feb 91 First Edition p 2

[Unattributed report of speech by V.A. Ivashko, deputy general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, at CPSU Central Committee plenum on 31 January 1991: "On the Current Moment and the Party's Tasks"]

[Text] In his report V.A. Ivashko, deputy general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, stressed the need to evaluate realistically and without bias the situation prevailing in the country and the party and set forth the fundamental principles by which the party's central organs are guided in their day-to-day work.

First, the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and Secretariat unswervingly follow the political line formulated by the 28th party congress. The program statement and resolutions of the congress and the new CPSU Statutes are the basis of all decisions of the Central Committee Politburo and Secretariat and guidelines issued to party committees. At the same time, at a tactical level account is taken, although not always promptly and accurately, of the rapidly changing situation, the instability of public awareness, and its inadequate defenses against the propaganda avalanche poured out by anticommunism, national chauvinism, and cheap populism. These phenomena are particularly dangerous for our society in view of the specific historical conditions in which it has developed over the decades.

Second, the practical actions of the Central Committee Politburo and Secretariat show full support for the course of renewal of Soviet society and loyalty to the USSR Constitution and socialist principles of social development and categorically reject all calumnies and accusations against them in connection with alleged attempts to change the state's domestic and foreign policy. We resolutely support the desire of the vast majority of Soviet people to live in a peaceful, civil society. A stable course and predictable development of social processes are the guarantees not only of normal life for every citizen but also of our state's preservation of a worthy place in the world community, where the strong and stable are valued but the weak and unreliable are simply not sought after as partners.

Third, the Central Committee Politburo and Secretariat adhere to a position of the primacy and priority importance of the interests of the individual, the people, and the state compared with internal party interests. The historical responsibility for the success of the reforms conceived rests with our party. The aim of these reforms is to build in our land a multinational society that lives peacefully and works normally and sovereign republics control the property that belongs to them and take care of their own culture, science, education, language, and other national assets, while all of them together, on the basis of the free expression of will and the friendship of peoples, preserve and protect the Soviet Union as a great world power—the guarantor of the rights and freedoms of all the Soviet peoples.

Only someone who is prejudiced, "stuck in a groove," as the fashionable phrase now goes, or perhaps simply ignorant can fail to understand that today there is no political force other than our party that is capable of resolving this most complex task and taking the opportunity granted by history. We are ready to work with everyone who wants to be on our side. But we must proceed from the assumption that success will come primarily as a result of our own efforts.

Fourth, the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and Secretariat consider it necessary resolutely to oppose all destructive ideas and actions in the economic, political, and spiritual spheres.

It must be acknowledged that hitherto the proper rebuff on our part has patently not been delivered. Our restraint was perceived by some people as weakness, confusion, and an inability to respond to attacks that have often been malicious and crude. Attempts to belittle the party, Lenin, and the ideas of October are becoming increasingly sophisticated and shameless. This cannot be tolerated.

Fifth, and last, the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and Secretariat persistently pursue a line of consolidating healthy forces in the party and society and achieving a situation where every party cell is constantly active and operational, thus seeking concrete results. This, along with the consistent democratization of the party line, is the guarantee of real renewal of the party.

I think these theses offer the opportunity to evaluate our principled positions on the key questions of public and party life.

It is naive, the speaker went on, to suppose that the profound social transformations taking place in our country could pass off without serious conflicts or clashes. No one in history has ever managed to implement such large-scale changes, affecting many people's interests, without acute resistance and confrontation, and also, mistakes and miscalculations.

Questions of the means and methods of reforming the economy and the state structure, curbing crime, and achieving social accord have become acute. In a number of places the developing processes of national rebirth have turned into national confrontation. Nationalism and separatism have prompted a wave of interethnic conflicts. Society's moral foundations are under threat. And what is required of all sensible politicians and every individual who cares about the motherland's future are actions capable of stopping society from disintegrating further.

An important event aimed at consolidating society was the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies. Its decisions concerning the socioeconomic and political stabilization of society, the terms for concluding a Union treaty, the strengthening of the executive power, and the Union budget seemed to open up real prospects for constructive work and collaboration by all political parties and movements.

But in real life the path of dialogue and compromise proposed by the CPSU to resolve the extremely complex problems of the transitional period is blocked by fierce resistance from separatists, nationalists, and all kinds of politickers who rate their own aims and personal ambitions above the country's future and the people's interests.

Events of recent months have clearly have revealed changes in the distribution of political forces. Those that call themselves "democratic" forces are evolving rapidly to the right and aligning themselves more and more blatantly with antisocialist values and unconstitutional actions. A bloc is being knocked together consisting of parties and currents of an obviously right-wing persuasion opposing the CPSU and set themselves the goal of changing the social system in the country. They have basically launched an open struggle to force the CPSU out of the political arena, to condemn socialism as an inherently futile idea, and to bring about the collapse of the Soviet Union.

These are the initial premises on which the tactics of political struggle are built. To characterize these tactics extremely briefly, they boil down to the destructive formula: "The worse things are—the better." The more difficult the situation in the country, the sooner they will come to power and embark on the realization of their stated strategic goals.

Wide use is being made of the methods of political and moral terror; personal defamation; vilification of the legitimate institutions of power and legitimately elected leaders; and calls for nonobservance of laws, for strikes, and even for total civil disobedience.

In general it can be said that a serious attempt is being made before our very eyes to implement a program to destroy the economic, political, and social system in our country.

Our assessment of what is happening, including the recent events in the Baltic region, is clear and specific. Supporting the USSR president's statement on events in the Baltic region, we are resolutely opposed to all attempts to split society and the country into hostile camps and are opposed to national strife, bitter and destructive confrontation, violence, and tyranny, wherever and in whatever form they are manifested.

We categorically reject the gross violation of civil rights, discrimination on ethnic grounds, contemptuous treatment of servicemen and their families, and attempts by certain circles to pin the blame for events in the Baltic region on our party and thereby fan anticommunist hysteria. The CPSU consistently comes out in favor of the development of the democratic process and against violence. Only the USSR Constitution, the laws of the Soviet state, and observance of every individual's rights can serve as a basis for resolving the problems that arise.

Undoubtedly every conflict has its prehistory, its deep-rooted causes, and they must be studied objectively. It is not right to exploit a tragedy; yet there is evidence of attempts at this kind of exploitation, and indeed on a large scale, even in the international arena. And we must realistically be aware that a purposeful, coordinated attack is under way by forces that can now be called an organized political opposition with far-reaching goals.

The offensive has been launched primarily against the center and all the Union structures. The Army, the KGB, and the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] are defamed. The new Cabinet of Ministers is not forgotten either. The USSR president is subject to shameless attacks.

It is being instilled into people that perestroyka, democracy, and glasnost are disappearing into oblivion and that dictatorship is coming to take their place. Now everyone who expresses doubt about any of the ideas, programs, or actions of the self-styled "democrats" is unconditionally categorized as a "reactionary"—one of the apostates of perestroyka. Attempts to turn the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet into a battering ram to break down the USSR are dangerous and carry the risk of serious consequences.

The speaker went on to dwell on the present complex international situation determining the conditions in which perestroyka is taking place in the USSR. Assessing the situation in the country as a whole, he noted that there are grounds for concern, but on no account should there be panic. The party is oriented toward constructive work; but when a tough political struggle is foisted on us, the CPSU should not avoid the challenge.

Dwelling on the state of affairs in the economy, Comrade Ivashko stressed that in 1990 there was an absolute decline in social production for the first time since the war. In terms of oil and coal extraction and metal production the country fell back to the positions of the early eighties. The disruption of intersector production ties and the unavailability of adequate supplies of raw materials, semimanufactures, subassemblies, and spare parts, including imports, have brought hundreds of enterprises, light industry included, to the brink of stoppage. Hundreds of thousands of people work at these enterprises. Direct losses of worktime alone resulted in a shortfall of 5 billion rubles [R] worth of output. One in four enterprises failed to fulfill their contractual commitments. This is the price we are paying for the intolerably protracted reorganization of national economic management, disorderliness and errors in implementing the reforms, the fall in labor activeness, and the decline in discipline. Many collectives used their economic autonomy to increase profits and wage funds by increasing prices for their output while reducing the volume of output.

Now that we have entered a new year, the situation is not improving. Not only has the decline in production been halted, it is continuing to progress. At a number of enterprises, shops and whole blocks were shut down from the very first days of the year. The production of the majority of the most important types of output in January this year fell 5-10 percent compared with last year. The situation is exacerbated by the poor organization of delivery and storage of goods: the goods are squandered, they fall into the hands of speculators, and in many cases patent sabotage is allowed to occur.

The imbalance between production plans and material and technical backup is still the primary cause of hitches. The campaign to conclude economic contracts for the delivery of output has yet to be completed, and numerous interregional barriers hampering the restoration of enterprises' economic links have not yet been removed.

The most resolute measures, perhaps even emergency measures, should be adopted to restore a normal pace of work at enterprises, as the main producers of material goods. These measures need strong party support and that means support by all party structures.

The primary political problem is the situation on the consumer market. The potential for reducing tension exists, but is not being realized.

The CPSU Central Committee Secretariat deemed it necessary to call on party organizations to become more actively involved in the fulfillment of the state program for stabilizing the food situation, adopted by the Congress of USSR People's Deputies. This is a concrete task that Communists in both the countryside and the cities should accept.

The impression is sometimes created that certain party organizations have "relieved" themselves, so to speak, of production responsibilities and become bystanders. They have stopped analyzing processes and actively influencing them on the basis of the situation. Judge for yourselves: Despite a record grain harvest and a pretty good harvest of feed crops, in the RSFSR as a whole milk production in the first three months of the winter period was 10 percent less than the previous year; in the Central Chernozem oblasts it was 15 percent less, and in the Volga region it was 14 percent less. In the Republic of Moldova it was 13 percent less. The situation is similar in Lvov and Odessa Oblasts in the Ukraine, Alma-Ata Oblast in Kazakhstan, and Samarkand Oblast in Uzbekistan.

We should state frankly that this is the result of serious blunders in work with livestock farmers, including the work of many primary party organizations and rural raykoms [rayon party committees]. Yet considerable experience has been accumulated here. To what purpose is it now suddenly being thrown overboard?

We have a good many leaders, especially in the cities, who have evidently come to believe firmly that you only have to proclaim new economic incentives and methods and they will start working on their own accord. And so this is what happened last fall: There was a pretty good harvest, the peasants were swamped with work, but the city dwellers—the bosses and all the rest—were in many cases staying out of it. You know the result.

A similar situation is taking shape with this year's crop. There is a shortfall of more than 5 million hectares in the area of winter sowings in the country as a whole, and 30 million hectares of fall plowing has not been done. In a number of places things are not going well with seed preparation, equipment repair, and machine and fertilizer deliveries. The peasant himself cannot cope with the volume of spring work that lies ahead, and so the countryside must be given real assistance before it is too late.

It is one of the tasks of party organizations actively to promote the reform of production relations and the establishment of a mixed economy in the countryside. Party committees are called upon to give the local soviets assistance in implementing the land reform and creating a special land stock from which rural and city dwellers could receive lease plots by this spring to organize family farms, peasant farms, and cooperatives and back-up personal plots. In short, if we have decided to boost the countryside by joint efforts, let us do it.

Economic recovery today depends crucially on the normalization of financial activity at all levels of management and economic activity. As a result of the conflict between the Union and republic budgets, it has become hard for local people to form a realistic idea of the resources available for the implementation of socioeconomic programs. The growth of monetary incomes and the budget deficit has led to an increase in the state's domestic and foreign debt, an increase in the surplus money supply, and inflation.

The population's monetary income increased by R232 billion in the 12th 5-Year Plan, growing three times more rapidly than in the previous five-year plan. One wonders: What market, what economy can withstand such a torrent of money?

An intelligent financial policy is needed, one that ensures the greatest possible savings of state resources and the direct dependence of incomes on the results of economic activity.

The price reform has begun in practice in the country, but it is being carried out unsystematically, at great cost. The gap between the levels of purchase, wholesale, and retail prices is holding back the production of output, primarily of consumer goods, and has placed many enterprises in a grave financial position. Some places have begun to carry out their own regional moves to rectify prices, thereby exacerbating an already heated political atmosphere.

We need unified principles, agreed by all the republics, for the rectification of state retail prices, coupled with a careful study of all the social consequences. Here every step must be considered comprehensively and an effective system be brought in for prompt, advance compensation for the losses that the population could sustain in the course of price increases. This applies particularly to citizens who are poorly off, especially pensioners, the disabled, and young people.

It is important that all work to normalize the economic situation be linked in the closest possible manner to the commencement of market relations. The party has defined its attitude to the market. It sees it as a means of bringing labor incentives into operation; ensuring competition; and doing away with monopolism, leveling, and dependent attitudes.

Basically we are already entering the market. Laws on ownership, enterprises, the new tax system, the banks, and many others have been adopted and the legal environment for the operation of market economy mechanisms has begun to be created. There is therefore no substance in accusations that we are rejecting the market and returning to the old administrative methods of economic management.

The transition to the market entails the adoption of unpopular and sometimes harsh measures in the sphere of the economy and social policy. Judging by world experience, this is inevitable. It is also acknowledged by the compilers of market programs of every kind. But here is a noteworthy point: The Union government only has to adopt one of these measures for politicians of a certain variety to raise the cry: This, they say, is an "act against the people," a "dubious venture," and so forth. One thing must be said about this: If every step along the road to the market becomes the subject of an unscrupulous political game, there will be no reforms.

For instance, many people are now concerned about the question of the reform of ownership; but here, too, the first costs have already become apparent. In some republics there are attempts to replace the administrative edict diktat of Union departments with diktat of a republican variety.

The party looks at the matter differently. In the market economy enterprises should be commanded neither by the center nor by the republics. The labor collectives should be granted real economic autonomy so that they can assume responsibility for the results of production.

While advocating equal rights for all types of ownership, we give preference to collective forms. There is as yet no thoroughly tested mechanism for dismantling state ownership and privatizing it, and this process must not be allowed to turn into an uncontrolled process of sharing out national assets and selling them off to dealers in the shadow economy. Within the framework of the laws already adopted, party committees could help labor collectives to exercise their rights to economic initiative through leasing and the creation of collective and joint-stock enterprises.

The problem of the social protection of people is inevitably being exacerbated with the transition to the market. Let us take an unprejudiced look at the phenomena fueling social tension. Property stratification within society is intensifying. The standard of living for the majority of the population is declining. Retail prices rose substantially in December of last year—to a considerable extent because of prices in kolkhoz [collective farm] markets and cooperative trade.

The employment problem is worsening. And after all, the overwhelming majority of people need to earn money. In 1991 it will be necessary to train for new trades more than 600,000 specialists and workers who were released in the course of conversion and to give them different jobs. A great number of construction workers are losing their familiar job because of the reduction in production investments.

Party committees must have a thorough knowledge of the situation in this sphere and propose their own measures to defuse the situation. It is very important to switch the cadre potential released as a result of structural shifts to new activity needed by the national economy. So we must show concern in good time to ensure that people's skill and worktime do not end up being lost to society.

The solution of many social questions has worsened. The graph for the commissioning of housing, schools, hospitals, and other projects shows a sharp downward curve. Last year alone the population failed to receive 29 million square meters of housing.

Party committees cannot regard this as merely a problem for the soviets and departments. Local forces, reserves, and potential must be mobilized to solve the housing problem. This is one of the specific actions.

After mentioning the need to resolve the urgent current problems, the speaker drew attention to the fact that in the economy you cannot live only for the present. While resolving the problems of stabilizing the economy, at the same time we should think about modernizing and renewing productive forces, that must encapsulate recent achievements in scientific and technical progress. This requires a well-thought-out investment policy and the appropriate investment of resources in science, in developing base sectors, and in creating modern highly productive machine building and resource-saving technologies. A great deal here is determined by the position of governments—both Union and republic—and of planning organs.

Speaking about the CPSU's role in the renewal of society, Comrade V.A. Ivashko said that the party's constructive position must find expression primarily in specific actions.

The party is anchored by deep roots among the people. Specific actions for people's benefit will only increase its prestige. Moreover, the party's active joining in the processes of social life and in the formation of a new economic, political, and spiritual environment will accelerate the renewal of the party itself.

Millions and millions of Communists, traveling the difficult road of political self-determination, have remained with the party. Many party organizations, including Union republic communist parties and republic and oblast organizations, have switched from mute defense to vigorous action and are gradually gaining confidence and beginning to work in a creative vein.

But on the whole the perestroyka of party life is going slowly, and there is a decline in activeness and a slackening of discipline in a number of organizations.

It should be admitted self-critically that we do not react promptly enough to specific situations. We do not always manage to do what was planned. But let us be blunt: The Central Committee, the Politburo, and the Secretariat, like the whole party, have been working in a very complex political situation lately. And there is only one way out of this situation: harmonious, cohesive work.

The paramount task is to ensure efficient work by all party structures—kraykoms [kray party committees], obkoms [oblast party committees], gorkoms [city party committees], and raykoms—and to strengthen vertical links between party organizations. Today everyone must be aware that we are a united party, and we must always display comradely solidarity. That is the only way in which it is possible to strengthen our ideological and moral positions in society and scale new heights.

The question of the place of the Union republics' communist parties within the CPSU arises in new terms for us under the present conditions. The essence here is as follows: We must really ensure their autonomy in accordance with the CPSU Statutes and at the same time unity of action by Communists on the basis of the platform of the whole party. Communists are Communists so long as they remain internationalists and fight for working people's common interests.

The present situation within the communist parties varies. Time has shown that if the leadership gives way in the face of nationalist pressure and flirts with separatists, a Communist Party begins to lose its position and prestige in the working people's eyes, or else simply to disintegrate. And the opposite also applies. When a Communist Party firmly upholds the ideas of socialism and internationalism, it stands fast even after heavy blows from splittist forces.

Stepping up the activity of primary party organizations is of key importance. They are slowly, very slowly, getting over the shock after fair and unfair criticism and the pressure of moral responsibility, as part of the CPSU, for affairs in the country. In a number of primary party organizations the situation is causing concern.

To consolidate the position of primary party organizations and strengthen their influence in labor collectives, it is important that wide support beg given to the experience of party committees that conclude contracts with the administration and labor collective councils regarding collaboration, that economic studies and political discussions and other duties be organized and taken on, and that working people's interests be defended vigorously.

The speaker went on to address the question of the composition of the CPSU's ranks, their size, and shortcomings in work with Communists. It was recommended that individual interviews with CPSU members be held in all party organizations. The aim is to strengthen their confidence in the party's potential, to reveal Communists' opinions about urgent questions, and to clarify the real disposition of forces inside the CPSU. Once the results of the interviews have been generalized, the necessary decisions on the organizational strengthening of party ranks could be adopted. It is also necessary to strengthen work to admit Komsomol [Leninist Communist Youth League] members and young people to the party. We must influence young people by force of persuasion and through the implementation of an active youth policy. Then the influx of young people into the CPSU will also be the consequence of a natural process.

Comrade V.A. Ivashko noted that, today, when the question of power is so sharply placed on the agenda, the CPSU's positions within the soviets must be strengthened. Above all, it is necessary to ensure cohesion and unity of action on the part of communist deputies in soviets at all levels. To this end we should step up the creation of communist groups (factions). Party committee secretaries who have been elected as deputies could be recommended as faction leaders. This work must be particularly important for them.

To strengthen party influence in the soviets, wider use should be made of deputies' clubs open not only to Communists but also to those who are prepared to cooperate with the CPSU in specific actions.

It also has to be said that it is impossible to tolerate the situation whereby a CPSU member elected as a deputy with the support of party organizations or directly on the CPSU ticket regards himself as free from any obligations to his party and even opposes its policy.

The report emphasized that the party's ideological and educational function has been seriously weakened recenly. Illusions have emerged in some quarters that a changed existence will automatically solve all problems of ideological, moral, and political education. We must waste no time in restoring everything positive that we used to have—but we must fill it with appropriate content, of course. The main thing now is to provide constant information to all party members about the most important aspects of its policy, systematically explain our aims, and utilize all forms of party studies at our disposal.

We are finding it difficult to rid ourselves of the superiority complex allowing us for decades to dominate social life. It is clear that, no matter how great the number of parties, groups, and movements emerging, at present they cannot operate on equal terms with the CPSU. But this does not mean that there are grounds for disregarding them. It is important for constructive dialogue to gather strength.

Cultural workers and the creative intelligentsia can do a great deal here. There are now hysterical cries on various sides about the shooting of perestroyka, a backlash, and perestroyka's failure. These emotional assessments are characteristic of a certain section of the intelligentsia which rushes from immoderate delight to imprecations. Genuine culture, of which lofty spirituality, morality, and a respectful attitude toward the individual and also, of course, toward the norms of communal life and the state's laws are an organic part, does not disunite people but unites them irrespective of their ideological and political views.

The most important and difficult thing in the party's activity is the profound interpretation of the processes taking place in society. To this end we must mobilize all of its scientific and technical potential and orient party scientific institutions toward elaborating the theory and urgent questions of the CPSU's present-day policy and the complex problems of the transitional period.

The press, radio, and television are the most powerful means of agitation and propaganda and of shaping the public mood in the struggle of ideas that has developed in our society.

A multiparty system among the mass news media is now a fact of our social life, but unfortunately it is not evidence of genuine democratization. The main aim for many publications is not to strengthen burgeoning democracy or to seek constructive solutions but to level fierce and destructive criticism at all and sundry, which sometimes shades into outright mockery of their own people, their history, and previous generations. The thesis that the country is still ruled by the partyocracy and that you need only overthrow it and everything will automatically be fine is designed for politically ignorant people.

I think the CPSU Central Committee plenum could instruct the party press to step up the struggle against the slander campaign. It should not merely defend Communists' honor and dignity but show their role in perestroyka and their dedication to the people's vital interests.

In conclusion, Comrade V.A. Ivashko said that, for all the contradictoriness of the processes of social development, we must concentrate on the main thing: how to make Soviet people's lives worthy of modern civilization. The CPSU has no interests other than the interests of the country and the people.

We will firmly and consistently steer a course toward democratization of social life, social harmony, a stable economy, a renewed and firm Soviet Union, and strong state power. Let no one doubt that.

Moiseyev, Others Address CPSU Military Panel

PM0302151591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Feb 91 Second Edition p 1

[Report by V. Izgarshev: "Concern for Military Is a Party Concern"]

[Text] A scheduled session of the CPSU Central Committee Commission on Party Military Policy was held yesterday under the chairmanship of O. Baklanov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Reports by A. Obukhov and M. Moiseyev, Communist leaders of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs and USSR Ministry of Defense, on the progress of arms reduction talks and safeguarding the military security of the Soviet state under the planned USSR Armed Forces reductions were heard and discussed.

Communists N. Shlyaga, B. Batalin, L. Nikiforov, O. Burdenko, and other commission members spoke in detail about the problems and tasks to be resolved by ministry and department party organizations in connection with the state's foreign policy activities, arms reductions, and agreements in this sphere. The speakers said that bilateral and multilateral treaties of importance for the destiny of the country and the whole world have been concluded recently. It is very important to ensure that the broad Soviet and world public, all the citizens of our country, have a clear idea about the objectives and progress of diplomatic talks and the nature of the documents adopted. It is also very important to ensure that everyone is aware of the military, political, and economic benefit of the agreements and treaties concluded. They are all intended reliably to ensure a peaceful life for the peoples of our country and to serve the cause of perestroyka, the speeches emphasized.

The commission heard a report by Communist and USSR People's Deputy I. Gorelovskiy on a tour by representatives of the USSR Supreme Soviet Defense and State Security Committee of a number of our military districts and East European countries in connection with the withdrawal of Soviet troops. During an exchange of opinions the extraordinary importance of the party's concern for servicemen and members of their families was emphasized.

Doing everything to surround with warmth and attention the servicemen who have discharged their duty abroad selflessly and with honor and to provide their families with all the essentials—this is the No. 1 task of Communists in cities and army garrisons where units and subunits from the groups of forces are being redeployed.

At the conclusion of the session, Army General M. Moiseyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, delivered a report on the military-political situation in the Persian Gulf.

Economic

Gorbachev Greets World Economic Forum in Davos

LD0202104391 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0954 GMT 2 Feb 91

[Text] Moscow, 2 Feb (TASS)—USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev congratulated the participants in the World Economic Forum, taking place in Davos to mark the organization's 20th anniversary. Gorbachev expressed in the telegram sent today that this organization "has earned a high reputation in the government and business circles".

President Gorbachev drew the attention of the forum participants "to the appearance of a dangerous backlash in estimating the Soviet Union's role in the world economy in the coming decades, and the attempts to create new obstacles for its striving to include its mighty potential in the world economic process on the basis of constructive and equal principles".

He expressed hope that "the Davos forum will demonstrate its usual modern way of thinking, worthy of such an influential and progressive organization".

Pavlov on Deposits, Banknote Circulation

LD0102191391 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1600 GMT 1 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondents Boris Grishchenko and Boris Shestakov]

[Text] Moscow, 1 Feb (TASS)—"The government has no plans for the further removal from circulation of banknotes or the freezing of deposits in savings-bank books," Valentin Pavlov, USSR prime minister, firmly stated to your TASS correspondents. It would seem that the frost has cooled the hot heads, he continued, but ridiculous rumors continue to spread. I can calm everyone who believed conjectures: In the foreseeable future, we are planning nothing of the sort. "One can live calmly," he added.

Some, of course, are attempting to find evasive maneuvers, the head of the government noted. These folk are quite sophisticated. There are enough cases of an organization that usually has a surplus of 100 rubles [R], suddenly depositing more than R2 million. This must be sorted out. But basically the state has always protected the population's savings. Incidentally, very few have drawn attention to the fact that savings in savings banks are not subject to inspection and no one checks the amount and legality of money placed there. The very fact that a person is not afraid to put money under his own name serves as proof for the state of his decency.

"We must end the financial panic. If people are simply saving for a rainy day, that is one thing; if, however, someone is making an illegal profit, that is another," Valentin Pavlov stressed. "We must resolutely put an end to this."

Government Releases 1990 Economic Results

914A0381A Moscow EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN in Russian No 5, Jan 91 pp 9-13

[Report of USSR State Committee for Statistics on plan fulfillment: "The USSR Economy in 1990"]

[Text]

I. Overall Results

The socioeconomic situation in the country deteriorated significantly last year. The crises continued to grow, encompassing all spheres of the economy, especially monetary circulation. There began an absolute decline of the scale of public production.

The growth of the population's monetary income significantly exceeded the dynamics of the production of goods and services, and as a result inflationary processes increased, and the consumer market collapsed.

The reduction of the buying power brought about the introduction of in-kind exchange among the enterprises, republics, and regions, which led to violations of the existing economic ties. The growing sociopolitical instability had a negative influence on the economy.

The basic socioeconomic indicators in 1990 are characterized by the following figures (in actual prices; billions of rubles):

	1990		1990 in % of 1989 (comparable prices)
	according to plan or calculations for it	Actual	
Industrial output	941.5	912.2	98.8
Production of consumer goods (in retail prices)	480.9	459.2	106
including:			
Foodstuffs	156.0	147.7	100.9
Alcoholic beverages	51.5	55.2	108
Nonfood commodities	273.4	256.3	109
Of these,			
Light industry goods	110.3	99.6	102
Agricultural products (in comparable prices)	239.5	220	97.7
Startup of fixed capital from state capital investments according to estimated value)	191,8*	164.0	96
State capital investments (according to estimated value):			
Centralized	83.6	79.0	81
Money from funds of enterprises and organizations	107.6*	111.0	110
Shipments (outbound)			
Cargo on general purpose transportation, billions of tons	13.2	12.2	94.1
Passenger travel on general purpose transportation, billions of passenger-kilometers	1162	1150	102.0
Profit in the national economy	272	288	99
Wage fund of workers and employees	367	387	111
Payments and benefits for the population from social consumption funds	204	210	110.4**

	1990		1990 in % of 1989 (comparable prices)
	according to plan or calculations for it	Actual	
Retail commodity turnover of state and cooperative trade	443.0	466.9	110.4
Paid services	76.2	72.6	105.2
Residential buildings made available from all sources of financing, millions of square meters of dwelling space	144.0	115.0	89

*According to the sum of plans of enterprises and organizations

**In actual prices

The gross national product decreased by two percent as compared to the preceding year, the produced national income—by four percent, and the productivity of social labor—by three percent.

Foreign trade turnover amounted to 13.2 billion foreign currency rubles, decreasing by 6.9 percent. The negative foreign trade balance reached 10 billion foreign currency rubles.

The state foreign debt increased by more than 150 billion rubles [R] and exceeded R550 billion.

State budget revenues reached R452 billion, and expenditures—R510.1 billion. The state budget deficit amounted to R58.1 billion as against the R60 billion approved by the USSR Supreme Soviet. It decreased by R22.6 as compared to 1989, which was basically brought about by the reduction of allocations for state centralized capital investments, the reduction of defense expenditures, and the increased revenues from turnover tax and the tax on the population.

The budget received R10 billion more in turnover tax or nine percent more than in 1989. Payments from the profit of state enterprises and organizations remained at approximately the same level as last year. Taxes on the population increased by more than 10 percent, which was related to the considerable growth of their incomes.

In state budget expenditures there was a certain increase in the share of expenditures on social and cultural measures, and it reached 31 percent. The proportion of expenditures on the national economy amounted to 37 percent, and defense—13.9 percent; these are less than last year. Subsidies for reimbursement for differences in prices for individual kinds of products amounted to about 20 percent of the budget expenditures.

The incomes of the enterprises grew, which is related primarily to the increased share of profit left at their disposal. There was an especially appreciable increase in the economic incentive funds, into which R340 billion were deposited. The residuals of these funds as of the beginning of 1991 amounted to R125 billion and had increased by R16 billion or 15 percent. The accumulation of a significant amount of money in the material incentive funds was related to the inadequate provision of material resources.

Credit investments in the national economy decreased by R26.5 billion and as of 1 January 1991 amounted to R364.6 billion.

The emission of cash money increased 1.5-fold which, with the limited possibilities of increasing expenditures on goods and services, led to a growth of residuals of cash reserves "on hand" among the population from R104.7 billion at the beginning of 1990 to R132.7 billion at the beginning of this year as well as to their further devaluation.

Last year certain measures were taken to implement scientific and technical programs.

There were 16 scientific discoveries in the area of physics, chemistry, biology, and medicine as well as 85,000 inventions registered in USSR registries.

Interbranch scientific and technical complexes created equipment and technology of a high technical level. Among them were: technology for microbiological influence on the oil-bearing layers which contributes to the most complete extraction of oil; an installation for preparing the surfaces of metals for the application of protective coatings, which makes it possible to improve the quality in increase the durability of items; technology for producing instruments made of tungsten-free and other hard alloys obtained on the basis of synthesis of new inorganic compounds and materials.

Important scientific research and developments have been carried out in keeping with state scientific and technical programs. In particular, using ecologically pure and reduced-waste technologies, experimental batches of energy-saving polymer materials were produced;an experimental batch of tires was produced using energy-saving technology and an ultra-high-frequency vulcanizer; and models of the ES-1863 personal computer were produced with 2-4 megabytes of random access memory, as well as an electrophonocardiograph with microprocessor control, and a number of new technical devices for television and radio broadcasting and cinematography.

On the whole the state order for the delivery of new kinds of technical equipment was fulfilled by 81 percent. Of the 182 items envisioned for output, delivery has not been started on 20 items.

The low level of the introduction of the achievements of scientific and technical progress has impeded the process of intensification of public production. The energy-intensiveness of the national income increased by more than four percent in 1990 as compared to 1989.

Fuel and energy were not used very efficiently. The level of losses of boiler and furnace fuel and electric and thermal energy, because they surpassed existing norms, amounted to 8.5 million tons of conventional fuel, while the average annual amount has been 5.2 million tons over the past four years. The volume of secondary thermal and combustible resources put into national economic circulation (61 million tons of conventional fuel) stayed at the same level as last year.

During the process of changing over to a market economy we saw the beginning of the formation its multiple structures and the development of new forms of management, which is characterized by the following data:

	Number of employees, millions		Output volume, billions of rubles		Fixed production capital, billions of rubles	
	1985	1990	1985	1990	1985	1990
Total (material production)	100.3	99.7	1,378.2	1,638	1,600.2	2,083.8
State sector	81.6	76.8	1,198.8	1,354	1,410.2	1,852.0
Cooperative sector	15.4	18.4	122.1	206	172.0	206.8
Including:						
Kolkhozes	12.2	11.2	101.2	125	153.5	173.3
Consumer cooperation	3.2	3.5	20.9	30	18.5	28.5
Cooperatives for producing goods and services	—	3.7	51	—	5.0	
Individual sector	3.3	4.5	57.3	78	18.0	25.0
Including:						
Peasant farms	—	0.1	—	2	—	0.6
Private subsidiary farms	3.2	4.2	57.3	74	18.0	24.4
Individual labor activity	0.1	0.2	—	2	—	—

Leasing has become widespread in practically all branches of the national economy. By the end of 1990 more than 2,000 trade organizations, trusts, and worker supply departments were working under leases as were more than 33,000 public catering stores and enterprises that are not united by the aforementioned trade organizations and trusts, almost 400 consumer service enterprises, and 1,600 ateliers and shops of the consumer service ministries.

Leasing has become most widespread in industry. In 1990 2,400 leasing enterprises produced R48 billion worth of products, which comprises 5.2 percent of the overall volume of output in the branch has a whole. The basic indicators of the operation leased enterprises are higher than in industry as a whole.

There has been further development of cooperatives for producing goods and services. In 1990 the number of operating cooperatives increased 1.4-fold and amounted to 260,000, and they employed 6.2 million people, including people with more than one job. They produced R70 billion worth of goods and services (in 1989—R40 billion), including directly to the population—in an amount of about R10 billion (in 1989—R6.2 billion). Cooperation accounts for about seven percent of the gross national product.

The majority of cooperatives (more than 80 percent) have been created at state enterprises and are operating with their production capital and therefore they are oriented toward the consumption of state enterprises and organizations. The latter account for more than four-fifths of the products (goods and services) sold by cooperatives. The influence of cooperatives on the saturation of the consumer market is still weak. The proportion of products sold by cooperatives in the overall volume of retail commodity turnover was two percent.

The creation of independent peasant farms is expanding. As of 1 January 1991 there were 40,600 peasant farms to which were assigned about 700,000 hectares of land.

As of the end of last year there were more than 120 concerns in the country, about 120 interbranch state associations, 1,420 conglomerates, 102 consortiums, more than 100 territorial interbranch associations, and more than 1,200 joint stock enterprises.

About 3,000 joint enterprises had been created by the end of 1990. Almost 80 percent of them were created with the participation of firms, companies, and enterprises of the FRG, the United States, Finland, and other developed capitalist countries. The charter fund of the joint enterprises is about R6 billion, one-third of which comes from foreign partners. But only 42 percent of the overall number of registered enterprises conduct production activity or render services. Their sales of goods and services on the domestic market as compared to retail commodity turnover amounts to 0.6 percent, their share of the country's exports is 0.3 percent, and imports—1.6 percent.

The process of privatization of property is developing. At the present time in the country it is intended to transfer to private or collective ownership 21,100 retail trade enterprises, 9,300 public catering enterprises, and 12,800 consumer service enterprises, which comprise three-five percent of their overall number.

A basis has been laid for the formation of a retail infrastructure. On the basis of the commodity-producing network of the USSR [State Committee for Material and Technical Supply] and other departments, stores and other commercial organizations are being created for wholesale trade in means of production. At the present time there are about 1,400 commercial and cooperative banks. As of 1 December 1990, 7.2 percent of the residual loan fund was from commercial and cooperative banks. The Moscow stock exchange has been created for trading in securities.

II. Social Development. Population and Labor Resources

As of the beginning of 1991 the USSR population amounted to 290.1 million. During the year it increased by 1.4 million as against 2 million in 1989. This was brought about to a considerable degree by the reduction of the birth rate and growth of the death rate, which is clear from the following figures.

	1989	1900
Overall coefficients (per 1,000 people)		
Birth rate	17.6	16.8
Death rate	10.0	10.4
Natural increase	7.6	6.4

The overall coefficient of the natural increase in 1990 is the lowest in postwar years. The most unfavorable demographic situation is developing mainly in the European part of the country.

The reduction of the growth rates of the population is also affected by the increased emigration from the USSR. In 1990 about 400,000 people moved outside the country for permanent residence, or twice as many as in the preceding year. This process is typical of the majority of Union republics.

The nature of internal migration changed significantly. In recent years there has been a category of migrant refugees which is new to our country. In 1990 this problem affected eight Union republics and more than half of the regions of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic]. As of the end of 1990 there were more than 600,000 refugees (forced migrants) in the country.

The country's labor resources amounted to 164 million people or about 60 percent of the overall population. The number of people employed in all spheres of activity dropped from 139.3 million in 1989 to 138.4 million in 1990. The state sector employed 114.6 million, the cooperative sector—19.3 million (of these, 11.5 million were kolkhoz workers, 3.5 million in consumers cooperation, and 4.3 million in cooperative), and in the individual sector—4.5 million people.

The reduction of the number of people employed in the national economy was largely conditioned by the introduction of such a social benefit as the growth of the length of vacations for women to care for children, the activation of the transition to pensions, and the growth of the number of unemployed.

The number of the able-bodied population who were not employed in the national economy and were not students increased. At the present time there are more than 8 million of them. Of this number, those who are temporarily out of work who can be counted as unemployed is approximately 2 million.

At the same time enterprises operating in the main production branches as of the beginning of 1991 for fulfilling the production program were short about 3 million workers. This was caused mainly by the lack of balance (lack of correspondence) between the available jobs and the available in both the territorial and occupational cross sections and the lack of uniformity in the provision of new jobs for the population.

Labor discipline decreased in the production collectives. Losses of working time in industry and construction in 1990 amounted to about 50 million man-days, which is tantamount to the daily absence from work of about 200,000 people. For this reason they failed to produce a total of R5 million worth of productions, which is 1.7 times more than the average for 1986-1988.

The increased losses of work time were affected by the strikes and interethnic conflicts. In 1990 1,800 enterprises and organizations had strikes, losses of work time exceeded 10 million man-day, and approximately 40,000 people were absent from their work places each day. The direct losses of output because of sociopolitical conflicts amounted to about R1 billion (not counting the more significant losses of "associates" because of the interruptions in the deliveries of raw and processed materials).

Incomes of the Population and Prices

The monetary incomes of the population amounted to R652.5 billion and increased over the preceding year by

R94.5 billion or 16.9 percent (with the planning calculations for the year being 7.1 percent). More than 60 percent of the overall growth of monetary incomes was from wages.

The wage fund in the national economy, including wages in cooperatives for producing goods and services and on kolkhozes, in 1990 amounted to R447 billion and had increased during the year by R53 billion or 13.5 percent. More than 20 percent of the growth of the wage fund was in cooperatives from producing goods and services, although their share of the overall wage fund is six percent.

Measures were taken to raise wages both with funds from the state budget and with funds earned directly by the enterprises.

Wages were increased for workers in libraries, club institutions, museums, and exhibitions located in the Northern Economic Region, the Far East, Siberia, Kazakhstan, and certain other localities; workers of the coal and shale industry and mining construction, and others. Percentage increments have been introduced for noncontinuous work tenure at enterprises, institutions, and organizations located in the southern regions of Irkutsk Oblast and Krasnoyarsk Kray for whom the payment of these increments have not been established previously. Beginning on 1 November rayon coefficients to wages were introduced for workers and employees for whom they had not already been established in Vologda Oblast.

A total of about R4 billion was allotted from the state budget for the aforementioned and certain other measures, or almost twice as much as in 1989.

Additionally, new salaries were established for workers of state arbitration organs and also courts, procurator organs, and notary offices using additional revenues from increasing the amounts of state taxes collected from the population. The material position of workers of internal affairs organs has improved.

The average monthly wages of workers and employees in the national economy increased from R240.4 in 1989 to R270, and the earnings of kolkhoz workers—from R203 to R220. The average monthly wages of people working in cooperatives amounted to R450.

Incomes for the population from the sale of agricultural products to the state and cooperative enterprises increased 1.3-fold, which was brought about to a considerable degree by the higher procurement prices.

There was a 1.5-fold increase in payments from the financial system. The was basically brought about by the paying off of state bonds for the development of the USSR national economy (issued in 1953-1956) for a sum of more the R7 billion.

As a result of the implementation of centralized measures for raising the standard of living, there was a considerable increase in payments to the population from social consumption funds in the form of pensions, grants, and stipends.

At the end of 1990 there were 61 million pensioners and the majority (three-fourths) were old-age pensioners. On 1 October pensions were recalculated for 6.2 million participants in the war, including 1.2 million disabled persons.

The population's deposits in institutions of the USSR Savings Bank during 1990 increased by R42.9 billion and reached R380.7 billion. Payments of insurance reimbursements and insurance sums paid to the population amounted to R9.4 billion.

Expenditures made by the population on the acquisition of goods and payment for services (consumer expenditures) increased by 15.2 percent.

The average per-capita monetary incomes of workers and employees increased by 10 percent as compared to 1989 and amounted to R172 per family member per month, and for kolkhoz workers—16 percent and R129, respectively.

The monetary expenditures of families of workers and employees for purchasing food products increased by eight percent during this period, and for the purchase of nonfood commodities—by 17 percent; for the families of kolkhoz workers these figures were nine and 14 percent, respectively. Because of the higher prices of goods in mass demand, the shortage of them in state trade, and the acquisition of goods on the kolkhoz market, in cooperation and on the "black market at higher prices, the consumer price index, taking into account "black market" prices, in 1990 as compared to 1989 was 106.8 percent, including for goods—107.8 percent, and for services—105.0 percent. This cost increase was felt in somewhat smaller amounts by families living in rural areas since they satisfy almost half of their need for food by private subsidiary farming.

On the whole during 1990 retail prices increased by 5.3 percent as compared to 1989, and for services—by three percent. The consolidated price index for goods and services was 105 percent. Moreover, state prices (sales at these prices account for about 93 percent of the volume of retail commodity turnover) increased by 4.3 percent, city and cooperative trade (2.5 percent of the commodity turnover)—by 8.7 percent, and the kolkhoz market—(2.8 percent of the commodity turnover)—by 29 percent. Retail prices increased at the most rapid rates toward the end of the year—in December their level was approximately 14 percent higher than at the beginning of the year.

For foodstuffs (taking into account sales in state trade, and stores of city and cooperative trade at commercial prices and on the kolkhoz market) the price index was 104.2 percent. There was a considerable increase in prices for potatoes—28 percent, vegetables—33 percent, and fruits—30 percent.

The price level on the kolkhoz market increased at ever higher rates. As compared to the corresponding period of 1989, in the first half of 1990 prices increased by 18 percent, in the third quarter—by 30 percent, and in the fourth quarter—by 44 percent, including in December—1.5-fold. And prices of animal husbandry products increased significantly everywhere, especially for meat (42 percent) and eggs (39 percent).

The price level was 6.2 percent higher for nonfood commodities and the growth occurred for practically all kinds of them. And for clothing, leather footwear, hosiery items, haberdashery, porcelain and china dishware, printed products, and watches, prices increased by 6-10 percent; for fabrics, knitted items, perfume and cosmetics, furniture, construction materials, rugs and tapestries, metal and glass dishware, sports equipment, and radio items—three-six percent. Prices of jewelry items increased approximately 1.5-fold.

The price level of nonfood goods was affected to a certain degree (especially recently) by the prices of cooperatives and individual labor activity, which are 1.7-2 times higher than state prices.

The prices of services of institutions of culture increased by 14.9 percent, including for movie services—19.2 percent, consumer services—6.6 percent, and for passenger transportation, communications, and housing and municipal services the prices remained the same.

Under the conditions of the unabating strain on the consumer market, speculation in consumer goods (the "black market") has assumed a large scale. Thus an investigation conducted by the USSR State Committee for Statistics in December 1990 showed that "black market" prices exceeded prices in state trade for motorcycles—2.1-fold, television sets—2.5-fold, sewing machines—2.6-fold, electric irons—5.6-fold, passenger cars—3-5-fold, medications—19-fold, and so forth.

The volume of the unsatisfied demand of the population (concealed or suppressed inflation) increased by R55 billion. The scale of inflationary processes, taking into account the higher prices and suppressed inflation, in 1990 as compared to 1989 was more than 19 percent.

The Consumer Market and the Sphere of Services

The overall volume of production of consumer goods (including the value of alcoholic beverages) was R459.2 billion, which was R26.6 billion (six percent) more than in 1989 but less than half the increase envisioned for the year. And this increase was basically provided through increasing the production of goods for cultural-domestic and household use (R19.2 billion) and alcoholic beverages (R3.9 billion).

A critical situation developed with the provision of foodstuffs for the population. We produced R147.7 billion worth of food products and their output increased by more than one percent.

The production of the majority of the kinds of food products decreased, which is clear from the following figures (millions of tons):

	1990	1990 in % of 1989
Meat (industrial output)	12.8	97
Sausage items	3.9	100.0
Food fish products, including canned fish	5.3	93
Animal fat	1.7	100.2
Fatty cheeses, thousands of tons	881	98
Whole-milk products (measured in milk)	34.6	100.1
Magarine products	1.4	93
Granulated sugar	12.2	91
Including from sugar beets	8.4	96
Vegetable oil	3.3	100.3
Flour	41.0	102
Groats	4.8	96
Macaroni items	1.8	102
Confectionery items	5.2	103
Packaged varietal tea, thousands of tons	266	88
Table salt (extraction)	14.7	98

	1990	1990 in % of 1989
Canned goods—total, billions of standard cans	20.4	97
including fruits and vegetables	14.3	96
Mineral waters, millions of decaliters	157	91
Nonalcoholic beverages, millions of decaliters	582	93

The production of alcoholic beverages in 1990 amounted to 132 billion decaliters (measured in absolute alcohol) or six percent more than in 1989; 313 billion cigarettes were produced (nine percent less than in 1989).

The output of nonfood consumer goods (not including light industry items) amounted to R156.7 billion, which is R19.2 billion (14 percent(more than in 1989.

Given below are the figures on the output of individual kinds of nonfood commodities:

	1990	1990 in %of 1989
Television sets, billion	10.5	106
Including color	7.2	113
Refrigerators and freezers, billions	6.5	100.5
Radio equipment, billions of units	9.2	107
Including tape recorders and radio tape recorders	1.4	126
Tape recorders, billions	6.3	109
Videocassette recorders, thousands	454	364
Sewing machines, millions	1.8	113
Including "Zigzag"	1.0	105
Washing machines, millions	7.9	118
Electric vacuum cleaners, millions	5.8	113
Furniture, billions of rubles	10.3	107
Motorcycles, thousands	1,014	102
Bicycles (not including childrens'), millions	5.8	103
Passenger cars, millions	1.3	103
Porcelain and earthenware dishware, millions of rubles	1,139	104
Wallpaper, millions of standard pieces	593	103
Paper cleaning items, millions of rubles	979	108
Elements and batteries for electric household appliances, billions of units	1.0	100.4
Garden sheds, including sets of parts for them, shells, and power units (deliveries to trade organizations), thousands	139	105
Synthetic detergents in small packages, thousands of tons	1,187	106
Household soap, thousands of tons	710	97
Toilet soap, thousands of tons	309	101

There was a considerable increase in the output of household equipment. Thus, as compared to 1989, the production of videocassette recorders increased 3.6-fold, washing machines—18 percent, electric vacuum cleaners and sewing machines—by 13 percent, and radios and tape recorders—seven-nine percent.

There was a reduction of production of a number of goods that are in mass demand. Among them are: blades for safety razors, school notebooks and pencils, rubber footwear, household soap, and cigarettes.

The main cause of the situation that developed was the shortage of raw material resources, slow deliveries, and sometimes a lack of batching items and parts and also a reduction of the deliveries of imported materials.

Under the conditions of the unbalanced market for nonfood commodities, industrial enterprises are doing unsatisfactory work for concluding contracts for the delivery of consumer goods to trade organizations. As of 7 January 1991 a contract was signed for delivering R83 billion worth of nonfood commodities (not including light industry items), which amounts to 82 percent of the volume projected by the enterprises. As of the beginning of 1990 the level of the conclusion of contracts for these goods was 94 percent.

The production of light industry goods is characterized by the following figures:

	1990	1990 in %of 1989
Fabrics—total, billions of square meters	12.7	97
Including:		
cotton	7.8	97
silk	2.1	96
woolen	0.7	98
Knitted items (billions of units)	1.9	99.1
including for children	1.1	98
Hosiery items, billions of pair	2.1	102
Including for children	0.8	101
Output from sewing industry (in normative value of processing), billions of rubles	4.6	105
Footwear, millions of pair	820	99.2
Including for children	362	98

As compared to 1989 there was a significant deterioration of the provision of light industry commodities for the population, which is related to the reduction of the production of footwear—by 6.6 billion pair, knitted items—17 million unites, and fabric—403 million square meters. Production of a number of items for children has been reduced: knitted—18 million units, and footwear—8.4 million pair.

Conditions for satisfying the needs for goods for youth have deteriorated especially. Thus the proportion of these goods will amount to 5-10 percent of the overall output while youth comprise almost one-fourth of the population. During 1990 the production of knitted items and dresses for youth decreased by 7-18 percent, and coats, jackets, footwear, and suits—by 21-25 percent.

Contractual discipline deteriorated considerably last year. Thus while in 1989 consumers failed to receive R0.7 billion worth of output and goods, in 1990 this volume increased more than four-fold (R3.0 billion).

The campaign for concluding treaties for the delivery of light industry products essentially failed this year. As of the beginning of 1991 light industry enterprises of the Union republics concluded contracts for only 70 percent of the necessary volume of output envisioned for delivery in 1991 or R42.9 billion while as of the beginning of 1990 this sum was R83.2 billion

Retail commodity turnover. By the end of 1990 the panic buying in many regions of the country became a regular thing. In spite of the unprecedented growth of commodity turnover, whose volume increased by R63.4 billion (15.7 percent in actual prices) last year, the situation in the consumer market has been extremely difficult throughout the year, and became critical by the end of the year—there were shortages of practically all consumer goods.

One-third of the increase in commodity turnover was obtained as a result of higher prices. By the end of the year the situation in the consumer market was made worse also by the fact that the growth rates of commodity resources were slowing up throughout the year. In the first half the volume of deliveries increased by nine percent, in the second half—six percent, and over the year as a whole—seven percent.

An especially difficult situation has developed in the market for food products. As compared to last year, only one percent more were sent to the trade network. The sale of cheese and animal fat remained at approximately the 1989 level. The sale of milk, fish, herring, meat and meat products, sugar, bread products, confectionery items, eggs, and margarine increased by two-five percent, canned fish—seven percent, vegetable oil—12 percent, and tea—15 percent. The reduction of the sales of potatoes was six percent, nonalcoholic beverages and mineral waters—eight percent, vegetables and fruit and vegetable juices—13-15 percent, and fruits and citrus fruits—20 percent.

The high rates of sales of individual food products were achieved as a result of intensive enlistment of reserves from retail trade, whose volume during the year decreased by R1.7 billion (approximately 20 percent).

Moreover there is a growing process of movement of commodity reserves from trade to the consumers. Thus in the families of workers and employees and kolkhoz workers the stocks of food products increased 1.5-2.0-fold as compared to 1989.

Because of the shortage of food resources, on many territories, especially the RSFSR, regulated supply of the basic goods to the population has been introduced.

The growth of retail commodity turnover was provided largely with nonfood commodities. The sale of furniture, television sets, cameras, automobiles (from current production), gasoline, household soap, synthetic detergents, porcelain and earthen dishware, and electric vacuum cleaners increased by 3-10 percent; motorcycles, washing machines, cotton and silk fabrics, sports equipment (not including clothing and footwear), tape recorders, watches, radio equipment, and knitted and silk items—12-20 percent, hosiery items—27 percent, and toilet soap—42 percent. At the same time the sale of slate, refrigerators, bicycles, tobacco items, and linen fabrics was approximately at last year's level, sales of woolen fabrics decreased by five percent, and timber materials—by four percent.

In spite of the high growth rates of sales, the situation in the market for nonfood commodities remains unsatisfactory. The majority of these goods have practically disappeared from the store shelves.

The situation in the consumer market is being complicated by the retardation of the growth of the volume of paid services.

While the assignment for the year was to increase their volume by 13.6 percent, the increase in actual prices amounted to 8.4 percent (in preceding years the average annual increase was 10.4 percent). And more than one-fourth of the increase is from earnings from sale to the population at their work places (not including services) of timber and construction materials, production byproducts, substandard items, and other items. If these sales are not included, the volume of paid services increased by 6.2 percent.

The volume of paid services was R72.6 billion and the assignment set for their sales was unfulfilled by R3.6 billion (the fulfillment of the plan was 95.2 percent). At the same time lower plans adopted by the enterprises were overfulfilled.

Consumer service cooperatives were not able to significantly influence the improvement of service to the population and give competition to state enterprises (in spite of the fact that their earnings comprised about 11 percent of the overall volume of consumer services)/

There was a tendency toward a reduction of the number of them, and especially services that are in critically short supply such as repair and sewing of footwear and clothing, repair and construction of housing, and repair of radio and television equipment and complicated household equipment.

Housing and Social-Cultural Construction

As compared to last year there was a reduction in the introduction of social objects—residential buildings, general educational schools, preschool institutions, hospitals, polyclinics, clubs, and houses of culture.

We built 1.8 million apartments with an overall area of 115 million square meters, which is 13.9 million square meters or 340,000 apartments less than in 1989. The annual program was unfulfilled in all Union republics except the Kirghiz and Turkmen SSR's. At the same time there was a reduction of the introduction of housing in all Union republics except the Uzbek, Azerbaijan, Kirghiz, and Turkmen SSR's.

The construction of individual and cooperative buildings—which account for 21 percent and six percent of the overall number, respectively—continues to be unsatisfactory.

The country's housing fund has reached 4.6 billion square meters of overall space, an average of about 16.0 square meters per resident, including dwelling space—10.8 square meters.

Housing conditions improved for about 2 million city families and single people or about 6 million people. But the number of city families and single people in need of improved housing conditions is not decreasing, and as of the beginning of 1991 it was more than 14 million or 23 percent of the overall number of city families and single residents. These are mainly families with up to seven square meters of dwelling space per person. At the same time another 17 percent of city families and single residents living in separate apartments have from seven to nine square meters of dwelling space per person and 16 percent are living in shared or communal apartments.

State apartments have been sold to citizens as private property. During 1990 about 75,000 apartments were sold with a value of R300 million.

General educational schools to accommodate 1.2 million were put into operation, the startup of these facilities having decreased by 17 percent. The annual plan was fulfilled only in the Belorussian SSR, the Kirghiz SSR, and the Turkmen SSR. The scale of school construction decreased in all Union republics except the Azerbaijan SSR, the Uzbek SSR, Moldovan SSR, and the Kirghiz SSR.

Preschool institutions have been constructed to accommodate 431,000, or less than half the number set by the plan. The greatest arrears were in the Moldovan SSR and the Armenian SSR.

Hospitals were constructed with a total of 45,000 beds, and out-patient polyclinic institutions—for 149,000 visits per shift. The annual assignment for the construction of hospitals was fulfilled in the Belorussian SSR, Latvian SSR, Kirghiz SSR, and Estonian SSR; and polyclinics—in the Belorussian SSR, Latvian SSR, and Kirghiz SSR.

Club institutions to accommodate 215,000 were put into operation, which is 78,000 less than in 1989. The annual program failed in all Union republics except the Kirghiz SSR.

There were serious arrears in the construction of boarding houses for the elderly and disabled. The number introduced will accommodate 9,000, which is less than half of the annual assignment. Not a single facility of this kind was introduced in the Uzbek SSR, Georgian SSR, Moldovan SSR, or Tajik SSR.

The level of fulfillment of annual assignments for the introduction of residential buildings in regions of the Armenian SSR that suffered from the earthquake was 17 percent, preschool institutions—nine percent, and schools, public health facilities, clubs, and houses of culture—one-four percent.

The Condition of the Environment

According to data from a spot check of the opinion of the urban population conducted by state statistical organs last year, only eight percent of the almost 100,000 individuals questioned were satisfied with the condition of the environment in their population point, 20 percent were partially satisfied, and 54 percent think that the ecological situation is unsatisfactory, while the rest could not give a definite answer.

More than R13 billion were spent on ecological measures (including forestry work), of which R3 billion were capital investments. The overall volume of environmental protection expenditures increased by seven percent as compared to 1989.

The intake of water for use from natural sources in the country as a whole exceeded 320 billion cubic meters, which is somewhat below last year's level. At the same time, the volumes of discharges of water polluted with industrial and municipal wastes into bodies of water was at last year's level—more than 30 billion cubic meters a year.

There was not a significant rise in the level of efficient water use or a reduction of the pollution of the country's bodies of water. High levels of concentration of toxic substances in water sources were registered by organs of the USSR State Committee for Hydrometeorology and other monitoring organizations in 3,600 cases at more than 500 water facilities. They include the following rivers: Nyuduay (Murmansk Oblast), Glubochanka and Ulba (Vostochno-Kazakhstan Oblast), Puska (Arkhangelsk Oblast), Pelshma (Vologda Oblast), Chusovaya (Sverdlovsk Oblast), Ilek (Aktyubinsk Oblast), Poltva (Lvov Oblast), and a number of others. The content of certain especially dangerous compounds in these rivers, as in preceding years, exceeded the permissible content 100-fold; the main polluters are enterprises of the USSR Ministry of Metallurgy, the USSR Ministry of the Timber Industry, the USSR Ministry of the Chemical and Petrochemical Industry, and also the municipal sewerage systems of the cities.

Discharges of harmful substances from stationary sources into the atmospheric air as a whole for all enterprises of the country amounted to 55 million tons, which is 3 million tons less than last year. At the same time, they increased by 2 million tons at 11,000 enterprises. Discharges were reduced in Cherepovets, Nizhnyy Tagil, Dnepropetrovsk, Krivoy Rog, Gomel, Temirtau, and a number of other cities with complicated ecological situations, which is related in many cases to the reduction of production and the output of products as well as the shutdown of individual facilities. At the same time discharges are increasing in Novosibirsk, Makeyevka, Almalyk, Marva, and certain other industrial centers.

Data from the USSR State Committee for Hydrometeorology show that in 1990 as in 1989 in almost 130 cities of the country the concentration of at least one harmful substance exceeded the established norms by a factor of 10 or more on certain days. They reported a total of 3,300 cases of such ecological violations. Exceeding the normatives for substances dangerous to the health of people by a factor of 10 or more was noted most frequently, in particular, in Bezmein (cement dust—115-fold), Gubakh and Kommunarsk (hydrogen sulfide—25-fold and 22-fold, respectively), Volgograd and Kiev (hydrogen chloride—68-fold and 10-fold), Leninogorsk (lead—31-fold), Rubezhnyy (nitrochlorobenzene—200-fold), Magnitogorsk (nitrogen dioxide—21-fold), Omsk (acetaldehyde—99-fold). Usol-Sibirskiy (mercury—11-fold, Chimkent (lead—19-fold), and Ufa (fluoroform—16-fold).

Each year 250 million tons of industrial wastes that contain toxic substances end up in slag heaps, testing grounds, and dumps, and less than 40 million tons are decontaminated and used. A considerable share of the toxic products are sent to places not designed for their storage, including dumps for solid household wastes.

There have been cases of continuous (emergency) pollution of the environment, which has an especially negative effect on water resources, the atmospheric air and the soil (Ufa, Novopolotsk, Ust-Kamenogorsk, and others).

In spite of the difficult ecological situation we failed to complete the startup of environmental protection facilities included in the state order. Of 296 of these structures and installations (including those carried over from 1989) only 78 were introduced (26 percent of the state order), including in the fuel and energy complex—16 (22 percent), metallurgical—23 (38 percent), machine building—seven (44 percent), and chemical and timber—eight (22 percent).

During the year there were more than 25,000 forest fires, which covered 1.7 million hectares. As a result 23.6 million cubic meters of timber were burned, which is approximately seven percent of the volume of industrial felling of timber.

Legal Violations

The deterioration of the economic situation in the country and the political instability in a number of regions are having a great effect on the further growth of crime, although for the first time in the years of the 12th Five-Year Plan there was a reduction of its growth rates.

There were 2.8 million crimes reported or 13.2 percent more than last year. The greatest share of crimes (more than a third) are theft of private property of the citizens. During the past year there were 979,000 thefts, which is 15.8 percent more than in the preceding year.

There were more thefts of state property, which occupies second place. The number of thefts of this kind increased by almost a third and amounted to 392,300.

The theft of arms and ammunition increased at more rapid rates (1.5-fold). The overall number of these reached 1,400.

Criminally punishable hooliganism is on the rise. there were 152,400 cases of this reported, or 7.3 percent more than in the preceding year.

The number of grave crimes increased by 15 percent; every seventh one of the overall number of crimes is a grave crime.

The number of burglaries and muggings is increasing. There were 152,000 of them, a 13.6-percent increase. There were 24,900 premeditated murders and attempted murders reported, which was 15.9 percent more; cases of deliberate serious bodily harm—57,800 and 12.2 percent; and rapes and attempted rapes—22,500 and 2.7 percent, respectively.

Every sixth one of the overall number of crimes was committed by an individual in a state of alcoholic intoxication; every eighth one—by a previous offender; and every tenth one—by people in a group.

Crime among minors continues to grow. They committed or participated in the commission of 235,000 crimes (an increase of 4.8 percent). Mainly these were theft, burglary, and mugging.

Crime is growing at the most rapid rates in the Armenian SSR—43.9 percent, the Baltic republics—24.4-16.9 percent, the Kirghiz SSR—16.1 percent, the Ukrainian SSR—14.7 percent, and the Belorussian SSR—13.8 percent.

The solving of crimes is decreasing. Last year 1.2 million crimes were not solved (36.4 percent of the overall number of cases under investigation), which is 25.9 percent more than in the preceding year.

The number of individuals committing crimes increased by six percent and amounted to 1.4 million, of whom 239.100 (17.3 percent) were not working or going to school (16 years of age and older). There was a certain reduction of the proportion of crimes committed by women. As before, every other person committing a crime is under 30 years of age. Charges were brought against almost two-thirds of the individuals who committed crimes.

Development of Material Production. Industry

The volume of material production declined by 1.2 percent compared to 1989. At the same time, Group A production fell by 3.2 percent, and Group B production increased by 4.4 percent.

In five union republics—the Belorussian SSR, Uzbek SSR, Moldova SSR, Tajik SSR, and Turkmen SSR—production was somewhat higher than in 1989. In the rest of the republics, production declined, including in the Armenian SSR by 7.3 percent, the Georgian SSR by 6.2 percent, the Azerbaijan SSR by 5.5 percent, and the Lithuanian SSR—3.0 percent.

A decline in the overall volume of production in defense industries in conjunction with conversion influenced the decline in industrial production to a certain degree. A drop in the production of military output was not offset by a quite substantial increase in the otput of civilian products and consumer goods. Imbalances, the disruption of existing economic ties, and consequences of interethnic conflicts and strikes were a factor.

Last year, contractual discipline in the sector deteriorated considerably. During the year, consumers failed to receive products worth R17.7 billion, which is R7.1 billion more than than in 1989. Contractual obligations to deliver products were 97.8 percent met; 25 percent of enterprises failed to meet them (in 1989, 98.6 percent and 19 percent respectively).

There was a considerable lag in the fulfillment of contractual obligations in the industry of the Armenian SSR (obligations were 89.2 percent met), the Georgian SSR (92.2 percent met), the Azerbaijan SSR (92.4 percent), and the Lithuanian SSR (96.1 percent met).

The output of products per one person employed in industry increased 1.5 percent compared to 1989. The number of employees at state enterprises declined by more than two percent.

The operation of national economic complexes is described by the following data (percent):

	Fulfillment of contractual obligations to deliver products	Products not delivered to consumers, million R	Percentage of enterprises failing to meet contractual obligations	Rates of growth (decrease)	
				of the volume of production (work, services)	of labor productivity
The fuel and energy complex	97.8	1,190	38	-1.5	-0.3
The machine-building complex	98.2	1,765	41	2.0	6.7

	Fulfillment of contractual obligations to deliver products	Products not delivered to consumers, million R	Percentage of enterprises failing to meet contractual obligations	Rates of growth (decrease)	
				of the volume of production (work, services)	of labor productivity
The metallurgical complex	96.7	2,530	46	-3.0	-1.8
The chemical and wood complex	96.1	4,117	58	-1.0	1.6
The agroindustrial complex	98.4	2,510	18	-1.4	-0.1
Ministries of Light Industry of union republics	97.0	2,990	35	-0.2	2.8

In many industries, serious shortcomings persisted in the field of commissioning new capacities. Two-thirds of the surveyed facilities which were commissioned or refurbished in the last two years utilized one-half of their potential capacity on the average. The use of production capacities in the construction industry and in consumer goods manufacturing was unsatisfactory, acute shortages of consumer goods and housing notwithstanding.

The output of certain most important types of products in individual complexes is shown by the following data:

The Fuel and Energy Complex

	1990	1990 as percentage of 1989
Electricity, billion kilowatt-hours	1,728	100.3
Crude oil (including oil condensate)	570	94
Gas, billion cubic meters	815	102
Coal, million tons	703	95

In the extraction industries of the fuel and energy complex, the production of crude oil, including gas condensate, and coal declined, while that of gas increased by 18.7 billion cubic meters. The decline in the output of coal and oil was not offset by the increase in the production of gas. On the whole for the above types of fuel, production last year amounted to 2,182,000,000 tons of standard fuel in terms of heat content, which is 54 million tons (two percent) less than in 1989.

The sharp drop in the volume of produced oil, including gas condensate, to the 1978 level of output occurred due to a lag in developing oilfields, an increase in above-the-norm stock of idle wells, and a reduction of the volume of production drilling, as well as the unsatisfactory supply of material-technical resources and equipment.

Inability to carry out the necessary amount of major repairs and refurbishment of the industrial systems of oil collection and transportation brought about a large number of accidents, stoppage of wells, loss of oil output, and deteriorating ecological condition of the natural environment. The development of the richest new raw-material areas in the Caspian Depression and the Yamal Peninsula proceeded slowly.

The task of using casing-head gas rationally was not accomplished satisfactorily due to the insufficient capacity to transport it. In particular, compression facilities at Gubkinskiy and Krasnoleninskiy Gas Processing Plants and compressor stations in Tomsk and Tyumen Oblasts were not commissioned.

In 1990, coal output continued to decline. Its level was 69 million tons (nine percent) lower than 1988 production. The production of coal for coking declined; overall, 191 million tons were produced during the year compared to 199 million tons in 1989.

The volume of coal declined due to a number of reasons. No consumers were found for poor-quality Ekibastuz and Kansk-Achinsk coals due to a lag in the commissioning of power-generating capacity. The use of these coals in other regions of the country was hampered by their high ash content.

The unsatisfactory condition of the social sphere in a number of coal-producing areas of the country which entailed a wave of strikes was a factor as well.

These complications in the operation of the coal industry were also exacerbated by shortcomings in the operation of railway transportation and the persisting lack of transportation vehicles for the coal industry in some regions of the country.

The operation of power generation was affected by a number of factors, the main one being a revision of the development concept of the industry in conjunction with the accident at the Chernobyl power station: a reduction in the construction of new nuclear power stations and conservation of power-generating units at a number of operating stations. The unfavorable attitude of the public toward the construction of power facilities also contributed to this taut situation.

In 1990, the increment of electricity generation compared to 1989 amounted to 0.3 percent. A serious power-supply situation developed in some republics. A drop in the generation of electricity was allowed to occur in the Armenian SSR—by 14 percent, the Kirghiz SSR—by 12 percent, the Georgian SSR—by 10 percent, and the Moldova SSR—by eight percent.

The Machine Building Complex

	1990	1990 as percentage of 1989
Metal-cutting machine tools with numerical program control, 1,000	22.5	95
Forging-press machines with numerical program control, 1,000	2.5	111
Instruments, means of automation, and spare parts, billion R	5.7	104
Medical equipment and spare parts, billion R	1.6	129
Computer equipment and spare parts, billion R	7.2	93
Rolling-mill equipment (including machines and equipment for the continuous pouring of blanks), million R	327	99.95
Oil equipment, million R	234	102
Chemical equipment and spare parts, million R	1,063	100.6
Motor vehicles, 1,000	2,119	100.3
Tractors, 1,000	494	93
Agricultural machinery, billion R	3.6	97
Machines and equipment for animal husbandry and feed production, billion R	2.5	93
Excavators, 1,000	37.7	104
Lead motor-vehicle accumulators and batteries, million pieces	9.0	99.3

In the machine-building complex, last year saw a decline in the volume of production of many main types of products.

Compared to 1989, five percent fewer direct-current electric engines and metal-cutting machine tools with numerical program control and three percent fewer large electric machines were produced. The production of trucks and buses declined. The rate of manufacturing equipment for metallurgical production dropped.

In 1990, a considerable decline of the production of many main types of agricultural machinery occurred. The production of tractors, and machines and equipment for animal husbandry and feed production declined by seven percent, and that of agricultural machinery for crop growing by three percent. There was a failure to start up to any significant degree the production of small implements for labor which farmsteads and lease collectives require.

A decline in the rate of growth of output in machine building, and in a number of cases absolute declines in the amount of output, are due to a shortage of material resources and disruptions in long-term cooperative ties between enterprises.

The program of developing the production of machines and equipment for the light and food industries, trade, and public catering was carried out by the machine-building industry more successfully in 1990. The amount of technical equipment and spare parts for the light industry increased by 12 percent, for the processing industries of the agroindustrial complex by a factor of 1.3, and for trade, public catering, and cafeterias by 6 percent. Enterprises of the defense complex played a leading role in the production of this equipment.

Despite a substantial increase in the volume of equipment production in terms of value, a decline of the production of individual types of machinery and equipment compared to 1989 occurred. Thus, the production of hosiery and glove automatic machines, pneumatic rapier looms, caramel-wrapping and tempering machines, and so on declined.

Production of medical equipment and spare parts for it increased by a factor of 1.3. However, despite the relatively high rate of growth of the output of these types of products, the scale of their production was still insufficient, and did not meet the needs of health care.

The renewal of machine-building production slowed down. The share of new and modernized products in the overall volume of machine-building output amounted to 10.6 percent (in 1989, 13.1 percent).

Contractual obligations for the delivery of most types of machinery and equipment, including main-line diesel locomotives, main-line freight cars, bulldozers, scrapers, and so on were not met.

The Metallurgical Complex

	1990	1990 as percentage of 1989
Steel, million tons	154	96
Ferrous-metal rolled goods (finished), million tons	112	97
Steel pipes, million tons	19.5	95
Iron ore, million tons	236	98

Enterprises of the metallurgical complex reduced the production of the main types of metal products in 1990. Compared to the previous year, the production of finished rolled goods declined by 3.7 million tons and that of steel pipes by 1.1 million tons. Declines were allowed to occur in the production of magnesium and magnesium alloys, refined copper, nickel, lead, titanium, and zinc.

In 1990, the enterprises of the metallurgical complex failed to deliver to consumers products worth R2.5 billion, which is 1.5 times more than the 1989 arrears. Taking into account the fact that ferrous and nonferrous metals account for the largest segment of structural materials (the share of plastics in the consumption of structural materials amounts to approximately one percent), this reduction in the volume of production brought about serious disruptions of the material-technical supply to enterprises which are the main consumers of metal products.

The persisting metal shortage does not prompt metallurgical enterprises to produce economical, less metal-intensive types of metal products the production of which is more labor-intensive. Compared to the previous year, in 1990 the output of economical types of metal products, such as cold-rolled sheet steel, low-alloy rolled products and those hardened by thermal processing, roll-formed steel sections, high-strength drilling and casing pipes, cold-rolled steel band, technical iron powder, and many others declined.

Last year, general difficulties in the operation of enterprises in the metallurgical complex were exacerbated by disruptions in the material-technical supply of coking coal, scrap metal, diesel fuel, and other materials. A reduction in the volume of output was due to disruptions in the transportation of metallurgical raw materials the reserves of which at many enterprises declined to critical levels, as well as the decline of labor and technological discipline in the industry, a lack of highly skilled cadres at the enterprises, a high degree of amortization of fixed assets, and the shutdown of production facilities due to an increased accident rate.

The Chemical and Wood Complex

	1990	1990 as percentage of 1989
Mineral fertilizer (100 percent nutrient content), million tons	31.7	92
Sulfuric acid, million tons	27.3	96
Caustic soda, million tons	3.0	93
Chemical fibers and thread, million tons	1.5	95
Synthetic resins and plastics, million tons	5.5	96
Pipes and pipeline parts made of thermosoftening plastics, million tons	172	88
Truck tires, million	26.3	96
Car tires, million	25.1	103
Medicinal compounds, billion R	3.9	106
Paper, million tons	6.2	97
out of which newsprint, billion square meters	36.7	99.5
Cardboard, million tons	4.2	98

The deteriorating shortage of chemical materials and products affected equilibrium in inter-industry ties adversely and became a perceptible obstacle to the development of key economic sectors—the agrarian sector, machine building, and consumer goods production. The volume of products which were not furnished increased by a factor of 1.7 compared to 1989.

The volume of output of the raw-material goods of basic chemistry (synthetic ammonia, sulfuric acid, caustic soda, and soda ash) amounted in 1990 to only between 91 and 96 percent of the amount of production in 1989.

The production of mineral fertilizer, chemical fibers and thread, synthetic resins, and plastics declined considerably.

A lag in the production of plastics, especially of the thermosoftening type, adversely affected the work of interconnected production facilities, primarily the production of pipes and parts of pipelines from thermosoftening plastics, the production of which declined by 26,400 tons compared to last year. A shortage of polymer raw materials was also responsible for a reduction in the production of some types of polymer containers (polyethylene trays, barrels, and bags) a shortage of which was very keenly felt at the enterprises of the agroindustrial complex.

The unstable operation of the enterprises of the complex additionally disrupted the saturation of the consumer market with consumer goods. Production of chemical fibers and thread was 80,000 tons lower than the level of last year, which affected the work of light-industry enterprises consuming up to 80 percent of the above products.

The insufficient delivery of polyvinyl chloride composites to the rubber footwear industry caused a reduction in the production of rubber footwear. The production of movie and camera films, as well as many other commonly used goods, by the enterprises of the complex declined compared to 1989.

The production of virtually all main types of products in wood processing—commercial timber, lumber, wallboard and plywood, pulp and paper products—declined. A shortage of wood materials in the country was estimated to amount to dozens of millions of cubic meters, and the trend was consistently upward. Trade in wood materials—commercial timber, wallboard, prefabricated wooden houses, and kits of parts for such houses—proceeded in the environment of shortages.

The closure or temporary discontinuation of the operation of a number of enterprises and production facilities in the chemical and wood complex for ecological reasons seriously affected the production and sale to the populace of the products of the medical and microbiological industry, paint, varnish, and pulp-and-paper products, synthetic detergents, cigarettes, technical rubber goods, and rubber footwear.

The Construction Materials Industry

	1990	1990 as percentage of 1989
Cement, million tons	137	98
Asbestos cement sheets (corrugated asbestos board), billion standard tiles	9.0	100
Asbestos cement pipes and pipe couplings, 1,000 kilometers of standard pipes	83.4	100.9
Soft roofing and insulation materials, billion square meters	1.8	94
Window glass, million square meters	211	87

The construction materials industry allowed considerable declines in output to occur compared to 1989—by 3 million tons of cement, 113 million square meters of soft roofing materials, 32 million square meters of window glass, and 533 million bricks.

The volume of output of elements for prefabricated housing construction and assembled reinforced-concrete structures and products amounted to 96 percent of the level of last year.

The Agroindustrial Complex

The planned rates and volumes of production of the main types of products were not attained in 1990 in the agroindustrial sector. The overall production of output in the complex was estimated to be R483 billion a year (in comparable prices), which was approximately one percent more than in 1989. The value of the gross product of agriculture declined by 2.3 percent and came to R220 billion. At the same time, the value of the output of crop growing declined by 4.3 percent that year whereas that of animal husbandry declined by 0.8 percent. Labor productivity in socialized agriculture declined by one percent.

Based on the results of operation in the course of the year, profits of agricultural enterprises increased; R58 billion were received in profits which is due mainly to the growth of average sale prices. The profit margin of agricultural production amounted to 35 percent. Nine hundred kolkhozes [collective farms] and sovkhozes [state farms] finished last year showing losses (1.7 percent of total).

The gross harvest of main crops on the farms of all categories in the past two five-year plans is indicated by the following data (million tons):

	Average per year		1989	1990
	1981-1985	1986-1990		
Grain (weight after additional processing)	168.7	196.5	196.7	218.0
Sugar beets (commercial grade)	76.4	87.3	97.4	81.2
Raw cotton	8.3	8.4	8.6	8.3
Sunflower	5.0	6.2	7.1	6.5
Potatoes	78.4	72.3	72.2	63.7
Vegetables	29.2	28.7	28.7	26.4
Fruits and berries	10.4	9.5	9.7	9.0
Grapes	7.1	5.7	5.0	5.6

The gross grain crop in the country amounted to 218 million tons (weight after additional processing). This is approximately at the level of the most abundant year 1978 when 222.5 million tons of grain were harvested. On RSFSR farms, the crop increment amounted to 12 million tons and in the Kazakh SSR—9.7 million tons. The farms of the Ukrainian SSR, Belorussian SSR, Lithuanian SSR, Moldova SSR, Kirghiz SSR, and Estonian SSR harvested less grain than in 1989. The crop of raw cotton, potatoes, vegetables, sunflower, sugar beets, flax fibers, fruits and berries was lower than in the previous year. Due to the insufficiently smooth organization of harvesting and disruptions in the material-technical support of agricultural enterprises, smaller involvement of the urban population in rendering aid at the time of harvesting, and protracted inclement weather in many regions, some of the crop grown, especially that of potatoes and vegetables, was not harvested.

The production of groats amounted to 6,853,000 tons and declined by 261,000 tons (4 percent) compared to 1989. The production of buckwheat increased by 267,000 tons (23 percent); less millet and rice were harvested (correspondingly, 461,000 and 87,000 tons).

Sixty-eight million tons of grain were delivered to state stocks, which is 18 million tons less than called for by the state order. Compared to 1989, the procurement of wheat, rye, buckwheat, barley, and peas increased. Less millet, rice, and corn were purchased. A total of 32 million tons of grain were imported in 1990, which is 5 million less than in 1989.

The production of potatoes, vegetables, and fruits declined last year in many regions of our country.

Compared to 1989, the procurement of potatoes declined by 3.2 million tons, or 25 percent, and that of vegetables by 2.3 million tons, or 13 percent. In 1990, a total of 9.5 million tons of potatoes and 15.7 million tons of vegetables were purchased.

The procurement of fruit and berry products declined in 1990 on the farms of the RSFSR, Belorussian SSR, Azerbaijan SSR, Moldova SSR, Armenian SSR, Turkmen SSR, and the Baltic republics.

Less sugar beets were produced and shipped to processing enterprises than in 1989. A total of 73.9 million tons of sugar beets (registered weight) were purchased, compared to 91.9 million tons in 1989. A decline was allowed to occur in all beet-growxing regions.

In 1990, 4.6 million tons of sunflower seeds were procured, or 0.96 million tons (17 percent) less than in 1989. The state order for procurement was 86 percent fulfilled. The volume of procurement of sunflower seeds dropped by 21 percent on the RSFSR farms, by 22 percent in the Moldova SSR, and by 14 percent in the Ukrainian SSR.

Two million six hundred thousand tons of cotton fibers (103 percent of the state order) were purchased. The procurement of fine-fibered cotton types increased. The farms of the Azerbaijan SSR and Tajik SSR failed to fulfill the state order for cotton sales.

An area of 34.9 million hectares was sown to winter crops to be harvested in 1991, and 89.4 million hectares were ploughed for winter fallow. This is substantially less than was done for the 1990 harvest; this will cause considerable strain during the conduct of spring agricultural work, and will require additional material resources to carry it out.

A stable annual increment of the volume of output of animal-husbandry products in the initial three years of the five-year plan gave way to a reduction of the rate in 1989 and 1990, and to declines of the output of individual products. This, in turn, resulted in the declining production of many foodstuffs by the eneterprises of the food industry and greater strain in the consumer market.

In the country as a whole, the per capita consumption of meat and milk virtually did not change last year. The consumption of eggs, potatoes, and vegetables declined.

The output of the main products of animal husbandry on the farms of all categories in the past two five-year plans changed as follows:

	Average per year			
	1981-1985	1986-1990	1989	1990
Meat (slaughter weight), million tons	16.2	19.3	20.1	19.9
Milk, million tons	94.6	106.0	108.5	108.7
Eggs, billion	74.4	83.1	84.9	82.0
Wool (physical mass), 1,000 tons	457	472	479	471

In 1990, meat production compared to 1989 declined in 11 union republics, of milk—in nine union republics, and of eggs in 12 union republics.

In a majority of the union republics, the volume of procurement of animal-husbandry products declined. In the country as a whole, their procurement from all categories of farms amounted to:

	1989	1990
Cattle and poultry, billion tons		
live weight	22.1	21.6
slaughter weight	14.5	14.1
Milk, million tons	77.7	77.0
Eggs, billion	53.8	51.6
Wool (in terms of pure fiber), 1,000 tons	258.1	252.6

A considerable shortfall of animal-husbandry products was allowed to occur due to high cattle loss. In 1990, 3 million head of cattle, (9 percent more than in 1989), 8.8 million hogs (12 percent more), and 10.1 million head of sheep and goats (2 percent more) were lost on the kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and at interfarm enterprises.

Last year, the herd of cattle in socialized agriculture was reduced, as indicated by the following data:

	Herd of cattle (as of 1 January, million head)			
	all categories of farms		out of which populace	
	1990	1991	1990	1991
Cattle	118.4	116.2	24.2	24.7
out of which cows	41.7	41.4	13.2	13.3
Hogs	79	76.8	15.2	15.9
Sheep and goats	145.4	141.1	36.3	36.9

The reduction in the herd was not offset by its increased productivity; it will affect unfavorably the volume of output of animal-husbandry products in subsequent years.

Less feed than the necessary requirements call for was stored by agricultural enterprises in most regions of our country for the winter period of 1990-1991; the quality of feed deteriorated.

Contractual obligations for the delivery of most types of agricultural machinery and mineral fertilizer were not met; the tendency to further reduce the volume of their delivery persisted.

Compared to 1989, the kolkhozes and sovkhozes received 38,000 fewer tractor-drawn cultivators, 9,000 fewer milking machines, 7,000 fewer machines for the soil apllication of mineral fertilizer, 4,700 fewer tractor-drawn seeders, 900 fewer grain cleaning machines, 1,300 fewer kits of equipment for preparing mixed-feed pellets KORK-15, 3 million tons less mineral fertilizer, 168,000 tons less feed additives, and 7.4 million tons less materials for the lime pretreatment of soil.

Capital Construction

The state of affairs in capital construction deteriorated. Out of the 505 facilities listed in the state order for 1990 at which [new] production capacity was under construction, 155, or 31 percent, were commissioned. Likewise, the commissioning of 103 state-ordered facilities out of the 241 (43 percent) which failed to be commissioned in 1989 was not ensured. Such results of the fulfillment of startup program did not occur even in the year 1989, a year of crisis in the sector, when the program was half fulfilled. This state of affairs in construction is largely due to a lack of correspondence between the construction program and material resources, the destabilization of material-technical support for construction projects, and the loss of control in the absence of an adequate system of economic management methods. It was largely for these reasons that the number of state-order facilities was reduced by 69 compared to the initially confirmed number.

The following data show the execution of assignments to commission state-order facilities (including those postponed from 1989):

	Number of facilities		
	envisaged for the year	commissioned	percentage of assignments fulfilled
Total	746	293	39
out of which			
The fuel and energy complex	80	45	56
The metallurgical complex	55	14	25
The machine-building complex	86	53	62
The chemical and wood complex	86	30	35

	Number of facilities		
	envisaged for the year	commissioned	percentage of assignments fulfilled
The agroindustrial complex	249	86	35
Ministries of Light Industry of union republics	86	38	44

Failure to comply with assignments to commission power-generation facilities exacerbates the gap between the growth of the needs of our national economy for electricity and the opportunity to meet them. Arrears in the commissioning of power station capacity amounted to 7.7 million kilowatt, or 60 percent of the state order, out of which 3.6 million kilowatt at thermal power stations and 4 million kilowatt at nuclear power station—49 and 80 percent respectively. At the same time, operation of heat and power facilities may be affected by arrears in the mining and processing of coal at coal-dressing plants—12 and 11 million tons of coal respectively, or 57 and 59 percent of the state order.

Construction of facilities for the deeper refining of oil proceeded in an extremely unsatisfactory manner. This may affect unfavorably the availability of fuel and lubricants to the sectors of national economy.

No facilities for producing welded cold-resistant and corrosion-proof large-diameter pipes and for processing scrap metal were introduced in metallurgy. Arrears in the commissioning of capacities producing concentrated iron ore and manufacturing and pouring steel in installations for the continuous pouring of blanks came to between 58 and 61 percent, and in the production of rolled ferrous metals—to almost one-half.

In machine building, not a single facility for producing road machines, power transformers, precision metal-cutting tools, medical equipment, and spare parts was commissioned. Commissioning of capacities for the production of main-line freight cars amounted to five percent of the state order, and those producing highly efficient diesel-generators and steam turbines—less than 40 percent, metal-cutting machine tools with numerical program control—57 percent, and agricultural machinery and implements for intensive crop-growing technologies—five percent.

Failure to build the facilities of all-union state order for producing non-food consumer goods, as well as ensuring the processing and storage of agricultural products, and fulfillment of less than one-half of the assignment to commission capacities for the manufacturing of footwear, garments, knitted goods, finished fabrics, and furniture became one of the factors destabilizing the situation in the consumer market.

While the situation with the availability of medicinal preparations to the populace was difficult, the state order to commission capacites for producing synthetic medicinal compounds was 46 percent fulfilled.

The assignment of the plan to commission capacities at processing-industry enterprises of the agroindustrial complex was not fulfilled in full.

Compared to 1989, the volume of contract work performed declined (by 8 percent), and compliance with contractual obligations by contractor organizations at startup facilities for production uses and those in the social sphere deteriorated.

Failure to meet contractual obligations for the delivery of the main types of construction materials, mainly due to reductions in their output, was one of the reasons for this state of affairs.

State construction organizations also experienced a shortage of skilled worker cadres due to their outflow to cooperatives. The number of employees in construction who worked in the state sector declined by 7 percent compared to 1989. The high level of labor turnover was due to the dissatisfaction of the employees with salary levels, shortcomings in the organization of production, and the underdevelopment of social services and housing.

As a result of failures to commission production capacities and facilities, the volume of state capital investment continued to exceed the commissioning of fixed assets, which caused unfinished construction to grow by 11 percent compared to 1989. Its amount as of the end of 1990 exceeded R200 billion; for the first time, it exceeded the amount of capital investment used. Out of this, above-the-norm unfinished construction amounted to R60 billion which was 1.7 times more than by the end of 1989.

Transportation and Communications

Freight haulage by common-use transportation dropped by 5.9 percent in conjunction with a general reduction in the output of products and the loss of existing economic ties between enterprises, industries, and regions. Shortcomings in the organization of operational activities of transportation, considerable obsolescence of available rolling stock, a poor condition of roads, and the increasing accident rate were a factor as well.

Shipments by railway transportation were 142.8 million tons lower than in 1989. The carriage of all most significant types of freight declined, with the exception of grain and products of grinding.

The plan of total shipment of freight was 100 percent fulfilled. However, the state order was underfulfilled by 55.3 million tons (by 2.3 percent) for nine types of freight out of 14, among which were hard coal, oil and refinery products, nonferrous ore and sulfurous raw materials, fluxes, ferrous metals, chemical and mineral fertilizer, cement, refractory materials, and lumber freight. At the same time, rail-side loading facilities of enterprises and stations held as of the end of November 40.6 million tons of freight ready to be shipped but not picked up by railway transportation.

In 1990, the turnaround time of freight cars increased by 2.6 hours. The average weight of trains declined.

Maritime transportation fulfilled the state order for the shipment of cargo to the regions of the Far North and those equated with them 101.1 percent, and met the target for carrying cargo in foreign navigation 99.8 percent.

As of the end of December, 5.8 million tons of cargo were available at seaports for shipment by seagoing vessels, out of which 4.8 million tons consisted of export cargo (as of the same day in 1989, 4.4 and 3.7 million tons respectively).

There were 0.9 million tons of cargo at the warehouses of ports for shipment by railway transportation of the USSR Ministry of Railways, out of which 0.7 million tons were imported cargo (as of the same day in 1989, 1.3 and 0.9 million tons respectively).

As of the end of December, 4.9 million tons of transfer cargo for railway transportation were held at ports on inland waterways (in warehouses and on vessels) compared to 5.1 million tons as of the same date in 1989.

Motor vehicle transportation did not meet the target for hauling freight. Only the Turkmen SSR, the Kazakh SSR, the Uzbek SSR, the Belorussian SSR, the Ukrainian SSR, and the RSFSR fulfilled the plan.

Financial losses in common-use transportation caused by accidents involving the rolling stock failed to decrease. Between January and November, 22,900 cars were damaged, and financial losses of R2.5 million were incurred on common-use railway tracks of the USSR Ministry of Railways in the course of shunting, loading, and unloading alone, and on the tracks of freight shipper enterprises 38,700 and R4.0 million respectively. Sixty-eight seagoing craft were lost or damaged (loss of R3 million), as well as 104 river and lake craft (R465,000), and 181 planes and helicopters (R28.8 million).

In 1990, common-use passenger transportation carried 55 billion people (at the 1989 level). Passenger turnover increased by 2.0 percent and came to 1,150 billion passenger-kilometers. Railway transportation met the state order for passenger turnover 100.0 percent, and civil aviation—103.8 percent.

The timetable for the movement of passenger means of transportation was violated; 16.5 percent of trains (with the exception of commuter trains) arrived at their destination with delays; 16.4 percent of planes and helicopters, nine percent of buses and 1.3 percent of river and lake vessels failed to arrive or arrived late.

Three hundred and thirty-two thousand casualty accidents involving moving vehicles on highways and streets were registered; this was 13,000, or four percent, more than in the similar period of 1989. Sixty-three thousand people died, 360,000 were wounded; their numbers increased by eight and 3.6 percent respectively. The share of those whose who died through the fault of drunk drivers amounted to 18.2 percent of the overall number of fatalities on the highways and streets.

In common-use rail transportation, 136 accidents occurred in which 41 people died, in maritime transportation, 74 and five people respectively, and in aviation, 193 accidents and 194 people.

In 1990, communications enterprises rendered to the populace services worth R4.3 billion, or 9.6 percent more than in the previous year. The plan was 104.7 percent fulfilled.

The number of main telephones on common-use circuits increased by 1.9 million at the end of 1990 compared to the beginning of the year (in 1989, the increment amounted to 2.3 million).

Foreign Economic Relations

A decline in the volume of industrial output, especially in the fuel and energy industry, caused a reduction of exports and hard-currency proceeds. Difficulties in the consumer market necessitated additional purchases of imported products abroad. The volume of export and import operations with member countries of the CEMA declined. All of the above brought about an increase of the negative balance of foreign trade by a factor of three compared to 1989.

The status of foreign trade in 1990 is described by the following data (billion of foreign-currency R, actual prices):

	Turnover	Exports	Imports	1990 as percentage of 1989		
				turnover	export	import
Total	131.2	60.6	70.6	93.1	88.1	97.8
CEMA member countries	69.5	30.1	39.4	88.6	79.5	97.0
PRC, DPRK, Laos, SFRY	8.2	4.0	4.2	98.1	93.9	102.4
Developed capitalist countries	37.6	17.4	20.2	101.8	106.0	98.5
Developing countries	15.9	9.1	6.8	92.8	89.3	97.9

In 1990, the annual quota for the export of goods was fulfilled 83 percent, taking into account additional decisions, out of which the quota for exports for freely convertible currencies—87 percent fulfilled. As a result, 2.5 billion in freely convertible currencies were not generated. Compared to the annual export quota, more than 44 million tons of crude oil and the main types of refinery products were not delivered, including 16 million tons of refinery products for freely convertible currencies; the plan of crude oil deliveries for freely convertible currencies was overfulfilled by 3.5 million tons.

The volume of technical assistance came to R3.2 billion and declined by R0.4 billion compared to 1989. The Soviet Union received rolled ferrous metal goods, raw sugar, alumina, bauxite, nickel-cobalt and molybdenum concentrates, tin, coal, metallurgical and other equipment from assistance projects as partial repayment of the loans extended.

The annual quota for the import of goods was 86 percent met, taking additional decisions into account, and [the quota for imports] paid for in freely convertible currencies was 83 percent met.

Machines, equipment, and consumer goods still remained the main import items. Gearing imports to meeting the needs of the social sphere to an increasing degree also affected the purchasing of the products of machine-building. Imports of equipment for the food-processing industry, the garments, leather, footwear, and fur industries, and the medical equipment and instrument industries increased.

Deliveries of goods to the national economy from imported stocks are indicated below:

	1989	1990	1990 as percentage of 1989
Coffee beans, 1,000 tons	103.0	65.8	64
Cocoa beans, 1,000 tons	225.5	147.3	65
Tea, 1,000 tons	213.7	241.2	113
Raw sugar (including white sugar converted to raw sugar)	5,422.0	3,837.2	71
Meat and meat products, 1,000 tons	631.5	982.6	156
Butter, 1,000 tons	248.4	260.3	105
Whole milk powder (including fat-free), 1,000 tons	90.6	84.5	93
Macaroni products, 1,000 tons	10.3	11.6	113
Citrus fruits, 1,000 tons	404.6	430.7	106
Vegetable oil, 1,000 tons	1,173.8	674.0	57
Cotton and upholstery fabrics, million running meters	159.1	197.8	124
Garments, million R	1,249.8	895.7	72
Knitted goods, million R	631.2	524.0	83
Leather footwear, million pairs	74.1	63.6	86
Furniture, million R	560.5	497.9	89
Drugs, sanitary and hygienic products, million rubles	1,653.5	1,798.9	109

Compared to 1989, the share of imports in the consumption of fresh fruits and berries in the country dropped from 7.3 to 4.5 percent, of vegetable oil—from 25.6 to 14.5 percent, and of furniture—from 10.7 to 8.4 percent. At the same time, [the share of] imports in tea consumption increased from 35.0 percent to 39.1 percent, of vegetable oil—from 35.0 to 39.1 percent, of meat and meat products—from 5.1 to 8.3 percent, of butter—from 12.6 to 15.7 percent, of footwear—from 8.3 to 12.2 percent, of household sewing machines—from 8.5 to 13.2 percent, of TV sets—from 1.6 to 3.3 percent, and of tape recorders—from 0.7 percent to 4.3 percent.

By 1 January 1991, the Soviet Union received humanitarian assistance in the amount of more than 26,000 tons, out of which foodstuffs accounted for 14,300 tons, drugs for 522 tons, medical equipment for about 72 tons, clothing and underwear for 211 tons. More than 11,000 tons of the aid provided consist of mixed shipments, which include foodstuffs, drugs, medical equipment, wheelchairs, and other goods.

In 1990, exports of goods within the framework of exchanges in kind (barter operations) amounted to R1.4 billion, including the following exports in barter operations: 1.7 million tons of coal, 0.7 million tons of crude oil, 3.3 million tons of refinery products, 0.3 million tons of cast iron, 0.5 million tons of ferrous rolled goods, R47 million worth of timber and pulp-and-paper products, 6 million standard cans of canned meat, 48,000 tons of fresh-frozen fish, 50,000 refrigerators, 21,000 TV sets, 11,000 radio sets, and other hard-currency goods. Goods worth R0.8 billion were imported under barter arrangements, out of which consumer goods (mainly video equipment, TV sets, tape recorders) and passenger cars accounted for R0.5 billion.

As of 1 January 1991, more than 26,000 participants in foreign economic relations were registered.

In 1991, large-scale measures envisaged by Main Directions for the Stabilization of National Economy and a Transition to Market Economy, adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet in October 1990, will be taken with a view to ensuring normal operations in the economy of our country. Ensuring civil accord, honest labor, responsibility and discipline everywhere is the most important condition for the implementation of these measures.

Baltic Republics

Gorbachev Names Baltic Talks Delegates

LD0102125891 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1134 GMT 1 Feb 91

[Text] Moscow, 1 Feb (TASS)—Here are three decrees of the president signed by him today:

Decree of the president of the USSR

On the composition of the delegation for discussions with representatives of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] of a range of political, social, and economic issues

The delegation for discussion of a whole range of political, social, and economic issues with representatives of the Latvian SSR to be endorsed as follows:

Velichko, Vladimir Makarovich—first deputy USSR prime minister;

Tarazevich, Georgiy Stanislavovich—chairman of the Commission for Nationalities Policy and Relations Between Nationalities of the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet;

Ogorok, Valentin Ivanovich—deputy chairman of the USSR State Planning Committee;

Varennikov, Valentin Ivanovich—USSR deputy defense minister;

Yakovlev, Venyamin Fedorovich—chairman of the USSR Supreme Court of Arbitration;

Komarov, Yuriy Trofimovich—chairman of the Committee for Construction and Architecture of the USSR Supreme Soviet;

Nikiforov, Valentin Mikhaylovich—USSR deputy foreign minister;

Kukushkin, Yuriy Aleksandrovich—USSR deputy minister of internal affairs.

[Signed] M. Gorbachev, president of the USSR, Moscow, the Kremlin, 1 February 1991

Decree of the president of the USSR

On the composition of the delegation for discussions with representatives of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] of a range of political, social, and economic questions.

The delegation for the discussion of a whole range of political, social, and economic questions with representatives of the Lithuanian SSR to be endorsed as follows:

Doguzhiyev, Vitaliy Khusseynovich—first deputy USSR prime minister;

Kalmykov, Yuriy Khamzatovich—chairman of the Committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet for Legislation;

Maslyukov, Yuriy Dmitriyevich—deputy USSR prime minister;

Moiseyev, Mikhail Alekseyevich—first deputy USSR minister of defense, chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces;

Lushchikov, Sergey Gennadyevich—USSR minister of justice;

Shuvalov, Sergey Gavrilovich—acting chairman of the Commission of the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet for the Development of Culture, Language, National, and Internationalist Traditions and Protection of the Historical Heritage;

Komplektov, Viktor Georgiyevich—deputy USSR minister of foreign affairs;

Demidov, Nikolay Ivanovich—deputy USSR minister of internal affairs.

[Signed] M. Gorbachev, president of the USSR, Moscow, Kremlin, 1 February 1991

Decree of the president of the USSR

On the composition of the delegation for discussions with representatives of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] of a range of political, social, and economic questions.

The delegation for discussion of a whole range of political, social, and economic questions with representatives of the Estonian SSR is to be endorsed as follows:

Laverov, Nikolay Pavlovich—USSR deputy prime minister;

Gritsenko, Nikolay Nikolayevich—chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Commission for Labor, Prices, and Social Policy;

Troshin, Aleksandr Nikolayevich—deputy chairman of the State Planning Commission;

Kapitanets, Ivan Matveyevich—first deputy commander in chief of the USSR Navy;

Topornin, Boris Nikolayevich—director of the Institute of the State and the Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences;

Sharipov, Yuriy Kamalovich—chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities Commission for the Social and Economic Development of Union and Autonomous Republics, Oblasts, and Okrugs;

Chaplin, Boris Nikolayevich—USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs;

Trushin, Basiliy Petrovich—USSR deputy minister of internal affairs.

[Signed] M. Gorbachev, president of the USSR, Moscow, Kremlin, 1 February, 1991

Delegations Viewed

LD0102152491 Moscow TASS in English 1507 GMT 1 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondent Aleksandras Budris]

[Text] Moscow February 1 TASS—President Gorbachev issued decrees here today on the composition of delegations "to discuss a package of political, social and economic issues" with representatives of three Baltic republics.

A delegation to hold talks with Latvia will be led by USSR First Deputy Prime Minister Vladimir Velichko, a delegation for Lithuania—by USSR First Deputy Prime Minister Vitaly Doguzhiyev and for Estonia—by USSR Deputy Prime Minister Nikolay Laverov. The delegations will include heads of committees and commissions of the Soviet parliament, the State Planning Committee, the Defence Ministry, the Foreign Ministry, the Interior Ministry, and other Soviet ministries and institutions.

Up till now representatives of the Soviet Union were preparing for talks with only Lithuania and Estonia. Consultative meetings with Lithuanian representatives were held on the level of delegations, appointed by a decree of the Soviet president and a resolution of the Lithuanian parliament accordingly.

They were led by former Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov and Lithuanian President Vytautas Landsbergis. Meetings with Estonian representatives were held on the level of experts. The sides failed to agree on the date of the beginning of official talks with Lithuania and Estonia. Baltic leaders insist that their republics should be treated as "sovereign states" at the talks, while the centre continues to regard them as part of the Soviet Union.

After the January events in the Baltic region, Latvia and Estonia signed treaties with the largest union republic, the Russian Federation. A similar treaty is expected to be signed soon between Russia and Lithuania.

It is noteworthy that the word "talks" is not mentioned in today's presidential decrees. They deal only with the "discussion of issues" with Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian representatives. The Baltic republics are mentioned as "Soviet Socialist" republics, although it is known that after proclaiming unilaterally their independence last spring they dropped those words from their names.

Nishanov Urges Peaceful Solution to Baltic Issue

LD0102173991 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1657 GMT 1 Feb 91

[By TASS world service correspondent Andrey Orlov]

[Text] Moscow, 1 Feb TASS—The Council of the Federation has expressed "exceptional alarm and concern in connection with the situation in the Baltic republics." This was stated by Rafik Nishanov, chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet. During a break between the sittings of the country's Federation Council, he commented on the situation in the Soviet Baltic republics which have been placed on the agenda of today's sitting as a separate item.

The participants in the Federation Council, Rafik Nishanov said, stressed that none of these questions can be tackled by means of force. However tense the situation may be, it is essential to seek political means to settle it.

"The tragedy occurred," Rafik Nishanov said, "and we all have very great sympathy for them. [as received] But in the future, methods of force and anticonstitutional actions must be ruled out. The situation can be improved only through patience, negotiations, and mutual agreement."

In order to normalize the situation in the Baltic republics the Federation Council considers it essential that "in the republics themselves the opposing forces and groups and the parliamentary factions reach agreement with each other by constitutional means, using in particular the authority of the commissions set up in accordance with the president's decree, as well as "roundtables'. There should be a review of the anticonstitutional laws that were hastily adopted by the parliaments of the three republics which violate the rights of citizens, and the question of their rescindment should be considered," Rafik Nishanov said. In this connection he warned against the hasty adoption of new laws.

The chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities stated that the participants in the meeting advocated the immediate resumption of political dialogue. For this purpose the USSR president today issued decrees on the appointment of delegations to discuss with representatives of all three republics a complex of political, social, and economic matters. The Federation Council considers that while the talks are proceeding the anticonstitutional laws should be frozen. "The Federation Council," Rafik Nishanov said, "has called on the citizens of the three republics to show patience and wisdom."

Landsbergis Says 'Propaganda War' Accelerating

LD0102174191 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian 1410 GMT 1 Feb 91

[Remarks by Lithuanian Supreme Council Chairman Vytautas Landsbergis; place and date not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] As far as Lithuania is concerned, we are aware of the [Soviet] military plans, but we also see a spreading and accelerating political propaganda war in the world. Use is being made of all means, old arguments. I would like to deal with some interesting reports by foreign radio and press agencies. For instance, the conversation between President Bush and the Soviet Union's foreign minister, Bessmertnykh. We know that it was said that some military units will be withdrawn from Lithuania. Thus we so far do not see any movement by those standing in the front and the most obvious soldiers who have occupied the buildings of the Lithuanian state. There cannot be any serious talks about any withdrawal. And here is such a composition of words. [as heard] According to REUTER, Bessmertnykh said that some units will be withdrawn so that talks can start with the president of the rebellious nationalists, Landsbergis. The question arises who has rebelled and against whom. What kind of rebels are we? Why does the foreign minister use such terminology? We have not rebelled against anyone. We are on our land, we have our rights, and we implement them as a nation, as a society having elected our government.

There was an attempt to revolt against the lawfully elected government or to pretend that there was some revolt by a local group that should be helped by the army of the great power with specially trained murderers. Of course, this was not a rebellion but a cover for aggression.

And, what is most important, the weapons. Our basic weapon—the greatest weapon that cannot be defeated—is our will, our clear determination to strive for freedom, for an independent Lithuania and our will to do this. We will strive and will not retreat. [passage omitted]

We know that there are deceptions, intimidations not only from that captured radio and television, but that rumors are being spread. Some person in a line at the store starts thinking that one should not vote [in the 9 February referendum], or rumors are being spread in the countryside that there may be lists for deportations if somebody votes, and so on. [passage omitted]

Today we received yet another decree announcing the composition of the delegation to discuss with the representatives of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic the whole range of political, social, and economic problems. Thus, we knew that there was talk from Moscow and from the Kremlin that, allegedly, they want to have talks with Lithuania. Now we receive this proposal. We must know what is hiding behind it, what is the political situation in the Soviet Union's leadership. But as it is stated that a proposal is made to begin discussions with representatives of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic, if we have to accept such a formula, this means, that at first we must capitulate, give in, acknowledge that we are something we are not, confirm the seizure of Lithuania, and only then will they negotiate with us.

At a first glance at this document we may say that, unfortunately, this is not the sign of goodwill from the Kremlin that we expected. But it seems some talks and discussions will take place. There may be some better prospects. [passage omitted]

Further on Landsbergis' Reaction

LD0202011391 Vilnius International Service in English 2300 GMT 1 Feb 91

[Excerpt] Unfortunately we have not received a positive sign indicating willingness to enter into dialogue—this is how Chairman of the Lithuanian Parliament Vytautas Landsbergis assessed the decree by the Soviet president, Mikhail Gorbachev, appointing a group of Kremlin negotiators for contacts with Lithuania's representatives.

The parliament's press representative, who conveyed the chairman's assessment, says that a more detailed response would be possibly presented tomorrow. The press representative also said that in the document Lithuania is named the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic, which is known in advance to be unacceptable to the republic. He also pointed out that when the parties had made up negotiating delegations and started consultations last year, the communiques signed by both parties used the word Lithuania as a compromise version. The parliament's press representative also drew attention to the fact that the Lithuanian party was rather ambiguously mentioned as representatives, avoiding the word delegation. Thus, head of the Soviet Union's Communist Party organization in Lithuania, Burokevicius, could also pose as Lithuania's representative.

The Soviet president's decree was in general qualified as a propaganda step to pacify the Western public. This will be apparent when Mikhail Gorbachev has appointed delegations to negotiate with Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. The three Baltic states are called Soviet socialist republics in the document. All the delegations are as alike as two drops water; some of them include eight apparatchiks, while heads of the delegations are not mentioned at all. According to the president's decree, the delegations are to work political, social, and economic groundwork with corresponding Baltic delegations. [passage omitted]

Landsbergis Holds News Conference 2 Feb

LD0302200291

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian at 1810 GMT on 2 February carries a live relay of a 45-minute news conference by Lithuanian Supreme Council Chairman Vytautas Landsbergis in Vilnius. Initial questions are fielded by Supreme Council press representative Audrius Azubalis.

Azubalis is questioned about a possible agreement with the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, RSFSR. Azubalis replies: "The Lithuanian delegation chairman spoke with esteemed Yeltsin; this was around lunchtime, and they reached an agreement to the effect that certain points of this agreement, which pertain to other language speakers among our republic's population, should be published in the press, since in principle the entire agreement is [word indistinct] in such a way that, while the question of signing or affixing signatures is only a question of time and apparently [words indistinct], it will have to take place sooner or later; I cannot tell you when."

Azubalis is then asked whether Mr. Stankevicius has returned. Azubalis replies that he is unable to answer that. He explains that Yeltsin had been accused earlier of having betrayed the interests of Baltic Russian speakers; therefore it was decided during a telephone conversation not to discuss certain points prior to their publication in the press.

Azubalis is then asked about the arrival of the delegation appointed by Gorbachev. He defers the question to Landsbergis.

Supreme Council Chairman Vytautas Landsbergis then enters the room, and says: "We have learned about the appointment of the delegation only through the news media. We have not received any letter asking us and no direct announcement, since the aim of appointing this delegation is formulated in a peculiar manner. For this reason, we hope to receive some sort of sign, not to mention the date, even. That is why your question concerning the date of the delegation's arrival is apparently premature."

Another question concerns the documents that have been exchanged, who prepared them, did the visitors bring them matter of factly, or were there other authorizations for them?

Landsbergis says: "These documents had been prepared earlier. We exchanged them via telefax, and these are identical documents—that is—one common document."

Landsbergis is then asked to explain somewhat what is preventing, if indeed something is preventing, the signing of these documents, and what is his opinion on this. He says: "My view is very favorable, while nothing in principle is preventing the signing of the documents; it simply amounts to technical preparation and agreement on a date."

Another question refers to the announcement that certain points of the agreement will be published in the press, and asks for certain details of these points. Landsbergis says: "In the agreement between Lithuania and Russia, there is no mention of Russian-speaking members of the population, since that term is incorrect. We do not make use of it for any reason. We refer to citizens of Russia or Russians, and with respect to these people, our agreement defines their citizenship, their right, and their [word indistinct] certain features and guarantees. There are some guarantees that are important for us as well as for Russia, which must resolve questions which concern us, as states, and concern and worry those people. It is understandable that these are not limited only to paragraphs concerning Russia's citizens in Lithuania, but also those that relate to Lithuania's citizens in Russia. This is a bilateral agreement; however, in truth, the political problem is caused mostly by the Russian citizens in Lithuania."

Questioned in Russian about guarantees in the agreement, Landsbergis replies: "The guarantees, discussed by me, must be understood in the sense that both countries, Lithuania and Russia, are providing for their own citizens and assume certain obligations. I do not think Russia should assume obligations concerning Georgians or Estonians who happen to live in Lithuania. [Word indistinct] is not formulated as a guarantee; however they contain guarantees which calm the people, as can be perceived."

He is then asked whether an exchange of diplomatic representatives is envisaged, following signing of the treaty with Russia and also with Iceland. Landsbergis says: "This is actually envisaged in the case of Russia. I cannot say whether reference is made there in the agreement to diplomatic representaives, or simply about representation of one country within another country, and vice versa. Moreover, we shall address this right from the start. Boris Yeltsin is greatly desirous of ensuring this as well. So that in Lithuania, in Vilnius, there would be a Russian mission and a certain center, perhaps for Russian interests and reconciling the interests of Russian citizens, and perhaps also a cultural center. These matters will be under discussion later, but representation is planned.

"As far as the embassy in Iceland is concerned, concrete discussion will take place depending on conditions. What conditions will be able to be guaranteed? Let us suppose there is an Icelandic Embassy in Lithuania, so that it may not be broken into by Soviet soldiers, to ascertain some suspicions of theirs.

"Paragraph 19—The high contracting parties consider it expedient to implement bilateral exchange with authorized embassies.

"The paragraphs relevant to citizenship are very lengthy. I think you will receive them tomorrow through our information center. Well, for example, paragraph 4 begins with that: Both high contracting parties guarantee its citizens, irrespective of their nationality or other differences, equal rights and freedoms. The Lithuanian Republic guarantees individuals, who have a right to Russian citizenship and who have maintained a permanent residence on Lithuanian territory prior to 23 November 1989 and continue to live there and have permanent employment, or other rights and sources of income in the Lithuanian Republic, they are guaranteed the right to acquire citizenship in the Lithuanian Republic, in accordance with expression of their own free will and according to the order prescribed by the Lithuanian Republic's laws, regardless of their [words indistinct], knowledge of the Lithuanian language, or any other conditions for obtaining citizenship, that differ from those established in the cases of all other individuals." Landsbergis also explains details of the Russian Federation's guarantees for individuals who have Lithuanian citizenship or have the right to such citizenship. He says, "in other words, everything is defined here according to law. The guarantee of rights and freedoms."

Landsbergis is asked whether there had been any reply regarding the request to discontinue patrols. He says: "No, I did not receive a reply, and very frequently, we receive no official reply, nor even a telephoned reply; we judge from the actions. Actions also constitute replies. In this instance, as you see, the reply was negative."

A BBC reporter asks whether Lithuanians living in Russia and Russians living in Lithuania will have dual citizenship.

Landsbergis says: "No, I do not know what laws Russia will have concerning citizenship; Russia does not yet have its citizenship law. According to the Lithuanian law, dual citizenship is only possible in exceptional circumstances. Also, the Supreme Council Presidium must pronounce on that in every case. That is why I do not think it would be realistic to think...[passage indistinct]; however the agreement defines even those instances where Russian nationality individuals now residing in Lithuania, or individuals of other nationalities of Russia entitled to Russian citizenship will want to assume Lithuanian citizenship, and those instances where they will desire to remain in Lithuania, without assuming Lithuanian citizenship, but holding, I think, Russian citizenship.

Asked whether military officers residing in Lithuania, can participate in the independence referendum, Landsbergis says: "Yes, they are invited to participate. They appear on voters' lists, and they will receive invitations to vote." The news conference then concludes.

Vilnius Officials React to Joint Patrol Decree

LD0102234191 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 1 Feb 91

[Report by "special" correspondent A. Kraminov from Vilnius; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Kraminov] Today's night patrol in Vilnius passed calmly, although there were grounds to fear excesses. Yesterday, Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, spoke on local television and radio, and censured the president's decree. As should have been expected, the republican police refused to accompany the patrols. Colonel Belous, the Vilnius military commandant, comments:

[Begin recording] [Kraminov] Would the participation of the local police make the fulfillment of your tasks of preserving order and of maintaining calm in the city easier?

[Belous] This is precisely so, because they are specialists in their sphere. Our servicemen, their age and their experience in the sphere are such that there would be far more results with the participation of the local militia bodies, and it would be easier to carry out their service. [end recording]

[Kraminov] It must be said, however, that there was no active kindling of anti-Army passions. It might even be proposed that the Lithuanian leadership is thinking about renouncing an openly hostile attitude toward the Armed Forces stationed on Lithuanian territory. At today's meeting between Vytenis Andriukaitis, deputy of the republic's Supreme Council, and officers from the signals corps, he repreatedly stressed that he represented only himself and was not speaking on behalf of parliament. Previously, such conversations were impossible. His proposal that a joint commission of parliamentarians and officers be set up was evidently unexpected for those present. [video shows Andriukaitis standing in front of a map, speaking]

[Begin Andriukaitis recording] Our commission, which would study specific issues on the matter of the current situation, moving away from various treaties, moving away from the views at the top—according to the maps—of what will happen, in order to resolve here, on the spot, all the social problems. [sentence as heard] Therefore I can assure you all frankly that I personally am prepared to work in such a commission, and to discuss, because we must guarantee everything—coupons, study, health, and life, and so on. [end recording]

[Kraminov] The opponents of the current Lithuanian leadership consider that it is seeking popularity among the Army on the eve of the referendum planned for 9 February, which local politicians probably intend to substitute for the all-union referendum. Perhaps this is the beginning of a turn toward more sober policies.

'Military Incidents' of Violence in Lithuania

LD0202103291 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian 0100 GMT 2 Feb 91

[Report by correspondent Guoda Salciute]

[Text] We enjoyed a comparatively quiet night last night. We are already talking about military incidents today. Soldiers broke into a citizen's flat in Elektrenai looking for a draft-age youngster and beat up the owner of the flat. A 22 year-old-man was beaten up in Vilnius, near Lukiskes.

Military patrols were more active in Vilnius last night, for some reason paying a great deal of attention to the Cathedral Square and the Sajudis premises.

More on Patrol Violence

LD0202144591 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Polish 1345 GMT 2 Feb 91

[Text] Military patrolling has started in Vilnius. The first night did not pass without incident. A young man was stopped in Lukiskes Street at 2100 last night. His name is not known. Armed soldiers demanded that he produce documents. Before he could do this, they started beating him. He lost consciousness. When he recovered, the soldiers were no longer there. There were many military patrols in Vilnius last night, especially in the city center. Armed with machine guns, trucks with armed soldiers were standing at the Sajudis headquarters. Motorized patrols were moving along the Paleckio, Zalgiro, and Kalvarijos Streets.

Vilnius Mayor Vytautas Bernatonis appealed yesterday to the capital's residents and advised them to lock their doors, not to allow anyone in, and if the door is broken, to telephone the Department of Internal Affairs duty officer or the city municipality. The mayor also said that the laws of Lithuania and of the Soviet Union guarantee the immunity of our apartments. Always demand that a search warrant is shown, he said.

Commentator Views Baltic Talks Delegation

LD0202113991 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian 0100 GMT 2 Feb 91

[Commentary by Cesloval Iskauskas]

[Text] There is no real peace, although delegations for negotiations with the Baltic Republics have been formed at a meeting of the Soviet Union's Council of the Federation. It is true—all three republics together are called the Soviet Socialist Republics.

Commentator Cesloval Iskauskas will say more about it:

[Iskauskas] Indeed, the Soviet Union's Council of the Federation yesterday formed a delegation that is instructed by Mikhail Gorbachev to conduct negotiations with Lithuania. So far it is too early to discuss the joint attitude of the delegation in the coming negotiations, but the names of its members bear witness to the fact that it will be sharp [words indistinct]. The attention of Western mass information media is especially drawn by the name Moiseyev, the USSR first deputy minister of defense. He, as far as we know, favors the Soyuz group at the Soviet Union's Supreme Soviet, which categorically opposes Baltic independence. Other members of the delegation are less well known. But it is notable that this time the delegation is of a lower rank than that headed by the Soviet Union's premier himself.

Most likely, our parliament will have to form a Lithuanian delegation, where both realistic and uncompromising stands should dominate.

On the whole, yesterday's meeting of the Council of the Federation did not produce anything new, although it was [words indistinct] Estonian Premier Savisaar, who took part in the meeting, who stated, and I quote: There is no good news. But, according to him, the discussion on the situation in Baltics was sharp and severe. Some members demanded that presidential rule be introduced without delay. But it must be acknowledged that Mikhail Gorbachev's irresolute stand this time yielded, I would say, positive results. The KGB leader, Kryuchkov, directly stated that in the Baltic [words indistinct] the Soviet Union's Constitution and this, alledgedly, is the main cause of the conflict. [Words indistinct] Nishanov, well known to us, demanded a freeze on the laws passed in Lithuania after 11 March. Such was their platform.

The Lithuanian representative, Egidijus Bickauskas, who attended the meeting, told an ELTA correspondent that the meeting was taking place in a very [word indistinct] atmosphere and [words indistinct] Mikhail Gorbachev was one of the more moderate [words indistinct]. Georgiy Tarazevich [word indistinct] the situation in Lithuania was, as before, impartial and supported political dialogue.

On the whole, if Moscow thinks that by forming the delegation it has already done half the job and metaphorically speaking put Vilnius before a fait accompli, the negotiations will be difficult. But despite the fact that the composition of the delegation does not promise anything good, and that its stand is clear to us, the negotiations must take place. Of course, they will take place under the conditions of double occupation—important buildings have been seized in Lithuania. This is a condition degrading us. Apart from that, the esteemed Guoda [Salciute] just now reported about the rage of the military. Of course, it is difficult for us to sit at the negotiating table under such conditions, but on the other hand, we believe that only negotiations, no matter what kind of negotiators are on the other side, can eliminate these conditions [passage indistinct].

According to Egidijus Bickauskas, who is familiar with the mood in Moscow, the Soviets are as they are. Hardly anyone will change them. Havng said that, stressed Bickauskas, one unfortunately still has to negotiate.

Lithuanian Official Claims Troops Not Withdrawn

LD0102111791 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1043 GMT 1 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondent Kazis Ustsila]

[Text] Vilnius, 1 Feb (TASS)—"The statement by the Soviet leaders that the additional contingent of the Soviet Army has been or is being withdrawn from Lithuania is not in accord with reality," said Kazimerqas Moteka, deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian Repubic, today in reply to a question from a TASS correspondent.

In the opinion of the deputy head of the Lithuanian legislature, "the additional contingent has not been withdrawn anywhere, quite the contrary—it has been increased." He added that "it can only be a question of redeployment, of troops being moved around." Kazimeras Moteka backed up his assertions by saying that "the military have not yet returned the buildings they seized." "Servicemen are continuing to carry out patrols both in military uniform and after changing into militia uniform." They "are using tanks and armored personnel carriers to block the roads."

Invesigatory Delegation Arrives in Lithuania

LD0302130191 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian 1000 GMT 3 Feb 91

[Text] A delegation of the union [word indistinct] organization arrived in Vilnius today. A week ago, this organization sent a letter in which it requested concurrence with its intent to come to Lithuania to join in investigating the criminal acts perpetrated by the Soviet Army.

The delegation is thus already in Lithuania today. Its members have met Lithuanian Supreme Council Chairman Vytautas Landsbergis in the Supreme Council building. General Director of the Department for the Country's Defense Audrius Butkevicius also participated in this meeting.

[Begin recording] [Correspondent] Esteemed Butkevicius, I would like to ask you for some brief details on which individuals have come and also—well, perhaps you have already had the opportunity to acquaint yourself with the more concrete delegation plans.

[Butkevicius] The (?SCH) organization is comprised of many reserve officers, a majority of whom protest against the use of the Soviet Army in resolving local internal conflicts. Also, they do not support the view that the Army should have such [word indistinct]. On the other hand, individuals who seek democratic relations within the Soviet Union are prepared to work and struggle for such concepts. [passage indistinct]

This commission, which has arrived in Vilnius, is led by candidate in technical sciences [words indistinct] doctor of juridical science, Levkov [words indistinct] doctor of juridical science, Levkov [word indistinct] Gennadiy Mikhailovich, and commission member (Krivchenko), Nikolay [word indistinct], who is a reserve major.

We think that the conclusions arrived at by this independent [words indistinct] will help, will expand the general picture concerning all that has taken place in Vilnius during recent days and will provide an additional source from which it will be possible to decide. [words indistinct]

[Correspondent] thank you, esteemed Butkevicius, for the interview. In turn, i would like to remind you that the delegation of the (?SCH) organization has only today arrived in Lithuania and that we will inform our radio listeners, in our subsequent bulletins, on its work and activity in Lithuania. [end recording]

Lithuanian Commission Issues Report on Violence

LD0302182291 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1737 GMT 3 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondent K. Ustsila]

[Text] Vilnius, 3 Feb (TASS)—"During the tragic events in Vilnius on 11-13 January, about 36 million rubles [R] worth of damage was done to the Lithuanian Republic," the state commission "for the investigation of USSR Armed Forces crimes in Lithuania" formed by the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Soviet today issued this preliminary result.

It emerges from the commission's information that damage amounting to about R14 million was done to the buildings of Lithuanian Television and Radio; about R3.6 million worth of damage was done to the television tower; and the losses inflicted on the Press House, amenities of the Lithuanian capital, and other facilities amount to large sums. The commission, citing the republican procurator general, confirmed that 13 civilian residents died on the night of the 12-13 January.

According to Lithuanian Health Ministry data contained in the commission's report, by 29 January 580 casualties had sought medical assistance, including 46 with bullet wounds. Expenditures on treatment and the provision of medical assistance comprises about R2 million.

This same information of the state commission reports that the Lithuanian Republic procurator general has instituted criminal proceedings against J. Jermalavicius, head of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Ideological Department, in accordance with Article 68 of the Lithuanian Criminal Code "for public appeals to violate the sovereignty of the Lithuanian state and overthrow state power by means of violence".

The state commission also reported: "The possibility is being checked that officials of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee formed the Lithuanian National Salvation Committee and participated in anticonstitutional activity.

Nordic Council Delegation To Observe Referendum

LD0202222491 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian 1900 GMT 2 Feb 91

[Text] A nationwide poll will be conducted in Lithuania on 9 February. It has been announced in Copenhagen that a Nordic Council delegation, composed of Danish, Finnish, Norwegian, Icelandic, and Swedish parliamentary representatives, will arrive on Tuesday [word indistinct] to observe the referendum.

According to a Swedish radio report, five Swedish deputies will arrive in Vilnius on 5 February. [passage indistinct]

Thousands Attend Funeral of Slain Lithuanian

AU0202170391 Paris AFP in English 1630 GMT 2 Jan 91

[Text] Vilnius, Lithuania, Feb 2 (AFP)—Several thousand people turned out in the Lithuanian capital Saturday to attend the funeral of a local youth shot and killed by Soviet troops after trying to evade conscription into the army. The emotional nationalist gathering came a day after the break-up in disarray of a meeting in

Moscow between President Mikhail Gorbachev and republican leaders to discuss the future shape of the Soviet Union.

Mourners packed into Saints Peter and Paul Church, while thousands more crowded outside, many in tears and holding lit candles. In his eulogy, the parish priest called the troops who shot 20-year-old Jonas Tautkus "assassins." Lithuania was "covered in blood this year, but we are sure the flowers of liberty will grow here again," he said.

The dead man, who had been evading the draft since January 13, died Wednesday, a day after he was shot at a roadblock.

In Moscow meawhile delegates revealed details of Friday's meeting of the new Council of the Soviet Federation, which although originally due to continue Saturday, came to an abrupt end late Friday without official explanation. Delegates said Mr. Gorbachev gave angry displays, particularly during the two hours devoted to the Baltic crisis. They said the issue of price hikes, which headed the agenda along with the Baltic republics and the future shape of the federation, was not even discussed.

A spokeswoman for the Lithuanian representation in Moscow, Dalia Bankauskaite, said Soviet delegates' comments centred on the Baltic region's "strategic importance" for the Soviet Union.

In other developments Saturday, Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia, one of several republic leaders who stayed away from the Moscow talks, said the Georgian parliament's decision this week to form a local armed force "is not anti-constitutional."

The militia would not be "an army" as such, he told a news conference in the Georgian capital Tbilisi, but would be a "national guard" staffed by 12,000 men from the Georgian Interior Ministry.

"Georgia has enough arms for them," he said, adding that "Every republic has the right to do the same, and to prohibit this ... would go against the Soviet Constitution".

Bullets in Lithuanians Not From Government Guns

LD0102223391 Moscow World Service in English 2100 GMT 1 Feb 91

[Text] In a sensational revelation to Leningrad's popular television program "600 seconds," Soviet MP Alksnis said 7.62-mm caliber bullets found in the bodies of the dead victims following the shooting incident in front of the television tower in Vilnius on 13 January did not belong to Interior Ministry [MVD] troops or special police units. Earlier reports spoke of unidentified individuals trying to (?bring out) corpses from the local morgue of people who died of causes unrelated to the events on 13 January. The exposure raises hard questions for a special inquiry into the tragic events in Vilnius.

Pro-Moscow Broadcasters Display Vilnius TV Tower

AU0402095891 Paris AFP in English 0910 GMT 4 Feb 91

[By Anne Penketh]

[Text] Vilnius, Lithuania, Feb 4 (AFP)—Barricaded inside the Vilnius televison tower, seized from the pro-independence authorities in a bloody attack, two ethnic Russian communists are the new masters of the Lithuanian airwaves.

"We are sending a message to all people, in the whole world fascism shall not pass", said Anatoliy Subotin, a steely-eyed former radio communications engineer who has worked in the broadcasting tower for the past 15 years.

Gennadiy Popov, his "co-chairman" and head of the "socialist federation of Lithuanian workers", said the Soviet Army was "invited" to storm the tower to "allow the opinions of the working people" to be broadcast.

He accused Lithuanian President Vytautas Landsbergis of muzzling opinion that did not coincide with those of his pro-independence government.

Outside the wire fences around the television transmitter, situated high on a hill in the Lithuanian capital, wreaths and burning candles pay a silent tribute to the 14 people killed and more than 100 injured when the Army stormed the television tower.

The assault was launched on request from the national salvation committee, backed by the pro-Moscow communist party which announced it was seizing power from the democratically-elected government.

Mr. Subotin, installed in a third floor office, says he rode on a tank to the television tower on January 13, and challenged a group of Western journalists to find any blood from the attack in the eerily empty building.

"Nobody was shot. Nobody was killed. Look there is no blood," he told visitors walking past the blown-out ground floor windows of the 21-storey tower, still guarded by armoured vehicles and armed troops.

"There should have been blood at the spot where a woman was supposedly run over by a tank. But there was no blood," he said.

Mr. Subotin denied he was a national salvation committee member, although he was identified as such by a young soldier guarding the tower's main entrance, linked to the building by a dimly-lit 250- metre (yards) tunnel.

Mr. Subotin charged that the Landsbergis government had come to power with the help of Western secret services and of the Roman Catholic Church "in order to restore a bourgeois and fascist order in Lithuania".

Since taking over the tower, Mr. Subotin and Mr. Popov decide on eight hours of daily programming to Vilnius on two Russian- language stations and one Polish-language channel with the "moral support" of the pro-Moscow party.

Of the 150 technicians and other employees in the tower only 20 now work there for "free, not even a kopeck", declared Mr. Subotin, who unsuccessfully demanded payment for the interview.

Other workers are afraid to return for fear of prosecution by the Lithuanian government, he said.

The television tower broadcast news programmes from Moscow, but has also aired a Benny Hill comedy show along with re-runs of concerts and films from the television archives. Members of the Lithuanian symphony orchestra and local artists have already protested at the broadcasting of their material by the Lithuanian television "occupiers".

Television staff invited to pick up their personal belongings from the tower have refused. The 2,000 Lithuanian journalists and technicians forcibly removed from their offices at the televison and radio centre on January 13 now broadcast from a room inside the fortified parliament.

But the signal from the parliament transmitter is not strong enough to cover all of Vilnius and attempts by Polish supporters to send more powerful equipment were blocked by Soviet border guards.

The Lithuanian authorities also have access to the transmittor in Kaunas, the former Lithuanian capital, which covers all the republic except Vilnius.

"There's never been such a precedent when the professionals are on the street and the amateurs in the television station," said Jonas Ramelis, head of television sports programmes.

The Lithuanian journalists are putting together four and a half hours of daily broadcasts, including news, chat shows and children programmes. Mr. Ramelis who worked his last shift at the television centre on the eve of the January 13 attack, said he saw no quick solution to the current situation. The deputy head of Soviet television, on a recent visit to Vilnius, refused to meet the journalists working for the Lituanian authorities.

Mr. Subotin said the situation could only change "once Gorbachev and Landsbergis reach an agreement". But that was unlikely to be soon, added Mr. Popov.

Damage to Tower Detailed

LD0302222591 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Russian 2015 GMT 3 Feb 91

[Text] According to the report issued by the State Commission for the Investigation of the Consequences of the Aggression by Soviet Troops in Lithuania, damage worth more than 1.6 billion rubles was done to the national economy of the republic—in particular 3.6 million rubles to the television tower, 14 million rubles to the television and radio complex, three million rubles to municipal services, and 1.5 million rubles to the publishing center.

It has already been reported by my colleagues today that a group of Lithuanian and foreign journalists—for them quite unexpectedly—was allowed into the television tower. The masters in military uniforms politely showed the guests around the ground floor, urging them to note that no traces of blood could be noticed anywhere. When the journalists asked how soon they would vacate the premises, and who would have to give orders for this, the serviemen answered that they did not obey either Gorbachev, Yedinstvo, or Landsbergis. They obeyed only—no, not the National Salvation Committee, as you might have thought—and by the way, colleagues, the journalists had also expected such an answer—but the Socialist Federation of Working People of the Republic, which is being suitably presented on the television and radio of Soviet Lithuania by, of course, Professor Kucherov.

It is curious that this organization had been sort of written off, and its existence almost forgotten, because it actually plays such an significant part in the political life of the republic.

Lithuanian Radio Resumes Moscow Broadcasts

LD0302171991 Moscow World Service in Russian 1225 GMT 3 Feb 91

[From the "DX-Club" program]

[Text] Lithuanian radio relays via a transmitter in Moscow Oblast have been resumed on frequencies of 6010 and 9675 khz. They were interrupted immediately after the tragic events in Vilnius on the night of 12-13 January.

Gorbunovs Calls for Independence Referendum

LD0202223391 Riga International Service in English 1830 GMT 2 Feb 91

[Text] Head of the Latvian parliament Anatolijs Gorbunovs has repeatedly pointed out during this week the necessity for Latvia to hold a referendum on the independence question. According to Gorbunovs the independence declaration passed by the Latvian parliament early last year may turn out to be an insufficient argument during the present constitutional crisis. The head of Latvia's parliament expressed his concern about lack of coordination between the three Baltic parliaments on the question of a referendum.

Gorbunovs Demands Transfer of Soviet Troops

LD0202193591 Riga International Service in English 1830 GMT 2 Feb 91

[Text] According to Anatolijs Gorbunovs, head of the Latvian parliament, there have been almost no concrete proposals on how to get out of the present stalemate in the Baltics-Kremlin relations. The thing Latvia can do at the moment, Gorbunovs stressed, is to work for a political consensus between different political forces in Latvia with regard to independence question. President of Latvian parliament Anatolijs Gorbunovs stressed during the council meeting yesterday that presidium of Latvian Parliament had also [word indistinct] Soviet parliament of stand of Latvian public with regard to the latest moves of the central Soviet authorities. The Republic of Latvia is an independent state, established with international rights, all questions regarding its statehood can only be resolved on an international level. Thus a referendum within this country carried out in accordance to the USSR law is impossible.

The decision of the Soviet Defense and Interior Ministries on joint army and military patrols as well as the granting of special powers to the KGB and militia to combat economic sabotage, according to Latvian Parliament decision, has no legal power in Latvia.

Anatolijs Gorbunovs, the head of the latvian Parliament, also categorically demanded all troop units participating in repression against civilians and local militia forces to be transferred to some place outside Latvian territory.

Latvian Legislature Rejects Joint Patrol Order

LD0102184291 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1600 GMT 1 Feb 91

[Report by correspondent Inard Skujins from Latvia]

[Text] I would like to start with the two latest decisions of the Latvian Supreme Soviet Presidium. The Supreme Soviet Presidium clarified its position regarding the union referendum. The Republic of Latvia categorically refuses to conduct any sort of referendum, organized in accordance with USSR legislation, on its territory. The reaction of the Supreme Soviet Presidium to the decree on joint patrols by the Army and police is also negative. The USSR president's decree is regarded as interference in Latvia's internal affairs and destabilizes the political situation in Latvia. It was made incumbent upon Anatolijs Gorbunovs, chairman of the Latvian Supreme Soviet, to set forth this position at the today's Federation Council session.

Colonel General Fedor Kuzmin, commander of the Baltic Military District, thinks that at the present moment there is no need to carry out joint patrols. If the need arises, this will be agreed upon with the republican leadership.

I received the following information after a meeting between Daynis Ivans, first deputy chairman of the Latvian Supreme Soviet, and journalists. Daynis Ivans and Foreign Minister Janis Jurkans have met the leaders of a number of western countries in the last two weeks, in particular the leaders of the United States, Canada, England, France, Germany, Austria, and Sweden. On his return from the United States and Canada, Daynis Ivans met journalists. In his words, the fact that the U.S.-Soviet summit has been postponed is presently the greatest diplomatic victory. Speaking at the U.S. Congress, Ivans dwelled upon one of Latvia's main demands—the internationalization of the Baltic issue by the United Nations and by other international organizations in order to make the Baltic parliaments and governments, at least, partially recognized as subjects of international law.

The Latvian Government has decided to increase salaries for health service and social security employees. But it should be noted here that the sum of 60 rubles is also included in their new salaries. This is compensation for rising food prices. The Latvian Government is allowing enterprises and organizations of entrepreneurs to pay their employees partly in foreign currency with effect from 1 March. Enterprises will have to transfer 10 percent of their hard currency income to Latvia's hard currency fund.

Interior Ministry Says No Joint Patrols in Riga

LD0202192291 Riga International Service in English 1830 GMT 2 Feb 91

[Text] There have been no joint army and militia patrols in the streets of the Latvian capital Riga, the Latvian Interior Ministry has informed yesterday. On 1 February President Gorbachev's decree on the joint army-militia patrols in all big cities were supposed to be implemented. A consensus has been reached between the parliament of Anatolijs Gorbunovs and Commander of the Soviet Baltic Military District General Kuzmin that such joint operations are not necessary.

Leningrad Journalist Nevzorov Attacked in Riga

LD0302151591 Moscow TASS in English 1500 GMT 3 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondent Galina Kuchina]

[Text] Riga February 3 TASS—A car carrying Leningrad journalist Aleksander Nevzorov and three servicemen of the Police Task Force came under fire in Riga at 2:00 today.

This happened one and a half kilometers away from the task force's rest base. Shots were fired at the car when it was heading towards the city and slowed down near a level crossing. The shootout lasted for ten minutes. Police believe that a hollow near the road saved their lives. The attack left no casualties.

Nevzorov filmed what was happening, but he is not sure about the quality of the film because it was too dark. The Volga car burned up as a result, as is believed, of a grenade hurled at it.

Two passengers of a Zhiguli car, suspected of involvement in the incident, were detained in an hour. Two radios, a diary of observations, in which the movement of the Nevzorov group and the task force was recorded, and a writing-pad with coded notes were found in the car belonging to the republic's Customs Department. The detainees carried identification cards of task force members.

Latvian Deputy Interior Minister Zenon Indrikov confirmed that, according to his information, the detained persons kept watch on the base of the Police Task Force. Indrikov said a group of investigators, including representatives of the USSR Public Prosecutor's Office and the Interior Ministry, dealt with the case.

Indrikov thinks that the incident can be explained only by someone's desire to heat up passions in the republic. "It is absolute nonsense as all problems can be solved peacefully," he said.

Hardly can the term "nonsense" explain what was done to Nevzorov's 600-Seconds programme broadcast in Latvia last Friday, on February 1. It was interrupted at the moment when Colonel Viktor Alksnis, a people's deputy of the USSR, was going to answer the journalist's question about how many weapons were supplied to Latvia and to whom they were supplied. The programme was replaced by a Latvian newscast.

RSFSR

RSFSR Supreme Soviet Holds Session 1 Feb

Session Detailed

LD0102214291

[Editorial Report] Moscow Central Television Second Program Network in Russian at 1857 GMT on 1 February, in its "RSFSR Supreme Soviet Diary" program, carries a 173-minute recording of proceedings of the 1 February session of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Supreme Soviet.

At 1857 GMT, the session opens with congratulations to RSFSR President Boris Yeltsin on his 60th birthday. Isakov takes the rostrum and recaps Yeltsin's biography, wishing him luck in the rebuilding of the Russian Federation. Deputies applaud.

Yeltsin thanks the deputies for their good wishes. He then proceeds to the business of the session. A draft resolution on the political situation in the RSFSR has been agreed upon and the deputies are asked to vote on it as it stands in the document they have before them.

At 1901 GMT, the result of the vote is announced: 168 for, 7 against, and 12 abstentions. Yeltsin asks the RSFSR Council of Ministers Chairman Ivan Silayev to take the floor to deliver a report on the results of the socioeconomic development of the RSFSR in 1990.

At 1902 GMT, Silayev delivers his 67-minute speech.

At 2009 GMT, Deputy (?Kazarov) then takes the floor and speaks of the banknote exchange in the Ulyanovsk oblast. He complains that people in the countryside are being unfairly treated, supplying produce in exchange for rubles for which nothing can be bought.

At 2015 GMT, Deputy Yuriy Grigoriyevich Gromov takes the floor. He says the RSFSR is a colony of the USSR. He quotes many foreign states' economic statistics.

Deputy Ispravnikov then takes the floor to raise some objections to the price reform proposals. The RSFSR legislature should decide that the proposals contravene the principles of economic reform in the republic, he says, describing compensation for price increases as political adventurism.

At 2027 GMT, Yeltsin gives the floor to Silayev, who answers deputies' questions. Concerning teachers' concern with payments, Silayev says that all payments for January will be made. He discusses the sale of goods in short supply to rural workers. Silayev says that he agrees with the deputies who think that the government should be more clearly defined and more personal. Regarding the decision on the market economy, it has not been ratified, Silayev says, because the time is not yet right. He asks the deputies to give the government until 15 March.

At 2035 GMT, Deputy Shakhray speaks on the draft referendum decision, which has two parts—on the RSFSR referendum and the RSFSR's attitude toward the Union referendum. He outlines the argument of some deputies who believe that the Union referendum cannot be held because the RSFSR Supreme Soviet has been blocked by the actions of local legislatures of autonomous republics and because the Union is disintegrating anyway. The RSFSR is trying to conclude treaties with other republics to prevent the Union from disintegration, he says.

Shakhray says the processes of disintegration have now touched the RSFSR too. He then considers various proposals on the way the RSFSR referendum should be held.

At 2150 GMT, a reporter says no decision was made on any other matter because there was no quorum, and the program concludes.

Silayev Addresses Supreme Soviet

LD0102224391 Moscow Central Television Second Program Network in Russian 1902 GMT 1 Feb 91

[Speech by Ivan Stepanovich Silayev, chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, RSFSR, Council of Ministers, at 1 February session of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet in the Kremlin—recorded]

[Text] First of all, I would like to respond to the alarm expressed by deputies on ensuring their safety and protection from encroachments and ensuring their honor and dignity. I consider that this formula is justified and the demands to the government and in particular to Comrade Barannikov [RSFSR minister of internal affairs] are also justified. Indeed, today the Moscow Metropolitan Police is not directly subordinate to the minister for internal affairs according to status. But this in no way means that we should not concern ourselves with this. We will therefore take measures both to ensure order and protection around this building of ours. I already issued an order somewhat earlier. I have received message to take protective measures at the residence of members of the Supreme Soviet and, obviously, we will adopt additional measures to ensure your dignity and to protect you from any encroachments.

Esteemed comrade deputies, the results of the social and economic development of the Russian Federation in 1990 are sufficiently detailed in the information of the RSFSR State Statistics Committee. They were also studied at the conference of the republic's Council of Ministers on the 22 January with the participation of the leaders of the Supreme Soviets belonging to the federation of people's deputies and their executive bodies. In this connection, the present report evidently does not need to dwell in detail on statistical data of the social and economic development of the republic last year, and I hope that you have these materials in tabular form.

Therefore, allow me to draw your attention to the matters indicated to the extent that it is necessary for the subsequent delineation of measures worked out by the government to stabilize the economy and transfer to market relations. 1990 was distinguished by the formation of many social relations, and the development of multiple models in the economy and the creation of a suitable legal basis.

The evolution of new types of economic activity, caused by the transfer to market relations, has continued. More than 1,600 industrial enterprises operate under leasehold conditions, which produced output worth 31 billion rubles [R], which represents more than 6 percent of the total volume of production as a whole. The basic figures for the work of leasehold enterprises are higher than in industry as a whole.

With the fall in the general volume of industrial production by 0.6 percent, production of output at leasehold enterprises grew by 3.7 percent, a lead of 4.3 percent. At present, 722 retail trade enterprises and 609 catering enterprises are working under leasehold conditions; their volume of retail goods turnover amounted to R39 billion, that is, 15 percent of the general goods turnover. Two-hundred and forty-seven enterprises have provided everyday services worth R500 million. This also constitutes an impressive figure—11 percent of the general volume of services.

Economic reform in the agro-industrial sector was accompanied by the expansion of lease relations and the creation of peasant farms. During the second half of 1990 the number of peasant farms registered at the executive committees of local soviets of people's deputies increased by almost five times. By 1 January 1991, there were 4,400. The process of forming peasant farms is going on particularly intensively in Leningrad, Novgorod, Volgograd, and Sakhalin oblasts, in the Checheno-Ingursk republic, and in the Krasnodar and Khabarovsk krays.

The process of forming a market infrastructure, especially in the banking system, insurance activities, and the formation of goods exchanges, is going on intensively. In the banking system there is the process of demonopolization which began in 1989 with the formation of a network of commercial and cooperative banks. Today, at the present time, there are more than 1,000 commercial banks.

Unfortunately, 1990 was marked by many negative phenomena and processes. The breaking of economic links between enterprises and the subjects of the federation and the USSR, the lack of balance of the consumer market, the disorder in the monetary system, and the weakening of production and technical discipline have caused a reduction in production volumes, a fall in its effectiveness and a worsening in food supplies and the quality of service for the population.

If we compare the indices of economic development of the federation with the total results for the whole country, then the comparison is not favorable for us. According to the state statistics committee, national revenue and labor productivity have fallen both in the Russian Federation and in the country as a whole. However, here the indices are 1.5 to 2 percent worse than the union ones, and are respectively 5.5 percent for national revenue and 5 percent for labor productivity.

The indices are relatively close for agriculture production. This can also be said about branches of industry such as construction, transport, and foreign trade. Here the indices were, at the very least, no worse than the all-union ones. And just for the production of industrial goods we have better results than the USSR as a whole. The volume of goods produced has fallen by 0.6 percent as compared to 1.2 percent for the country as a whole. The question arises: With the better position of industry, comparatively better, and with an approximately identical situation in agriculture and other branches, why has the national revenue generated in the Russian Federation fallen considerably more than in the country as a whole? There is one answer: The structure of the economy of the Russian Federation is deformed. In industry, where more than half of the national revenue is generated, the manufacture of capital goods here accounts for 75.4 percent and consumer items are less than a quarter, while world experience shows the effectiveness of the reverse correlation.

This disproportion was formed over decades and in essence reflects the damage to the interests of the Russian Federation in the interests of the union as a whole. For your information I will say that the proportion of consumer goods in the total volume of USSR production is: in the Russian Federation 24.6 percent, in Belorussia 32.8, in Latvia 48.7—almost half is in the sphere of production of consumer goods. This is also reflected in a more generalized index—the production of consumer goods per head of population. In the Russian Federation it is 1,229 rubles per head, in the Ukraine 1,275, in Belorussia 1,847 and in Latvia 2,581 rubles.

The result of all this is that the Russian Federation imports from other republics consumer goods to the value of 30 billion rubles, and exports 11.2 billion, that is almost three times less.

How can one fail to turn to the 500 days plan? The system of economic relations and of the management of the national economic complex which has been created here is guilty of the fact that in a rich country, the hard-working people are living at a level which does not at all correspond to the wealth of the territory, to its talents and efforts. People are living in a worse off way than they are working because either they are not doing what they themselves need, or because what is done by them is lost or not used. And really, given our colossal natural resources and talented people we could manufacture more necessary goods, as much as needed. That is our main task, today, tomorrow, and in the long term.

Despite the fact that the output of consumer goods rose by 7 percent in the republic, that turned out to be patently insufficient. In 1990, the volume of unsatisfied consumer demand exceeded R128 billion. The presence among the population of such a quantity of money which is not backed up by goods gave rise to agitated demand by purchasers and led to unprecedented pressure on the market. That is why the program for the stabilization of the consumer market provides for a set of economic measures aimed at stimulating higher growth of output of consumer goods. But I will speak of that later.

Obviously, the negative processes in the republic's national economy will continue in 1991. We forecast that national income will decrease by 3 percent, labor productivity by 0.5 percent, and industrial and agricultural production will remain at the previous level. It is possible that these assessments may seem too optimistic. That is not out of the question. In order to compensate for unforseen deviations, we have provided for an extrabudgetary stabilization fund and I would like to appeal to you here, too, esteemed comrade people's deputies, and to all of us, not to use that fund for other purposes. In this situation, the RSFSR Council of Ministers considers it necessary to concentrate its attention on the key guidelines determining the republic's social development. Taking account of the results last year, the RSFSR Council of Ministers has defined actions aimed at resolving the main tasks. They take account of the intentions and proposals of enterprises, organizations, the Council of Ministers of the republics, kray executive committees, and oblast executive committees. The key guidelines include forecasting evaluations of the most important indicators of the development of the republic's national economy, of the centralized capital investment quota, of the volume of deliveries of products for state needs, events to implement RSFSR state programs to eliminate the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear electric power station, and to develop the northern territories. Besides that, a special program for the stabilization of the consumer market has been drawn up and the appropriate resolutions have been adopted by the RSFSR Council of Ministers.

Comrades, in the present economic situation, we cannot limit ourselves to individual stop-gap measures. We believe that our main task is to take steps to stimulate the economy and support its main figure—the producer. It is not by redistributing our financial and material resources but by increeasing them that we will succeed in escaping from the crisis situation. The thrust of our action has been determined by us: accelerating the preparation and implementation of radical economic reform, whose aim it is to create the fundamentals of a market economy within 18 months to 2 years—a market economy capable both of developing itself and targeted at satisfying the demands of the people. Incidentally, that, too, is an extract from the 500- days program.

Allow me to recall the words of academician Shatalin in his famous article: "I Want to Vindicate Myself Before the People." Let us hasten back to the 500 days. If that is too short a time, then we will add another one day in the life of Ivan Denisovich [reference to Solzhenisyn book of the same name].

In recent times these proposals have been aired frequently from lofty rostrums, not least by Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin in his speeches, and by Presidents Nazarbayev and Akayev. We have analyzed the possibility of implementing this program, approved as it was by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, taking into account the actual socio-economic situation in the republic and the country. On the basis of the accords reached with various republics and of the economic and political agreements that have been signed with them, and also taking account of the processes that are developing on the territories and in the enterprises of the republics of the federation and the regions, we believe that—with certain modifications—the main thrusts of this program could still be implemented in Russia within the next two years. So far as such aspects as privatization, land reform, housing reform, support for commercial enterprise, demonopolization, and the development of competition, the restructuring of organizational structures, and the creation of a market infrastructure are concerned, the program could be implemented in its original format.

The plan for practical actions to implement these directions and program, including the elaboration of mechanism for the implementation of already adopted laws and those being adopted by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet on economic reform will be presented by the government in March. In this connection, I would like to ask the Supreme Soviet to accelerate the study and adoption of the following laws: on joint-stock companies and societies; on the limitation of monopolistic activity and the development of competition; on the privatization and creation of a housing market in the Russian Federation;

on amendments and additions to the housing code; on foreign investments; on commodities and stock exchanges; on a state tax service for the RSFSR, and a number of others.

In other areas, such as the stabilization of the money in circulation and the consumer market, the pricing, foreign economic, finance, and monetary credit system, we will be forced to introduce corrections taking into account the unrealized economic sovereignty of Russia and the as yet unimplemented division of authority between the republic and the center. We must also take into account the consequences of the actions taken by the center in these areas.

Here it should be said that these extremely important areas can be implemented totally only within the framework of a union program. However, such a chance was let slip, not by our doing, in October 1990. Unfortunately, today there is no guarantee that we will be able to do this on our own. Incidentally, in conditions of an increasing move to the right this is becoming a problematic reality of our economic sovereignty. However, it seems to me, there are still chances to stand our ground, and they must be used.

I want to dwell on questions of implementing the program for the transfer to the market in basic areas. Privatization of state property is a powerful factor in increasing the business activity of the population and in stabilizing the social and political situation in the republic. A man with his own house and piece of land, with shares or other financial assets is objectively interested in the stability of society and in social and national concord. And, on the contrary, our sad experience shows how dangerous for society, for its normal life, is the man who has nothing to lose.

The privatization program envisages the following: first, the creation of joint-stock companies on the basis of major and medium state enterprises and their associations. This process has already begun and is gaining strength in various branches of the economy, both under republic and union control. The Russian airlines, the Vnukovo aviation association, are changing into a joint-stock company, as are the Krasnodar cotton combine, the GUM [State Universal Stores] trade association, the Sterlitamak machine-tool construction company, MNIG [expansion unknown] eye surgery, and a number of other enterprises. At the moment, more than 60 major joint-stock companies are at the stage of being created. The process of changing lease enterprises into joint-stock companies is also beginning. It is possible to expect that in the first six months around 100 major joint-stock companies will be created.

The second direction of privatization is the sale of enterprises, of trade and public catering enterprises, enterprises catering for everyday repairs and other everyday services, and small industrial enterprises. The practical implementation of that part of the program will begin after the adoption of the law on privatization, which the government has presented for your examination. During 1991, it is planned to transfer 19,000 retail trade enterprises, 12,000 public catering enterprises, and 15,000 Rosbytsoyuz enterprises [union providing everyday services and repairs to the Russian population] from state ownership to ownership of individual citizens, collectives, and other forms of nongovernment ownership.

The third direction is the privatization of housing and facilities in the sociocultural sphere. That process will begin also after the adoption of the relevant legislative acts on housing reform.

The RSFSR Council of Ministers thinks it essential to examine already at this session the following proposals: to transfer free of charge to the ownership of the citizens of the republic the housing occuied by them within the limits of the existing health standards. In the event that the occupied area exceeds the health standards, this excess should be paid for by citizens according to amounts established by the local soviets of people's deputies. The dimension of housing transferred free of charge is not to be restricted for citizens whose income is below the living wage. For citizens with low incomes, below the poverty line, the government could propose a program of housing construction from the budget and transfer it to their ownership free of charge. The government could present the draft resolution of the Supreme Soviet on these proposals before 10 February.

The fourth direction is the selling off by labor collectives, economic associations, cooperatives, and the population of facilities whose construction is incomplete, of equipment which has not been installed, and other material and technical resources which have not been used. To these ends, the local soviets of people's deputies, together with the State Committee for the Management of State Property, will organize the stock-taking of such property at all enterprises, regardless of whom they are subordinate to, and it will subsequently be sold off through commodity stock-exchanges and auctions.

And another important direction is the sale of land, garden and country plots for the construction of houses and for running crofts.

These processes are regulated by the legislation adopted on land reform. The laws of the Russian Federation on land reform and peasant farms are creating favorable conditions for the formation in Russia of a farming structure. But the automatic process of farmerization will not come about by itself. Serious capital investments and radical restructuring of the whole system of agricultural training and laborious educational and organizational work are necessary. It is expedient to highlight two stages in it. The first stage is the resolution of the problem of land for those wishing to become farmers and the provision of minimum state support through finance and resources. All of this is provided for by the RSFSR Council of Ministers decision on support for peasant farms. It is important to implement it consistently in

1991 and 1992. The second stage is the elaboration and the realization of a complex Russian farmer program, planned for five years, including the creation of peasant farms on an area of from 5 to 7 million hectares, the directed construction of farming settlements with all the necessary production and social infrastructure, as well as the development of equipment for farms on the basis of large-scale conversion of military and civilian mechanical engineering.

We will also have to resolve the task of privatization within large agricultural establishments. This part of the general reform of property may be no less useful with regard to its socio-economic effect than the farm option. Internal privatization in the form of the introduction of joint stock, share, and group types of property has already been carried out in 30 of the republic's agricultural establishments. As a rule, the effect is quite large. A conscientious attitude to resources is developing. Profitability is increasing. Investment is increasing with stabilization of the wage fund.

Therefore, parallel with the work to develop farming programs, we will introduce a system of measures to reform the relation to property of sovkhozes and kolkhozes. The stabilization of the economy will also assist the following measures concerning land reform: The introduction in 1991 of a land tax on all categories of land; the creation of a Russian land bank; the allocation to citizens of land plots according to increased norms for carrying out supplementary personal farming over a total area of 300 million hectares; complete satisfaction of citizens' demand for orchard and garden allotments; the allocation for these purposes of approximately an extra 2.5 million hectares.

Inefficient kolkhozes and sovkhozes should be transformed into associations of peasant farms, cooperatives, and other forms of farming involving efficient economic management. Plots of land should be provided for individual housing construction. At the end of this section the government proposes the following: plots of land provided for permanent use by collective or individual horticulture, market gardening, and livestock breeding should be placed in the ownership of citizens either free of charge or for life with right of inheritance [as heard], as desired, within the earlier established limits. Rayon, city, and rural soviets of people's deputies with the participation of the organs of the RSFSR State Committee for Land Reform should issue documents establishing the right to the plots which are placed in ownership, that is, in the ownership of citizens for life with right of inheritance.

The size of the plots placed in the possession of citizens for collective and individual horticulure, gardening, and livestock farming should be increased up to one tenth of a hectare taking account of local conditions. In our view, this should be considered very urgently since it could be enforced in the agrarian sphere this coming spring and could in some measure bring more food on to the tables of our citizens.

The draft decision of the Supreme Soviet has been prepared by us and can be submitted within three days.

The government is working out measures to back up business initiative. The budget of the republic envisages means for the creation of a foundation to support initiative and to develop competition. This foundation will fund a financial and credit, and a material and technical back-up for the newly created small businesses and business firms working in top priority spheres such as the production of consumer goods and the processing of agricultural produce, housing, municipal and communal services, and the manufacture of construction materials.

A program to support young people's business initiative is being elaborated. It includes the establishment of networks of educational centers for training and retraining businessmen. Foreign specialists are being involved in drafting curricula at such colleges. It envisages business ethics and a code of businessman's honor, market principles and methods of economic management, price formation, taxation, finance, legislation, banking, psychology, and sociology. The fund will act as guarantor for loans advanced by commercial banks to graduates of such schools. The fund will order small, ready-to-assemble plants for the production of bricks and joinery, enterprises for the processing of agricultural produce, vehicle workshops, and so on. These small plants will be sold or leased to young entrepreneurs. We hope that these measures will make it possible to attract energetic young people into the production sphere and raise the prestige of honest enterprise.

Healthy competition is a most important factor in stimulating economic activity. The development of healthy competition requires the demonopoliation of production, the formation of a production structure which ensures that there are enough producers of each type of product engaged on the market, free access to the market by any economic component, state support for competition, and the prevention of monopolistic practices. A law on the restriction of monopolistic activities and the development of competition will be the legal basis for the implementation of antimonopoly policy. The draft has already been submitted to the Supreme Soviet. A program for the demonopolization of the economy is being worked out. This will include measures to stop the abuse of monopolitic positions by producers, to break up certain associations and enterprises, to develop competition, and to support entrepreneurs who are entering the market for the first time. There will also be measures to open the internal market to western goods, to authorize our own producers to have free access to western markets, and so on.

The organizational structures which grew up under the command system of administration impede the development of market relations. One of the tasks which has to be tackled during 1991 is the restructuring of the organizational structures of administration. The government supports the voluntary formation of independent associations and enterprises which decide to opt out of administrative structures. Experience shows that such voluntary associations and enterprises, whose management is based on completely democratic foundations, adapt themselves more speedily to market conditions. They establish their own intermediary, supply, marketing, and foreign trade organizations, information centers, commercial banks, and other elements of market infrastructure. Such associations are quicker to go over to durable horizontal links. They have fewer problems in obtaining supplies, including supplies of types of raw material, semifinished goods, and other wares of which there is the greatest shortage. They gear their production to the manufacture of goods which bring them the best return and which the republic needs most.

The concerns Ivanovskiy Tekstil, Rostfosfor, Rossiskiy Mekh, Kubanvinprom, and others—which have detached themselves from membership of the former ministries—may serve as examples of such associations. The formation of associations integrating scientific-commercial and agricultural enterprises is gaining important significance. Such are the associations (Kvantimpagro), (Yugoagrokont), (Emgaoris), and others. Associations are being set up which are using the potential set free as a result of conversion in order to resolve very important national tasks, such as the Association of Progressive Technology and Culture and (Agrokonvers).

At the present time, the process of the transition of enterprises from subordination to the union to the jurisdiction of Russia is actively underway. It needs to be said that as a result of our lack of readiness to actively accept their proposals, a certain degree of obstruction has been created and this has caused a certain lack of decisiveness and worry on the part of those wishing to work under the aegis of Russia. The Council of Ministers has considered this issue and has adopted a decision defining the procedure for such transition, regulating it precisely, and simplifying it to the maximum. We have received requests for transition from major enterprises of the USSR Ministry of the Medical Industry, almost all enterprises of the Ministry of the Timber Industry, a number of mines from the Ministry of the Coal Industry, as well as from a whole series of enterprises from machine-building and other branches of industry. New, progressive management structures are being set up on the basis of these enterprises.

At the same time there is a group of enterprises situated on the territory of various republics which have close scientific and technical and production links. Such enterprises are setting up interrepublican associations the status of which is defined by interrepublican, parliamentary agreements. We have signed the first such agreement with the leaders of the governments of Belorussia, the Ukraine, and Lithuania. This concerns machine-building enterprises.

A few words about financial, monetary, and credit policies. For the successful functioning of the budgetary and banking systems in the republic, stability in money circulation is required. However, the situation in this sphere has become much more acute. The sum of the excess of monetary income over the expenditure of the population reached 18.1 billion rubles last year, which almost two-fold exceeded the proposed figures, as calculated. We expect a reduction in this sum for 1991 to between 4 and 5 billion rubles through a number of measures including the privatization of property, the sale of shares, and so on. Work on the accumulation of free monetary resources by enterprises and by the population with the aid of loans and the sale of bonds and other securities will be a very important element in the recovery of money in circulation.

The policies implemented in the republic directed toward leaving a significant proportion of the financial resources at the disposal of enterprises, associations, and organizations will facilitate the formation of free monetary means which will be a source of replenishment for the resources of the bank and will create the conditions for increasing the credit facility and efficacity of banking activities.

The gradual changeover from budget financing to bank credits will make it possible to reduce the burden on the budget and, at the same time, will stimulate the economic subjects to a more rational and effective application of the credit resources which they have attracted.

It must be supposed that this process will be difficult and painful, as our enterprises, after many decades of functioning under the old structure, are not accustomed to using credits and prefer to have ready money. The prejudice has even sprung up that credit is very bad and that credit means ruin. One can speak about deformation in this sphere, too, when the whole world works on a credit system.

We consider that a serious role in strengthening financial and credit-money discipline has been played by the law adopted by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet on the Central Bank of the RSFSR and the setting up of a system of commercial banks. As is known, there was a lot of fuss about this decision, this law. There were protests, accusations, and reproaches, but today we can say that our national state bank of the RSFSR is confidently standing on its own two feet. The infrastructure is being set up, as I already said, in the form of commercial banks.

The ban on using the issuing of money directly to finance the deficit in the republican budget and the transfer of the central bank to come under the Supreme Soviet have made it possible to raise financial discipline and the commercial and credit activity of the executive bodies.

The relations of the apparatus of the Finance Ministry and the state bank are now, today, constructed on new stages and new principles. Business-like approaches and constructive cooperation have been established all the way from the rank and file workers up to the leaders. It is very important to keep this fundamental question within the conceived ideology, and we will facilitate this to the maximum. However, it must be said that it is necessary to remove some juridical obstacles connected with the operational cooperation between the republican government and the RSFSR State Bank.

Esteemed comrades, it is well known that none of the world's developed countries has state planning bodies similar to ours. The planning and regulating role there is played by the budgets. In essence, the revenue part of these is the forecast of the functioning of the economy, and the expenditure part is planning and management via financial levers. It is on the basis of these positions that the Council of Ministers has approached the formation of the financial-budget system of 1991 together with the commissions and committees and with the Supreme Soviet as a whole.

I think there is no need to run through a detailed analysis of the articles of the budget. This was discussed thoroughly at the Supreme Soviet session when the 1991 budget law was being adopted. In line with instructions from the Supreme Soviet, additional details of it will be reported by 15 February, following the work with the regions and republics, which is continuing. I'll just mention some of the basic points. Given that 100 percent of turnover tax remains in the republic, it is intended to put R31.4 billion into the local budgets, which is 2.2 times as much as last year. All of personal income tax also remains in the local budgets, as opposed to 50 percent last year. This will make it possible to increase the territories' revenue total under this article from R12.5 billion to R30 billion. Articles 4, 5, and 6 of the law give local bodies the opportunity to create additional sources for the revenue side of their budgets. The tax provisions that the budget is based on are directed at increasing the proportion of profit that remains at the disposal of businesses. With the introduction of the profit tax provisions, the rate at which such tax is levied from enterprises subordinated to the republic is limited to 38 percent. Given a forecast profit level for 1991 estimated at R190 billion, R124 billion remains at the disposal of enterprises, associations, and organizations for tackling matters to do with production development and financing social programs, which is R32.9 billion more than 1990. Moreover, as a result of incentives in individual areas of activity of enterprises, priority areas targeted at tackling social issues—the system of profit tax allowances has been widely applied. It is enshrined in our plans. As a result, an additional sum of around R20 billion, according to preliminary estimates, remains with RSFR businesses, businesses subordinated to the RSFSR for tackling matters to do with their own development.

Substantial changes have also been made to the expenditure side of the republican budget. This is the result, first and foremost, of the policy we have evolved for transitioning to market relations. The gist of the new budget policy lies in boosting the social and economic yield of budget allocations and providing social protection for the population, while pursuing unflagging work to combat the budget deficit. And although, as I am aware, words of criticism and dissatisfaction at the way it is planned to tackle problems in the agrocomplex in 1991 were levelled here yesterday, I'd like to remind you again that it is intended to channel budget allocations of around R30 billion, and specifically R21.9 billion into financing enterprises and organizations of the agroindustrial complex, which is more than double the 1990 level, and, taking the total of all the sums—republican and local budgets and enterprises' own funds—we have stipulated a proportion of spending from national income amounting to R15 billion. There will no doubt be questions on this. I will be pleased to answer them.

Apart from financing expenditure for the maintenance and development of institutions in the social and cultural sphere, it is planned to provide financial resources for implementing republican special purpose programs and measures from newly created republican funds.

The volume of the RSFSR budget, which has increased in 1991, and also the determining by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet of the areas needing budget resources and resources from the stabilization fund, will make it possible to maneuver these resources in the interests of stabilizing the economic situation in the republic, introducing market relations in the economy, and implementing the necessary social provision and protection of the population. This is a matter of raising the wages of the workers in public education and some other institutions of the social and cultural sphere, increasing the norms for food and medicines, and carrying out measures to strengthen the material and technical basis of these institutions, bearing in mind the priority provision of these in rural areas.

All of these questions are being resolved both from the budget and from the fund for stabilizing the economy. The mechanism which has been elaborated from the functioning of this fund makes it possible to accumulate resources to begin financing these measures. Undoubtedly, the stabilization of the republican financial position will not be possible without conducting a strict budget policy, keeping the budget deficit without fail within the limits, and covering the deficit by means of loans, the possibility of which is unfortunately limited.

It must not be ruled out that during the implementation of the budget if the forecast revenue is not received in full, it may be necessary to implement a direct reduction in some of the expenditure articles of the budget. So, the budget is very strained. Naturally, during the discussion of it most reproaches, dissatisfaction, and objections were heard concerning its expenditure. But the most intense work must be conducted, naturally headed by the government, on forming the revenue articles. What we have laid down and what we have expressed in the various revenue articles are only the monitoring guidelines. We need to organize work in such a way as to augment these revenue articles. This is because forthcoming events, which require us to provide more reliable protection of the population, require additional expenditure, too. On 22 January 1991, the Council of Ministers adopted a decision which endores the program to stabilize the consumer market. It contains a range of measures which ensure that production of consumer goods will increase. First and foremost, cost-effectiveness measures are being introduced. These will stimulate production and expansion at the existing production capacities. The point is, above all, to introduce exemptions on paying tax on profit obtained through marketing of consumer goods and services over and above the level attained in the corresponding period of last year, and this would also apply to enterprises where production of goods does not represent the main field of activity. Enterprises which produce consumer goods using local raw materials and waste products are also being exempted from paying the profits tax, apart from those that produce vodka, wine, beer, cigarettes, tobacco, plastics, and perfumery and cosmetics which contain spirits, on condition that the cost of the raw and other materials used for production purposes does not exceed 25 percent of the total cost of raw and other materials. Folk art and handicrafts enterprises are also being exempted from paying taxes. According to the calculations of the RSFSR's Sate Committee for the Economy, the additional expenditure connected wih the introduction of tax benefits which stimulate the production of consumer goods and the provision of paid services for the population will amount to R2.5 billion, a no mean sum. Its use, however, will make it possible, according to our estimates, to obtain about R15 billion worth of increase in the production of goods and in services. The program also provides for setting up new production facilities to produce consumer goods. More than R5 billion worth of capital investments will be made available for these purposes from the centralized sources of financing. Economic benefits are currently being defined, and the areas where these will apply include the customs regulations and the utilization by foreign investors of the facilities of the infrastructure in the sphere of production of goods and services. What is also envisaged is to increase the production of consumer goods at enterprises through conversion of industries and importation of these goods from other union republics in accordance with the agreements which have been entered. The program contains measures to ensure production of consumer goods using the centrally distributed material and technical resources.

In order to implement the measures to stimulate and increase goods production and the availability of paid services for the population, centralized funds have been created to support the consumer market. The source of their creation is the additional revenue from republican and local budgets gained by implementing measures for privatizing enterprises, introducing free prices, and so on.

By our calculations, the implementation of all measures outlined in the program will allow the tempo of growth in consumer goods production to increase by 2.5 times as compared to the indices obtained proceeding from proposals received from enterprises. The task is very difficult and it can only be solved by mobilizing possibilities and reserves. For this reason I appeal to all people's deputies to show maxium support for the mobilization of this difficult task, and in the first instance to support the efforts of local bodies to create and bring on line new capacities for producing consumer goods.

Unfortunately, in 1991 we cannot get by without purchasing imported consumer goods. We have discussed this question more than once and have quoted a figure of up to 10 billion rubles. Particularly acute is the question of purchasing a large amount of foodstuffs and raw materials for the textile and light industry, and also combine foods and other elements for guaranteeing the production of agricultural products. If we do not do this in the very near future our northern regions, industrial centers, Moscow, and Leningrad may end up without food, light and textile industry enterprises without raw materials, and peasants without combine foods.

Here I would like to say this: the joint efforts of the Union government, the state security bodies, and the press have forced your government, comrade deputies, into a hard currency trap. The Union government has deceived us by signing an agreement with us, as with other republics, on foodstuffs, and as yet has not given us one single hard ruble or bought a single tonne of grain and butter. I want to remind you that one of the points of this agreement provides for the purchase of 15 million tonnes of grain for us from centralized funds. As yet not a single tonne, not a single kilo, has been bought. Only what we have been able to do by making direct contacts with Canadian firms—that is 3 million tonnes of grain—today that is all we have at our disposal, including the needs for the production of combine food at our enterprises by our own efforts. Thus, this is the first thing. Barter deals and customs posts are closed to us and to our regions, and in practical terms we cannot have our own currency. The KGB bodies have unleashed a proper witch-hunt, supposedly against members of the Russian Government, seeking to catch them out, irrespective of methods and means. Insulting hints, suspicions, or even fabrictions have flooded the pages of many central newspapers and the cry is about to go up: Stop the thief, the Russian deputy chairman! We are already aware of other names with which, so to speak, they plan to concern themselves.

Unfortunately, the Supreme Soviet has not considered it possible to interest itself in the opinion of the Council of Ministers on this matter. It has organized an investigative commission without including anyone from the government, not even the justice minister. So the whole cabinet of the Council of Ministers is under suspicion today.

Recently, the Council of Ministers Presidium listened to information from Justice Minister Comrade Fedorov on this matter and noted that comrade Filshin did not take upon himself any legal obligations and has not violated any norms or rules. We sent this material to the commission investigating this activity two days ago. In conclusion, I want to say that the Council of Ministers is suprised by the mistrust and suspicion toward it from certain members of the Supreme Soviet. I ask forgiveness for this formulation of the issue.

Thus, this year products with a value of over R25 billion in foreign currency will be exported from the territory of the republic, but the government does not have the funds to resolve a minimum number of the most acute questions. I report to you, esteemed comrades, that as of 14 January our foreign currency account stands at minus R600,000.

What is the way out? Naturally, to seek energetically—and I refer this primarily to myself—to lift the ban on barter deals. How can it be that Chelyabinsk, Sverdlovsk, Krasnoyarsk, and other cities that have saved up crumb by crumb their potential and resources and that have agreed to exchange some products, mainly in the agricultural and foodstuffs area, are not allowed to do this? Thus, follows the lifting of the ban on barter deals for our enterprises and for the government and the opening of customs posts for us. Today, the only line open for us is the one connected with the realization of the harvest 1990 program. However, time is needed for this, and time does not wait. Of course, the main task is, this year, at least by next year, to achieve the guaranteed right to have at our disposal the main part of the foreign currency which is engendered on Russian territory in accordance with the existing scheme for allocations to local budgets. The main allocation is to the enterprise's income, and some goes to republican budget and fixed payments to the union to resolve certain obligatory tasks. However, this takes time, and time does not wait. Therefore, we put forward the proposal to the Supreme Soviet and ask it give the government the unrestricted right to hold talks and to conclude contracts to buy foodstuffs, nonfoodstuff goods, and raw material for the light and textile industry to a sum of R6-7 billion on conditions as favorable as possible. And here, I would like to say, esteemed comrades, that we understand all the responsibility of our actions. In some cases, we may display some lack of caution, but we understand the critical situation and the particular responsibility of the government for not permitting any serious exacerbations of the social and, if you like, the ethnic situation in the Russian Federation due to the absence of foodstuffs and consumer goods.

And here, I want to clarify our position, although this may already be the start of the next twist in the spiral of criticism of the Russian government. It means—once we are sure of the reliabilty of Western partners and having checked their reliability—using their suggestions, getting their articles supplied to our territory, marketing them for rubles, and granting the right to use at least 90 percent of the rubles thus earned, once again, in specified sectors of the RSFSR economy, and mainly the development and creation of capacities in the same priority areas. A legislative decision may have to be adopted on this. This has now become almost impossible, as "Operation Y" [the name of an old film with a farcical plot] has already affected potential reliable partners. Today, regrettbly, we are only talking abut R1 billion so far, but our partners are also waiting for this mammoth campaign to end. So, I'd ask for this matter to be considered and for us to be granted this right.

Esteemed comrade deputies, transitioning to a market economy is impossible without a radical reform of price-setting. The pricing system currently in place has become obsolete. A vast number of inconsistencies and distortions are concentrated in it, as nowhere else. The interconnection between the level of wholesale, procurement, and market prices has been servered. In many cases, prices do not reflect the profit level of output. Serious disproportions have arisen in the prices of output from different branches of the national economy, and above all industry and agriculture and the extracting and processing industries. The equivalent exchange between regions and republics has eben upset, and there has been a sharp intensification of redistributive relations in the national economy. Subsidies from the budget have increased. The establishment of prices for the overwhelming proportion of output is strictly centralized by the union bodies. As a result of all this, prices have ceased to act as an incentive for enterprises and individuals to step up their economic activity. The chief task we have to tackle in transitioning to a market economy is the creation of an interlinked system of wholesale, procurement, and retail prices and tariffs for services, the reduction of budget subsidies, and the gradual liberalization of prices as the market is supplied with goods and competition develops. New wholesale prices for industrial output have been brought in, as one knows, by the union bodies from 1 January 1991. The total increase is R335 billion for the RSFSR, which is 60 percent. The level of procurement prices for agricultural produce has been increased by R30 billion, or by 35 percent.

As a result, in 1991 30 percent of the budget—approximately R80 billion—will go to pay subsidies, and this is significantly higher than in 1980, practically 40 percent more. Unfortunately, one cannot conduct one's prices policy in isolation from the union. We became convinced of this through the example of the new wholesale prices, elaborated and introduced by the USSR State Committee for Prices. All republics criticized them in unison, and they introduced them as of 1 January 1991 in an even greater unison. Such is the real life and the conditions of economy as a single entity in the union. From the vantage point of 1988, which is when they were worked out, it would have been a progressive measure. However, in the space of those two years, our economy has undergone considerable deformations, and the overwhelming majority of its features is now negative. This is known and has been expressed in what has been said and in the evaluations, letters, and statements by numerous people who are in charge of enterprises, organizations, and collective and state farms. Unfortunately, a different system was not put forward, and they were introduced due to the fact that there was no way out of the situation. This is connected with the global monopoly in pricing: the proportion of prices set by the republic within the total volume of industrial output amounts to between 10 and 12 percent. Prices for the remaining output produced on the territory of the Russian Federation, that is to say, prices on 90 percent of what the Russian Federation produces, are controlled, defined, and set by the Union Committee for Prices. Naturally, this completely fails to be in keeping with the principles of the movement toward a market economy and, naturally, it will continue to be an area of serious economic and financial complications. Consequently, there is only one way out of this: to renounce prices set by directive and to go over to a market economy. In this case, it makes sense to regulate prices on a limited range of output, having agreed on this with the union republics. Regarding the critical situation which took shape in January that is connected to the production and deliverty of goods and considering the new wholesale prices for industrial output, on the one hand, and of the existing retail prices on the consumer market—this made itself felt particularly acutely in the production of the textiles and light industry—we have been compelled to introduce subsidies for consumers through the Ministry of Trade system. In essence, this is a 100 percent compensation for the population. On a monthly basis, it amounts to R4 billion. If we do not undertake anything, and we multiply this by the number of months, it will amount to almost R50 billion by way of additional subsidies. Thus, the total sum of subsidies would in this case reach R130 billion; that is to say, a half of the budget would be spent on subsidies. Consequently, not a single social program, whether big or small, planned by us through the budget and allocations from outside the budget for the year 1991 can, in this case, be fulfilled.

That is why the reform of retail prices is something that is urgently needed, without delay. The reform being proposed clearly ought to be implemented union-wide and introduced by a presidential decree throughout the entire country simultaneously. I want to emphasize again that the question of adopting a decision to change retail prices is the responsibility of the union bodies. This is because this question has arisen, in all its sharpness, in connection with the fact that the union government introduced new wholesale and purchasing prices while retail prices remained unchanged. In the situation that has taken shape, we see our main task as protecting the interests of the population of the republic through a complete or partial compensation of the additional expenditure incurred by the population, caused by the forthcoming alterations affecting the retail prices. Specifically, we envisage the following measures: a full compensation of expenditure connected with the increase of state prices for foodstuffs, payable to all categories of citizens; a differentiated compensation of expenditure on individual types of goods other than foodstuffs, payable to various groups of population, beginning with a 100 percent compensation for citizens on low incomes and ending with a minimal compensation for highly paid groups; a 100 percent compensation for all strata of the population for medicines, children's food, and goods from within the range of goods for children other than foodstuffs.

To retain the natural consumption norms in hospitals, kindergartens, schools, boarding schools, old age homes, homes for the infirm, and other establishments financed through the budget, it is planned to make additional essential financial resources available. We hope that the information about the new retail prices will be obtained by us not on the night preceding their introduction, but no less than two to three weeks prior to their introduction. In this case, we will be able to carry out our firm intention to make essential compensation payments to our citizens in good time. Finally, considering the fact that the introduction of free prices is inevitable in market conditions, it is esential that a mechanism for protecting citizens' incomes against possible losses is introduced legislatively. Positive experience has been accumulated in this respect worldwide, in countries which have developed market economy. What is envisaged, in particular, is making use of the indexation of the population's monetary incomes. The government of the republic has prepared a draft law on the indexation of the RSFSR population's incomes with account having been taken of the changed prices for consumer goods and services, and this draft law will be submitted for your examination over the next few days. Thus, it will be necessary to spend an additional R80 billion to implement the program for protecting the population, including R60 billion to compensate the population's additional expenditure caused by increased consumer goods prices, R13.7 billion for goods other than foodstuffs, and R6 billion to compensate hospitals. Free lunches will cost R1.2 billion. Well, I said hospitals, but it is compensation for easting in the canteens of hospitals, schools, and kindergartens, this sort of area. It will, nevertheless, be necessary to pay out between R32 billion and R35 billion by way of subsidies for enterprises which still remain unprofitable. This is because the level of prices that is being planned is such that it will not eliminate the subsidies—read loss-making—of individual areas in our industry, and this applies to the textiles industry, it applies to some types of municipal activities, and it applies to the processing industries of the agroindustrial complex. Thus, between R113 billion and R116 billion will be needed in total to compensate the population and to subsidise enterprises. Where is one to get these resources from? The 1991 budget lays down the sum of between R72 billion and R73 billion. We can actually obtain R20 billion. Consequently, it will be necessary to identify additional sources, from the harshest possible savings obtained with regard to all the expenditure articles of the budget to the introduction of excise duty on some essential goods. The relevant proposals on this score have been prepared.

Comrade deputies, in my report I have reflected the main directions of the activity of the government in the critical situation which has arisen today. As you can see, they also envisage urgent measures to localize the acute problems arising, and they lay the basis for economic stabilization in 1991. At the same time, we will continue our work in the main strategic direction of implementing the program for changing over to the market.

Esteemed comrades, a few days ago we completed the forming of the government. In the 200 days which have passed since the moment of the election, the appointment of the first members of the government have not been easy for us. The process of seeking forms and methods of work and totally new governmental structures was under way. The principles of interaction with each other and with the committees and commissions of the Supreme Soviet were worked out. All of this took place in a complcated and rapidly changing political and economic situation.

I would like to assure you, esteemed comrade deputies, that today our government is already a more mature and considerably more capable collective. The success of the work will depend not only on the government. What is required is vigorous joint work by the executive bodies at all levels; reliable support from the corps of deputies; and, of course, the trust of the Russian people. Thank you for your attention.

Further on Session

LD0102222991 Moscow TASS in English 2126 GMT 1 Feb 91

[Text] Moscow February 1 TASS—The Russian parliament discussed today the holding of two referenda—the Union and republican ones. No resolution was adopted after a long discussion.

The Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies, held late last year, decided to hold a referendum in the country on the problem of the preservation of the Soviet Union as a "renovated federation of equal sovereign republics". This is going to be the first such event in the history of the Soviet Union.

Many Russian legislators want to hold simultaneously another referendum, in order to find out people's attitude to the introduction of the post of president of the Russian Federation, elected by popular vote, and to the prospect of the existence of the Russian Federation as a sovereign federal state, integrated on a voluntary and equal basis into the Union of sovereign republics. This wording was supported by 400 deputies while, in accordance with the law, a referendum can be held if it is supported by 355 republican legislators.

Deputies to the Russian parliament are positive that the future of Russia is linked with the renovated Soviet Union. This stand was supported by two congresses of Russian people's deputies, held last year. Today, however, the wording of the suggestions, on which the referendum is to be held, became the subject of a keen discussion. The Russian legislators also argued whether or not the two referendums should be held simultaneously. Many suggestions and amendments were put forward. Various views were expressed, some of them in a most emphatic way, but no resolution was adopted.

Summing up the results of the discussion, Russian President Boris Yeltsin suggested that the work on the resolution should be continued and that consultations should be held with parliamentary groups, committees and commissions, so that the parliament would be able to resume the discussion of these issues in a few days.

Previously the parliament discussed the report on the economic and social situation of the republic, made by Russian Prime Minister Ivan Silayev. A draft resolution on this issue was described as "half-done" and was returned for finishing.

The last item of today's agenda—the ratification of Russia's treaties with Kazakhstan and Belorussia—was not discussed, because in the afternoon there was no quorum, needed for voting. And still Friday cannot be regarded as an empty day, because in the morning the parliament adopted a resolution on Yeltsin's report about a political situation in Russia, the discussion of which took ten days. This could be regarded as a sort of a present, given by the parliament to its leader, because Yeltsin was 60 on Friday.

Deputies Discuss Militias

LD0102120991 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0900 GMT 1 Feb 91

[Report by correspondent Olga Vasilenko]

[Text] Today's Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Supreme Soviet session started with kind, warm congratulations for Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin on his 60th birthday from Boris Vladimirovich Isakov, chairman of the Soviet of the Republic, both on behalf of his chamber and on behalf of the Soviet of Nationalities. There were flowers, too, but the chairman of Russia's Supreme Soviet very quickly passed on to work. After all, questions of extreme importance will be discussed: the results of economic and social development in Russia in 1990, the functioning of the republic's economoy, the RSFSR budget, and the prices policy in the current year. Nevertheless, time for discussion on the agenda was, as always, allocated. Just like yesterday, Deputy Batakov, from South Ossetia, spoke once more. He once again asked the Supreme Soviet whether it intended to help South Ossetia: Can we expect some protection from the Supreme Soviet?

The chairpersion said a special group of deputies would go there on 4 February, but a proposal was made that this should be done earlier, perhaps even today.

Deputy Tarasov, Artem Mikhaylovich, said the special purpose militia detachment on 28 January again conducted a search and removed cash and bookkeeping documents from the office of the (?Aris) service in

Sheremetyevo. This service is the very same foreign economic association that Tarasov is in charge of and is carrying out one of the programs of the Russian Government. Moreover, stock of the foreign economic association was confiscated from the storehouse. Attempts to enter association staff members' homes were made on 30 January. One of them, Kuznetsov, was taken away and in his presence they attempted to smash the door of the association's central office. Deputy Tarasov made an official deputies' protest and, as a member of the Mossovet executive committee, appealed to General Bogdanov, who is acting head of the Internal Affairs Directorate of the Moscow Executive Committee. He received the reply that sanctions and claims would be lodged when the Internal Affairs Directorate considers this necessary.

The deputy appealed for assistance to the RSFSR Procuracy and Internal Affairs Ministry and to the deputies' commission on human rights.

By the way, Artem Mikhaylovich, who yesterday participated in one of our live reports, has just arrived here, at our correspondent's position, and asked us to say that regarding this forecast for a change in the economic situation, he is prepared to apologize personally to the president, apologize to the president of the USSR, as Mikhail Sergeyevich regarded this economic hypothesis unacceptable. But, well, once he is prepared to apologize, this means that he will find a dignified way in which to do this.

There were also other questions at the session, concerning the ethics of deputies' conduct and calls for them to work more constructively.

The chairperson then proposed that a decision on the political situation in the RSFSR be adopted. This was already the fourth variant. The draft decision was proposed by the reconciliation commission of the chambers. This variant was adopted by a majority, so that the RSFSR Supreme Soviet has at last expressed its attitude to the events that took place in the republics and the regions and where fatalities were involved.

The main thing today, of course, is the report by Ivan Stepanovich Silayev, the head of the Russian Government. He just finished. It gave the deputies a very thorough analysis of the economic situation. Forecasts for the future are not at all gladdening, but in Silayev's view the 500 days plan can be implemented in Russia in the next two years with certain modifications. Ivan Stepanovich also said that it is very difficult for the Russian Government to work: there are many obstacles, and there is a lot of distrust and suspicion.

Adopts Decision on Domestic Situation

LD0102132491 Moscow TASS in English 1313 GMT 1 Feb 91

[Text] Moscow February 1 TASS—The Russian parliament condemns the illegal involvement of troops and paramilitary units in political conflicts, according to "the decision on the political situation in the Russian Federation" adopted today by the republican legislature.

Today's decision is the fifth version on the issue which was heatedly debated by the third session of the Russian parliament for ten days.

The final version which satisfied all parliamentary groups and was approved without discussion, was proposed by the Conciliation Commission of the Council of the Republic and the Council of Nationalities, the two chambers of the legislature.

The Russian Supreme Soviet called on the legislatures of Union republics "to take measures to ensure the equality of citizens, irrespective of their nationality, political affiliations" and other factors and "to prevent infringements on citizens' rights on their territories, including servicemen and members of their families".

The Russian parliament proposed that the all-Union legislature and Soviet president "include heads of union republics' legislatures in the USSR Defence Council and chairmen of appropriate councils of people's deputies in military councils of military districts".

Parliament expressed regret over the tragic events in republics and regions that had resulted in casualties.

The Russian legislature called on the peoples of the republic, workers and mass organisations to pool their efforts to consolidate society in order to settle urgent social and economic problems and to protect constitutional law and order and legally elected bodies of power.

The session proposed that the all-Union parliament and the Soviet president "accelerate drafting laws on the reform of the Army, the KGB and the Interior Ministry" and take measures "to disband and prevent the emergence of unconstitutional structures calling for the violent overthrow of legally elected bodies of power".

Yeltsin Spokesman on Interrepublic Agreement

LD0102144491 Moscow TASS in English 1411 GMT 1 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondent Boris Zverev]

[Text] Moscow February 1 TASS—Gennadiy Burbulis, a Russian presidential spokesman, said here today that working groups of the Ukraine, Belorussia, Kazakhstan and Russia would meet in Moscow on Monday to draft a quadripartite agreement.

Speaking at an all-Russian meeting of newspaper editors in Moscow today, he said the document, which has yet to be named, confirms "the stability of horizontal relations between republics".

Burbulis emphasised that the agreement sums up the current stage of bilateral agreements between Soviet republics. A multilateral agreement is needed today, Burbulis said adding that the interrepublican negotiating process "provides for the formation of a new union".

Western Republics

INTERFAX Cited on Ukrainian 'Radioactive Cloud'

LD0202180191 Berlin ADN in German 1655 GMT 2 Feb 91

[Text] Moscow (ADN)—In the Ukrainian area of the Carpathian mountains, a considerable increase in the radioactivity in the air and a passage of short-lived isotopes four meters above the ground was registered today, the independent Moscow news agency INTERFAX reported. The origins of the radioactive cloud are unknown. The local authorities responsible have called in scientists to investigate the situation.

Ukrainian Supreme Soviet Session Opens 1 Feb

LD0202103391 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1642 GMT 1 Feb 91

[By UKRINFORM-TASS correspondent Aleksey Petrunya]

[Text] Kiev, 1 Feb (TASS)—The third session of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet began today in Kiev. Without even discussing the agenda, the deputies adopted a decision under which coal mining and metallurgical industry enterprises in the Ukraine will become the property of the republic. In view of the emergence of new parties and public organizations in the republic, the membership of the Central Electoral Commission responsible for supervising the election of the Ukrainian people's deputies was enlarged. One of its tasks will be to organize the referendum in the republic on preserving the union, which is scheduled for 17 March.

The session, which will last until 28 June, will study about 60 bills; even this seemed too few to some deputies. They proposed that items on an economic zone in the Trans-Carpathian region, on the government's economic activities, on ethnic relations, on preparing a new Ukrainian constitution, and on nationalizing the CPSU's assets should be added to the session's agenda

The session adopted the text of a greetings telegram from the presidium of the republic's Supreme Soviet to Boris Yeltsin, chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet, on his 60th birthday.

Dnestr 'Republic' Ratifies Joint Patrol Decree

LD0102201191 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1900 GMT 1 Feb 91

[Text] The Supreme Soviet of the Dnestr republic, which was outlawed by a decree of the country's president and Moldova's Supreme Soviet, has begun a session in Tiraspol. In contrast to the Moldovan legislature, the Dnestr Supreme Soviet recognized that joint patrolling of Dnestr towns and villages by militia and military would be expedient. It has ratified the relevant decree of the USSR president. This had also been reported by the NOVOSTI agency.

Caucasus

Armenian Legislature Halts Presidential Decrees

LD0102152291 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1459 GMT 1 Feb 91

[Text] Yerevan, 1 Feb (ARMENPRESS-TASS)—The Armenian Supreme Soviet Presidium has adopted a decision to halt the operation of the USSR presidential decrees "on measures to ensure the struggle against economic sabotage and other crimes in the sphere of the economy" and "on cooperation between the militia and units of the Armed Forces in ensuring law and order and the struggle against crime" on the territory of the republic.

Georgia, Armenia Suspend Order on Patrols

LD0102145291 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 1 Feb 91

[Text] Here is a report from Tbilisi and Yerevan: The Georgian and Armenian Supreme Soviets decided to suspend on the territory of their republics the order concerning joint patrolling of large cities by militia and subunits of the USSR Armed Forces. It has been made incumbent on Georgia's internal ministry not to allow national militia employees to take part in patrolling. The Presidium of the Armenian Supreme Soviet thinks—an ARMENPRESS agency correspondent reports—that the joint order issued by the two union ministers is anticonstitutional and its execution could jeopardize the stabilization of the social and political situation in the republic.

Communal Violence Erupts in Ossetia, Georgia

Three Reported Killed

AU0102151291 Paris AFP in English 1455 GMT 1 Feb 91

[Text] Moscow, Feb 1 (AFP)—Three people were killed in communal violence in South Ossetia, an autonomous province "dissolved" and put under a state of emergency in December by the Georgian republic's secessionist leadership.

The Soviet INTERFAX news agency said the three died in an attack on the village of Otrevi, near South Ossetia's main town of Tskhinvali.

Two other people were injured and three homes set on fire in the attack, which the Soviet Interior Ministry said was carried out "most likely by Georgians," according to INTERFAX.

It was the latest of several clashes between the tiny Ossetian minority and militant Georgians in recent weeks, which Soviet Interior Minister Boris Pugo said has left some 20 dead and many injured in Tskhinvali.

INTERFAX said an attack was also made on the neighboring village of Artsevi, where 16 people were injured and three houses set on fire, though it gave no date.

The South Ossetian Autonomous Region, in northern Georgia, has been calling for a merger with North Ossetia, which is part of the Russian Federation.

In December, the Georgian leadership declared a state of emergency in the province and sent in militia reinforcements.

The government daily IZVESTIA said the Soviet military helped mediate a ceasefire in late January between local officials of South Ossetia and Georgian leaders.

Under the agreement, Georgian militiamen were to pull out of the region, the paper said.

USSR Militia Group Ambushed

LD0202151591 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 2 Feb 91

[Text] Contradictory information is coming in from South Ossetia. The press center of the Georgian MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] reported that, during the night of 30-31 January, the situation in Tskhinvali was relatively calm. There was no shooting, and there were no incidents apart from one fire at the home of a local resident which was put out by the fire brigade. Measures are being taken to further stabilize the situation in the town and its environs.

LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA [LENINIST BANNER], the newspaper of the Transcaucasus military district, reports that, on the night of 30-31 January, on the road from Tskhinvali to Tamarasheni, a homemade explosive device was detonated. An operational group from the USSR MVD that arrived on the scene was stopped and came under fire from an ambush. During the exchange of fire that ensued, one of the attackers was wounded, and four were seized and handed over to subunits of internal troops of the USSR MVD. All the attackers are Georgian fighters.

Workers Cut Off Locality's Power

LD0302174491 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1530 GMT 3 Feb 91

[Text] The next report is from the South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast. In accordance with a decision by Georgia's independent power workers union, electricity supplies to Tskhinvali and villages in Dzhavskiy Rayon have been cut off. The union says it has done this because the plight of local inhabitants who are Georgians has deteriorated.

The power workers' ultimatum has exacerbated the already tense situation in the area covered by the state of emergency. Industrial enterprises have ground to a halt. Hospitals are working under difficult conditions. Inhabitants in the oblast center are without heat. There is a danger that mines in Dzhavskiy Rayon will be flooded. Local residents have appealed to USSR Interior Ministry troops for help. The troops provided an escort through to generating stations and organized hot meals for children. They are helping to evacuate people from areas where armed clashes are taking place.

Georgian Party Leader Margiani Interviewed

PM3101102591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Jan 91 Second Edition p 2

[Interview with A.A. Margiani, first secretary of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee, by correspondent G. Lebanidze in Tbilisi; date not given; first two paragraphs are introduction: "Balance and Sobriety of Positions"]

[Text] Tbilisi—As is well known, at the second stage of the 28th Congress of the Communist Party of Georgia, A.A. Margiani was elected first secretary of its Central Committee. He is 45 years old and he has not held any high posts in the party hierarchy. He has been known only as a pretty good middle-echelon economic leader.

To the surprise of many people, himself included, Avtandil Antonovich was elected five months ago as first secretary of the Gardabanskiy party Raykom [rayon committee] and chairman of the rayon soviet of people's deputies. And now, on the wave of renewal, the Communists of the whole republic have recognized him as their leader.

[Lebanidze] The congress delegates had little knowledge of you, but you were elected in the first round. What is that, in your opinion: a covert protest against the over-familiar nomenclatura or the desire to promote a "strong-willed, resolute leader," as you were described at the congress?

[Margiani] I think something else had an effect here. To be frank, not long before the congress at the multiparty elections to the Supreme Soviet, I, among only a few party workers, got into parliament not on the party list, but on general grounds, that is by winning in my electoral district. The time has passed when a first secretary was almost automatically elected a deputy. Perhaps this time the congress delegates decided to elect a deputy as secretary. After all, in order to combine these two roles, today you have to withstand a very keen political struggle with your opponents.

Actually, the party ideals and principles essentially did not differ from the people's supreme morality. But today truth and veracity are not always interpreted in the same way, and to defend your convictions you do indeed sometimes need a sizeable share of courage. It is hard to persuade people who have lost their faith that neither the subtle methods of the leaders who usurped power nor the vulgar hairbrained schemes of those keen to level down and merge the peoples can discredit the great ideas of equality, fraternity, and social justice for which Communists fought. After all, the medieval inquisition and religious fanaticism have not discredited Christianity, for instance. It is naive to oppose Christian morality to communist morality: They are based on the same supreme general human norms and principles.

So, returning to your question, my nomination as candidate for the post of first secretary of the Central Committee was even more unexpected for me than the election. Nor did I have any formulated, polished program. And then I decided simply to impart what most concerned me as a communist. It is not programs which are in short supply today—there are more than enough of them—there is a shortage of purposefulness, sincerity, and faith in our own efforts.

[Lebanidze] Does the fact that of the 728 congress delegates, 61 have left the party—and, naturally, have been deprived of their deputies' powers—while of the remainder 240 delegates failed to appear for various reasons?

[Margiani] Such generalizations can hardly reflect the true picture. Some delegates, mainly representatives of the law enforcement organs, left the party in accordance with the decision of the republic's Supreme Soviet on the depoliticization of some state structures. Incidentally, the new statutes adopted at our congress legalizes the possibility of temporary suspension of party membership when it cannot be combined with the fulfillment of official duties. Many members of the delegations from autonomous formations did not come to the congress for political reasons and if their position is hard to accept, it is at any rate possible to understand it.

Unfortunately, there were also those who left the party out of faintheartedness or for considerations of expediency. I do not think that, when they join other parties and movements, they will serve them "heart and soul." They were hardly able to create the necessary political backdrop at our congress.

[Lebanidze] At the elections to the republic's Supreme Soviet the "Roundtable" bloc received the absolute majority of votes while the Georgian Communist Party got only about one-third of the seats in parliament. Many people assess that as a defeat.

[Margiani] We publicly proclaimed the renunciation of a monopoly and consequently we must gradually abandon some entrenched stereotypes. In any democratic society a party which has collected 30 percent of the votes independently without forming a bloc with anyone would consider the results of the elections to be positive and encouraging. We are not struggling for power but striving to serve the people's interests better. And this representation—which, incidentally, not a single other individual party or sociopolitical organization has—is entirely sufficient to defend our position and to worthily represent the working people's interests.

Although the results of the elections undoubtedly teach us a lot, they await dispassionate in-depth analysis and should serve as the basis for the further renewal of the territorial base and practical actions of the Georgian Communist Party.

[Lebanidze] One of a new leader's advantages is that, unburdened by the errors and blunders of the past, he has more moral right to speak of new goals and tasks.

[Margiani] In this case I would not start to give anyone priority for the moral right to speak on behalf of a renewed Georgian Communist Party. And in general recently, especially in the interval between the first and second stages of the congress, the communist party has, I believe, achieved quite a lot—pluralism and the multiparty system have become a natural feature of the republic's political and social life. And let no one try to argue that this could have been achieved without the Georgian Communist Party's active role. Aware of its responsibility, it led society in the channel of objective processes, avoiding civil antagonism with all ensuing consequences. And I think that many people give its due to this balanced, sober position.

It is no secret that certain forces are trying to argue that the communist party in Georgia is left without functions. The absurdity of such assertions is obvious. Our party intends to use its enormous potential primarily to defend democratic gains, because individual political movements are not averse to laying claim to a monopoly in society. And moreover some people are hankering after party property. We are prepared to dispose rationally of everything we have but only we ourselves can resolve such questions and we are already resolving them.

The Communist Party has elaborated a realistic program in the field of boosting Georgia's national economy. It can play an important role in dismantling many bureaucratic institutions in order to transfer with minimal losses to new forms and structures of power. The Communist Party's most important function is the social protection of the population, of the working people, and the solution of major social problems, of which there are quite a few. Thus, in Gardabanskiy Rayon alone, where I have worked, over 700 families of mountain-dwellers who have been the victims of natural disasters remain without a roof over their heads. Within the framework of the Samachablo fund created at the Communist Party's initiative it is planned to put an end to the problems of resettlers, including those from the North Caucasus regions.

At their 28th congress the Georgian Communists retained their loyalty to lofty social ideals in a new humanist interpretation and confirmed their autonomy and independence? In what form? The choice is very wide but in any case not in the form of self-isolation. That would be fatal to everyone, including the national-social movement in the republic. I should state that despite our own view of the problem, we have no fundamental differences with them. Moreover, we believe ourselves today to be not an opposition force but part of that movement in all questions of vital importance to Georgia, designating as our program goal the restoration and consolidation of the republic's state sovereignty.

[Lebanidze] What then is the Communist Party's position with regard to the Union treaty? As is well known, you were present at the Congress of USSR People's Deputies.

[Margiani] This problem has several aspects. One of them may be said to be the psychological aspect. The actual form of this treaty in the past so discredited itself that you cannot help associating it with our totalitarian past. The Georgian people respect the historic mission which the Russian people have fulfilled for centuries. And that is all the more reason why we do not have the right to allow the interests of the Russian people and any other people to be sacrificed again to imperial ambitions. Only the union republics' real sovereignty can be a guarantee here.

Yet some provisions of Rafik Nishanovich Nishanov's report merely confirmed our worst fears. The readiness to hand out sovereignties generously to everyone who wants them leaves open the main question: Of what then will the sovereignty of the union republics consist?

We are following with understanding the development of sociopolitical processes in the autonomous formations. But the problems of each autonomous formation are so individual and unique that they do not tolerate uniform approaches. At any rate under our conditions the expansion of the autonomous republics' sovereignty can be viewed only in the framework of the acquisition of full state sovereignty by Georgia as a whole.

All the 20th century experience of Georgian statehood attests that such sovereignty is not established by a stroke of the pen and is not asserted on account. A solid legal base and the review of unsubstantiated legal and other acts are needed. Firm economic and political foundations and guarantees are needed. That is why the Georgian parliament has considered that it is wrong to raise the question of the Union Treaty, at any rate for our republic, before the transitional period expires.

At the same time the communist party, remaining on the soil of realism, proceeds from the premise that, first, for all the changes in the republic's Constitution, the 1922 treaty on the formation of the USSR continues to operate. And, second, at the transitional stage it is essential to intensively develop both vertical and horizontal ties because it would be a mistake to destroy the economic and political mutual relations which have taken shape over centuries.

Central Asia

Union Referendum in Kazakhstan Set for 17 Mar

LD0202074991 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0030 GMT 2 Feb 91

[Text] A referendum will take place in Kazakhstan on the future of the USSR. Twenty-one constituencies, where a secret ballot will be held, have been formed to ensure that all inhabitants of the republic reply in a democratic way. However, it is not yet clear what kind of union will be voted for on 17 March—for a federation, confederation, or a third option, the AZIYA-PRESS AGENCY has reported.

Kirghiz Legislature Appeals for Talks on Baltics

LD0102101491 Moscow TASS in English 0828 GMT 1 Feb 91

[By TASS correspondent Boris Maynayev]

[Text] Frunze February 1 TASS—Kirghizia's Parliament issued an appeal to the Soviet Parliament and Baltic parliamentarians, expressing concern over events in the Soviet Baltic republics.

Deputies called for "negotiations, peaceful resolutions of disputes, and the protected interests of all social groups, nationalities, every individual". They denounced "the use of military force against the civilian population".

The Soviet Federation Council will meet in Moscow today to discuss the situation in the Baltic Republics.

20-Million Ruble Damage Seen in Tajik Quake

LD0102122591 Moscow TASS in English 1214 GMT 1 Feb 91

[By TASS-TAJIKTA correspondent Sadansho Nafasshoyev]

[Text] Khorog (Tajikistan) February 1 TASS—According to rough estimates, today's earthquake inflicted 20 million roubles worth of damage on the economy of the Soviet Pamir area. The quake, with an epicentre in the Pamirs, rocked virtually all of Tajikistan today at 02:08 Moscow time.

The two tremors measured between 6 and 7 on the 12-point scale.

Many houses, shops and medical establishments were destroyed in Khorog, the Pamir administrative centre, and surrounding villages. Republican authorities set up a special commission led by deputy chairman of the Gorno-Badakhshan regional council.

The quake triggered landslides and destroyed communications, power transmission lines and roads. Traffic came to a halt. Not a single Pamir village has reported casualties.

Tajhik Vice-President Izatullo Khayeyev came to the region to assess the situation.

Tajik Decree Creates Foreign Trade Ministry

LD3001212191 Dushanbe Domestic Service in Tajik 0005 GMT 30 Jan 91

[Text] Kakhar Makhkamov, president of the Tajik SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], has issued a decree establishing the republican Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations. In accordance with the presidential decree, Comrade Mirzotimur Mirzoyev has been appointed minister of Tajikistan foreign economic relations.

Similarly, President of the Tajik SSR Kakhar Makhkamov has issued a decree establishing the republican State Committee on Management of State Property. Comrade Ismatullo Khomidovich Karimov, in accordance with the presidential decree, has been appointed chairman of the Tajikistan State Committee on Management of State Property. In accordance with the presidential decree, Comrade Ismatullo Khomidovich Karimov has been relieved as chairman of the Tajikistan State Committee for Statistics in view of his appointment to another job.

Rostakhez Leaders Charged With Inciting Rioting

LD3001144291 Moscow TASS in English 1425 GMT 30 Jan 91

[By TASS-TADJIKTA correspondent Galina Gridneva]

[Text] Dushanbe January 30 TASS—The leaders of the public-political movement Rostakhez (Rebirth) have been charged with inciting rioting in the capital of the Soviet Central Asian Tajik republic in February 1990. The charges were brought by Amirkul Azimov, who heads a group of investigators at the Tajik chief prosecutor's office.

In his article, published in Tajik newspapers today, Azimov lists unconstitutional activities by this organisation, which has failed to register with the authorities in accordance with law.

Rostakhez has proclaimed that its chief aim is to revive the Tajik people in Central Asia.

"At the end of January and the beginning of February 1990," Azimov says, "Rostakhez functionaries began to spread false rumours about the mass arrival in the republic of several thousand Armenian refugees. They alleged that local authorities had already allocated houses for the refugees, openly infringing on the rights of the Republic's native population.

They called upon people to take part in unauthorized rallies and demand the resignation of the Republic's leadership. They urged protesters to use force if their demands were not met.

Some Rostakhez activists incited violent and destructive actions in the building of the Tajik Communist Party Central Committee and participated in mass unrest and rioting in the city's residential quarters, which led to bloodshed, Azimov said.

The article notes that Rostakhez leaders initiated the creation of the unconstitutional provisional committee, which claimed the power to fulfil all republican political and administrative functions.

A movement activist, Bozor Sabir, appeared on television to demand the resignation of the legitimate government and the formation of a new cabinet.

Azimov called "insolvent" Rostakhez leaders' plea that they were unaware of the tragic consequences their unconstitutional actions could entail.

The Tajik Supreme Court is expected to pass legal judgement on the activity of the movement after considering material presented by the investigators, the newspaper says.